[Advaita-l] [advaitin] A Post-Shankara Advaitin says 'anādi ajnāna, etc. are mithyā'

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Jaishankarji,

You are quite right and I easily forget satkaryavada. Your 3 definitions
are helpful.



The issue is how does SSS warrant the accusation of reifying a second
entity onto PSA? It is more subtle than just upAdAnakAraNa. There is always
an implication of ‘something’ that is not Brahman with the notion of
mulavidya. Calling it anirvacaniya, maya or ‘not a tangible substance as it
avyakta (unmanifest) and sookshma (subtle),’ only disguises by implying
there is something which is avyakta, sookshma, or indefinable.



“mulAvidya is drishya as it is sAkshi-bhAsya and so it is mithyA.” –
reifying by way of both standpoint and explanation.

“So it is created every time a samsAri wakes up.” – the mere idea of
creation, of a samsAri ‘waking up’,  is the subtle second thing SSS refers
to in all the above.



However, none of this applies to simple error – adhyasa. Why add a cause to
adhyasa and all sorts of weighty explanation to that which is to be
sublated in the end anyway? Instead, simply recognize Sankara’s words that
adhyasa is prasiddha, anadi, naisargika – no cause necessary to prove


Claude responds to the remainder of your attack:


First, the Taittirīya maxim you turn against us — abhāvād bhāvotpattiḥ
sarvapramāṇavyākopaḥ — charging that we breed the waking saṃsārin from the
jñāna-abhāva of suṣupti. But we assert no utpatti. The whole force of
"naisargiko 'yaṃ loka-vyavahāraḥ" is anāditva: the saṃsāra is unoriginated.
Where nothing is produced, a maxim against production-from-absence has no
purchase. It binds precisely whoever needs a positive upādāna for an arisen
effect — i.e., the bhāvarūpa account. The pramāṇa tells against the side
that requires a bhāva, not against ours.

Second, the abhāva/bhāva pincer — "viśeṣaṇavattve bhāva eva syāt." A false
dilemma. Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha; it
is atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ — viparyaya-jñāna, erroneous cognition. A cognition
may be false and still be a cognition, bearing its phenomenal features
without being reified into insentient stuff. The abhāva-horn is not ours to
hold. It is mūlāvidyā that must be at once positive (bhāvarūpa), insentient
(jaḍa), and the negation of knowledge — Padmapāda's own gloss — and it is
that composite which strains the very logic you cite.

On naisargikatva: occurrent superimpositions do recur on each waking;
granted. But beginninglessness belongs to the series (bīja-aṅkura-nyāya),
not to a continuant dozing through suṣupti. To read a persisting positive
substrate out of the recurrence is to assume the reification under dispute
— no differently than inferring a stored homunculus from the daily return
of waking.

