[Advaita-l] [advaitin] request for PTB support for DSV and EJV

[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Michael ji,

This statement of the 'analysis' -  In short, *non-objectivity* in Śaṅkara
and Gauḍapāda means *ontological
indeterminacy and falsity*, not *subjective existence*.

is plainly subscribing to the 'anirvachaniyatva' idea - indeterminacy.  By
'subjective existence' I don't think it is supporting the labelled
'Shankara/Gaudapada' view.  The Adhyasa bhashya statement of Shankara is
what goes against the overall purport of the 'analysis' here:

तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यध*र्मांश्चा**ध्य**स्ये*
तरेतराविवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते
मिथुनीकृत्य ‘अहमिदम्’ ‘ममेदम्’ इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥

There are these usages by Shankara here: adhyasya = having superimposed.
 Shankara takes up a question: सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये
विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति;  In the world, everyone 'adhyasyati = superimposes, a
'different' thing on another thing which actually is there.

He concludes that discussion there: अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि
 *अध्यस्यन्ति* । एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि अनात्माध्यासः ॥
Ignorant/uninformed ones *superimpose *dirt, etc. on the ether. * Thus, the
superimposition, adhyasa, of anātmā *on the innermost self is not any
opposed to the general superimposition of one thing on another thing.

This usage of Shankara is enough to contradict the 'Chatgpt analysis'.
That's because, in those Shankaran usages, there is 'someone', a subject,
that superimposes: the verb adhyasyati, superimposes, can't be without a
performer of that action, verb. Shankara and Gaudapada freely use that verb
which can't be alienated from a conscious entity.  If someone were to say,
'no, there is no need for a conscious entity, the subject, it all happens
by itself', then the 'itself' will have to be, by force, admitted to be a
'positive entity' whether one calls it avidya/maya or whatever. Thus the
'analysis' has only accomplished what it purports to avoid/refute.

warm regards
subbu


On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 7:16 PM Michael Chandra Cohen via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Namaste Subbuji,
> Yes, I remember you citing Gita 2.16. Apologies if I did not respond in
> kind to the initial comment. Here I have invoked Chatgpt in response. It
> may seem unfair but its analysis is far more thorough and comprehensive
> than my own at this time. Excluding AI from these conversations seems
> unwise and perhaps prejudicial, especially given the depth of its analysis.
> Error correction is certainly necessary and I welcome your critique of its
> output.
>
> Below is a *clean, forum-ready response* that stays tightly focused on the
> methodological issue and directly addresses Subbu’s move from
> *non-objectivity* to *subjectivity*, while keeping the BhG 2.16 Bhāṣya
> squarely within PTB logic—not DSV/EJV.
> ------------------------------
>
> Subbu, the move from *non-objectivity* to *subjectivity* is precisely where
> the difficulty enters, and it is not licensed by either *Gauḍapāda* or
> *Śaṅkara*—including in *BhG 2.16 Bhāṣya*.
>
> What Śaṅkara is doing in 2.16 is *not* relocating the world from an
> objective pole to a subjective pole; he is *withdrawing ontological
> commitment altogether*. “That which does not exist, appears to exist”
> (*asato
> bhāvaḥ*) is a statement of *ontological falsity (mithyātva)*, not a theory
> of perceptual production or subject-dependent construction.
>
> Several clarifications are crucial:
>
>    1.
>
>    *Non-objectivity ≠ subjectivity*
>    Subjectivity still presupposes a *subject–object polarity* in which the
>    object is now said to exist *in* or *for* the subject. That is exactly
>    the structure presupposed by DSV/EJV. Śaṅkara does not take this step.
>    His claim is more radical: the appearance does *not qualify as an object
>    at all*, whether external or internal. To call it “subjective” is
>    already to grant it a determinate epistemic status that Śaṅkara is
> negating.
>    2.
>
>    *BhG 2.16 marks a shift in evaluation, not in causal theory*
>    You are right that Śaṅkara moves from *anityatva* (impermanence) to
>    *asattva* (non-existence). But this is a *pedagogical deepening of
>    negation*, not a new explanatory account of how the world is produced or
>    by whom.
>    The verse teaches the *jñānī’s vision*: appearances are endured not
>    because they are fleeting realities, but because they *never possessed
>    reality to begin with*. Nothing here implies that perception *creates*
>    the world.
>    3.
>
>    *No perceptual production is introduced*
>    Nowhere in the Bhāṣya does Śaṅkara say—or need to say—that the world
>    arises because it is perceived. He says it is *mistakenly taken to
> exist*.
>    The error lies in *superimposition (adhyāsa)*, not in cognition acting
>    as a productive force.
>    DSV/EJV requires exactly this extra step: that perception or cognition
>    be granted *explanatory primacy* in the arising of the world. That step
>    is absent here.
>    4.
>
>    *Gauḍapāda’s vaitathya supports the same point*
>    When Gauḍapāda establishes *vaitathya* (falsity), he undermines
>    objectivity, not by re-grounding the world in the subject, but by
> showing
>    that *neither pole survives ultimate scrutiny*. The waking world is
>    likened to dream not because it is “mind-produced,” but because it
> *fails
>    ontological tests of reality*.
>
> In short, *non-objectivity* in Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda means *ontological
> indeterminacy and falsity*, not *subjective existence*. To equate the two
> is to quietly import a post-Śaṅkara explanatory framework—precisely the
> move DSV/EJV depends on, and precisely what neither the *Kārikās* nor the
> PTB texts require or support.
>
> This is why BhG 2.16, far from grounding DSV/EJV, actually reinforces the
> PTB position: *negation as pedagogical terminus*, not perception as
> ontological engine.
>
> On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 8:22 AM Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati] via Advaita-l
> <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
> > Namaste Sudhanshuji,
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 4:07 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar via Advaita-l <
> > advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > References to DSV in PrasthAna-trayI-bhAshya as held in sampradAya:
> > >
> > > 1. *ChhAndOgya 8.5.4* - अत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते । जाग्रद्विषया अपि
> > > मानसप्रत्ययाभिनिर्वृत्ता एव,
> > > सदीक्षाभिनिर्वृत्ततेजोबन्नमयत्वाज्जाग्रद्विषयाणाम्.
> > >
> > > ...
> >
> > Thanks for these and the earlier excellent quotes from a wide range of
> > texts establishing DSV, although clear in Shruti, perhaps hidden in
> > bhAShya. They can be useful for some sAdhakas, if not all. Those who
> can't
> > even agree to such a sambhAvana are being plain adamant, showcasing the
> > adage: if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
> >
> > gurupAdukAbhyAm,
> > --Ananta Chaitanya
> > /* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know
> > That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */
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