[Advaita-l] [advaitin] rope has some problem in rope snake analogy :-)

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Vikram Ji,

My understanding is as follows.

Reg  // The snake is said to be imagined (as opposed to being pratyaksha or
directly perceived) because this adhyasa is of the nature of remembrance
(recollection) of an earlier experience in a different locus. In Vedanta
Paribhasha, recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana.//,

Not in my understanding of the Bhashya. No doubt recollection is not
accepted as pratyaksha pramana. That the snake is of the nature of
remembrance (recollection) is akhyAti vAda of Mimamsaka (Prabhakara). This
has been refuted in no uncertain terms by Sri Bhagavatpada. In the Advaita
Siddhanta as advanced by Sri Bhagavatpada, snake is actually *produced* by
avidyA. It gains its status of *pratyaksha* because the experience is **It
is a snake**. The *It is* part is *pratyaksha* in the sense it is pramAtru
bhAsya while the snake part is *pratyaksha* being sAkshi bhAsya. Vedanta
Paribhasha also mentions as follows while admitting this as pratyaksha

// अत एव च प्रातिभासिकरजतस्थले रजताकाराविद्यावृत्तिः साम्प्रदायिकैरङ्गीकृता
।//

// ata eva cha prAtibhAsikarajatasthale rajatAkArAvidyAvRRittiH
sAmpradAyikaira~NgIkRRitA | //.

Reg  // But this experience (prama) is not arising from a valid pratyaksha
pramana //,

Not exactly. Snake is sAkshi bhAsya. Are not hunger or thirst considered
pratyaksha? They are so because they are sAkshi bhAsya.

Reg // Being 'imagined' and 'experiencing as existing' are not opposites or
mutually exclusive //,

Not in my understanding. They are certainly mutually exclusive. *Imagined*
excludes any corresponding vastu as *existing*.

Reg  // Ignorance is the material cause of illusion //.

Are you considering Ignorance as a vastu (bhAvarUpa) or as absence of
knowledge? The doubt arises because of your followup statement  ** because
the cause is ignorance and not knowledge **. If vastu, then illusion also
is a vastu. If not, then both it and illusion are not  vastu. So the
question of one being the material cause of another does not arise.
Regards

On Wed, Dec 13, 2023 at 10:20 PM Vikram Jagannathan <vikkyjagan at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Namaskaram Shri Chandramouli ji,
>
> I believe your question / comment is one of semantics & standpoint. I do
> not see a contradiction. Kindly requesting you to please share what you
> mean by 'imagined' versus 'created' versus 'experienced as existing'. My
> intent is shared below.
>
> The snake is said to be imagined (as opposed to being pratyaksha or
> directly perceived) because this adhyasa is of the nature of remembrance
> (recollection) of an earlier experience in a different locus. In Vedanta
> Paribhasha, recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana. Of course,
> it is accepted that the snake is 'experienced as existing'. But this
> experience (prama) is not arising from a valid pratyaksha pramana. Being
> 'imagined' and 'experiencing as existing' are not opposites or mutually
> exclusive. The 'imagination' is vyavaharika reality and, as you said,
> 'experience as existing' is pratibhasika reality. As the pratibhasika
> reality is sublated by the vyavaharika knowledge, the recollection of
> earlier experience of the snake is understood to be an imagination. It is
> an imagination, again, since the snake does not actually exist in the rope
> but only appeared to exist as such.
>
> My understanding of 'creation' (manifestation) is that once created
> (manifested), the object is valid as a pratyaksha object. If the object is
> not pratyaksha post-creation, then it is a mere imagination in the
> vyavaharika sense.
>
> Moving on to BUBV-1-4-371, ajnana is the upadana karanam of
> "dvaitendrajala". Particularly, "indrajala" means illusion / art of magic,
> sorcery, jugglery, delusion etc. Ignorance is the material cause of
> illusion. In that way, it can be argued that illusion is 'created' by
> ignorance. Applying this to our rope-snake example, it can be argued that
> the snake is 'created' by the ignorance of rope. But this 'creation' does
> not have the same ontological reality as of the cause because the cause is
> ignorance and not knowledge. Thus, it is in a way differentiated from the
> other 'creation' with knowledge as the cause (such as a pot from a lump of
> clay) and is termed 'imagination', similar to "indrajala".
>
> with humble prostrations,
> Vikram
>
>
>
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