On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 3:48 AM V Subrahmanian <v.subrahmanian at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 2:37 AM Michael Chandra Cohen <
> michaelchandra108 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Namaste Subbuji,
>>
>> The accusation of a second thing in addition to Brahman stems from
>> mulavidya vada demanding a material cause.
>>
>
> Namaste Michael ji,
>
> A second thing in addition to Brahman means that such a second thing is
> also held to be unnegatable: paramārthika sattā. Such is not the case with
> the PSA.  In fact Padmapada's definition of mithyajnanam itself states that
> such an ajnanam is mithya. Shankara and Sureshwara accept that such
> ignorance yields a result. P.S.A., Shankara, and Sureshwara also state that
> true knowledge dispels ignorance and its effects. So, finally in all cases
> Brahman alone is the sole reality across all periods of time.
>
> Warm regards
>
>
>> Padmapada:
>> [" Mithyajnana nimitta iti
>> " 23—that which is mithya
>> (erroneous) and at the same time, ajnana (nescience) is mithyajnana.]
>> The word ' mithya ' means * inexpressible ' (anirvacanlya),
>> and by the word * ajnana ' is meant the potency of avidya which
>> is of the nature of insentience and is the negation of jnana. And
>> ' tannimitta ' means * having that (viz., mithyajnana) as the
>> material cause.'
>>
>> Siddhantabindu:
>>
>> *§57* नापि भ्रमसंशयतत्संस्कारपरम्पराऽरूपम्, अपरोक्षत्वात्,
>> अतीतानागतभ्रमसंशयतत्संस्काराणां चापरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुम् अशक्यत्वात्,
>> आवरणात्मकत्वात्, भ्रमाद्युत्पादनत्वाच् च । आत्मनो निर्विकारत्वात्,
>> अन्तःकरणादेश् च तज्जन्यत्वात् ।
>>
>> This nescience cannot be of the nature of delusion, doubt or a succession
>> of mental impressions caused by delusion or doubt, because it is directly
>> experienced. Delusions, doubts and their impressions which relate to the
>> past or to the future cannot be experienced directly at the present time. This
>> nescience cannot be mere negation because it is something which covers or
>> hides (the atman) and is the material cause of the delusion in the form
>> ‘I am a man, etc’. The self cannot be the cause of this delusion because it
>> is immutable. Nor can the mind, etc., be the cause of the delusion, because
>> they are themselves products of nescience.
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 29, 2026 at 1:37 PM V Subrahmanian <v.subrahmanian at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Michael ji,
>>>
>>> The following is what SSS says in a ‘Reply’, in a paper of 1930's
>>> (approx):
>>>
>>> // *AdhyAsa*, of course, presupposes ignorance or want of true
>>> knowledge. But this is a logical presupposition, a necessary implication of
>>> thought. No positive entity like the unfortunate *MUlAvidyA* can claim
>>> precedence in time over *adhyAsa; *for, as already said, time itself is
>>> its product.* Vedanta which predicates the unity of Brahman will be
>>> shattered to pieces, if a second entity not subjected to or originating
>>> from adhyAsa be for a moment conceded to exist. *The reality of the
>>> not-self (*anAtman) *follows necessarily from its not being *adhyAsa, *superimposed.
>>> I submit this vital aspect of the system to the learned Professor for his
>>> deep consideration.//
>>>
>>> It's clear that the writings of PSAs contain no evidence for a
>>> real-as-Brahman *MUlAvidyA. *On the contrary they have explicitly
>>> stated that such an Avidya is mithyā.  So, SSS's understanding of the PSA's
>>> position is evidently incorrect. He tried to refute something they never
>>> admitted or proposed.
>>>
>>> Sureshwaracharya too accepts Avidya producing effects and as mithyā too
>>> (that is, that which has no real existence in all three periods of time),
>>> just as the PSA that I have cited:
>>> तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसंयग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ।
>>> *अविद्या सह कार्येण नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥ *
>>>
>>> The Tattvamasi, etc. passages give rise to that knowledge which dispels
>>> the *avidya, along with its effects*, which is non-existent in all the
>>> three periods of time.
>>>
>>> If Avidya produces effects, it must inherently be a bhāvarupa entity.
>>> Also, if the mahavakya-generated knowledge must dispel something, it must
>>> be an existent thing, though not an ontological one.
>>>
>>> Thus there is absolutely nothing the PSA has said that contradicts
>>> Shankara, etc.
>>>
>>> regards
>>> subbu
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 29, 2026 at 5:46 PM Michael Chandra Cohen via Advaita-l <
>>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Namaste Subbuji,
>>>> "All the above prove unequivocally that proponents of the concept of
>>>> Mūlāvidyā do not consider it a real entity apart from Brahman."
>>>>
>>>> Devil is in the details. If Brahman alone is, then even the proposal of
>>>> a
>>>> perception that has an "indescribable ontological status" or is sadasat
>>>> vilakshana presents perception as other than Brahman.  Indetermnable is
>>>> doing ontological work - something is there that can't be determined.
>>>> The
>>>> idea of a 'real entity' is disguised in the need to find a cause of
>>>> perception with the weighty construct of avarana, vikshepa shakti, mula
>>>> and
>>>> tula avidya, and the need to posit a remainder following jnana termed
>>>> paramamukti.
>>>>
>>>>  Whereas mere error simply depends on the miscomprehension of 'Brahman
>>>> alone is'.  I don't wish to get into a debate here - just a
>>>> clarification
>>>> of a "real entity"
>>>>
>>>> Siddhanta Bindu,
>>>> *dṛśyatvād vināśitvāc ca paricchinnāpy avidyā nirvacanīyatvena
>>>> vicārāsahā
>>>> āvaraṇa-vikṣepa-śakti-dvayavatī sarvagataṃ cidātmānam āvṛṇoti, aṅgulir
>>>> iva
>>>> nayana-puraḥsthitā sūrya-maṇḍalam* —
>>>> “because it is seen and perishes, ignorance, though limited, is
>>>> indefinable
>>>> and incapable of withstanding inquiry; possessed of the two powers of
>>>> concealment and projection, it covers the all-pervading conscious Self,
>>>> like a finger held before the eye covers the disk of the sun.”
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jun 29, 2026 at 7:32 AM V Subrahmanian <
>>>> v.subrahmanian at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > Sri Achyutakrishnānanda Tirtha (17th–18th Century CE), who admits
>>>> > mūlāvidyā, also wrote a commentary on Sri Appayya Dikshita's
>>>> Siddhantaleśa
>>>> > Saṅgraha.  In his commentary, Vanamālā, on the Taittiriya Upanishad
>>>> > Bhashya, he says:
>>>> >
>>>> > एतेनानाद्यज्ञानादेरपि मिथ्यात्वं व्याख्यातम् , अज्ञानादेरपि चैतन्ये
>>>> > कादाचित्कत्वात् । न च हेत्वसिद्धिः, अज्ञानतत्सम्बन्धजीवत्वादीनां
>>>> विद्यया
>>>> > निवृत्तिश्रवणादित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः ।
>>>> >
>>>> > "By this, the *mithyātva *(illusoriness) of *beginningless ignorance
>>>> > (anādi-ajñāna)* and the like has also been explained, since ignorance
>>>> and
>>>> > the like are only occasional (kādācitka) in Consciousness (Chaitanya).
>>>> >
>>>> > Nor is the reason (hetu) unestablished (asiddha), because the
>>>> scriptures
>>>> > declare that ignorance, its connection (with the Self), jīva-hood,
>>>> and the
>>>> > like are removed by knowledge (vidyā). A more detailed discussion of
>>>> this
>>>> > is given elsewhere."
>>>> >
>>>> > Recently we saw another Post Shankara Advaitin also hold that avidya,
>>>> > etc. are mithya.
>>>> >
>>>> > Swami Vidyaranya, in his Anubhuti Prakasha has said:
>>>> >
>>>> > अविद्यादिनिवृत्तिश्च चैतन्यव्यतिरेकतः ।
>>>> >
>>>> > नास्तीत्येवमभिप्राय एवकारेण सूच्यते ॥ १८.२६९॥
>>>> >
>>>> > The cessation of anādi Avidya, etc. is also not distinct from Brahman.
>>>> >
>>>> > Here too the appearance/superimposition of Avidya, etc., on Brahman is
>>>> > admitted to be non-different from Brahman. This implies that Avidya,
>>>> etc.
>>>> > are only appearances in Brahman.
>>>> >
>>>> > All the above prove unequivocally that proponents of the concept of
>>>> Mūlāvidyā
>>>> > do not consider it a real entity apart from Brahman. In other words,
>>>> > admitting Mulavidya does not render Brahman un-Advaitic, meaning it
>>>> doesn't
>>>> > introduce a second entity.
>>>> >
>>>> > Warm regards
>>>> >
>>>> > subbu
>>>> >
>>>> > --
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