[Advaita-l] [advaitin] References to drishTi-srishTi-vAda in Shruti, BhAshya and works of sampradAya-vit-AchAryAs

[Raghav Kumar Dwivedula]

On Mon, 2 Feb 2026 at 7:56 PM, Sudhanshu Shekhar via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Namaste Michael ji.
>
> //The Māṇḍūkya Kārikās employ dream analogies, dṛśyatva-based inference,
> and citta-vikalpa language solely to negate the reality and origination of
> the waking world (MK 2.4–2.38), explicitly denying both physical and mental
> causation (MK 4.39, 4.71), and therefore do not support a dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi
> doctrine but culminate instead in uncompromising ajātivāda (MK 2.32;
> 4.71).//
>
> Sir, ajAti-vAda is apavAda. For adhyArOpa, shAstra provides either pariNAma
> or vivarta. Within vivarta, either DSV or SDV. Wherever dream is equated to
> waking, the adhyArOpa falls under DSV. MANDUkya unarguably equated waking
> and dream. So, for adhyArOpa, MANDUkya uses DSV.
>
> For apavAda, obviously there is ajAti.
>
> //Waking objects are illusory because they are perceived, not because they
> are mentally produced.//


Namaste Sudhanshu ji

>
>
> True. Mind itself is a perceived object


I don’t think SSSS accepts mind as a dṛśya. That is the point of
divergence. If they do, they cannot deny the coherence of DSV as a
prakriyā. If they deny mind is a dṛśya, that will have to be first
discussed in detail. (They appear to say that all dṛg-dṛśya-vyavahāra
presumes mind and so mind itself cannot be called dṛśya - that’s how they
manage to hold on to the straws of “avidyā is just antaḥkaraṇa doṣha”).
They do not accept the concept of sākṣi-vedya as a pramāṇa.

Also, SDV takes the entire set of dṛg-dṛśya-darśana triads and organizes
them in to two sets, waking and dream and privileges one set of triads over
another to start with.

DSV follows a more parsimonious scheme and asserts the need to examine only
the triad actually experienced (called the present moment in popular
parlance) as the starting point , ie DSV collapses all past and future
triads as merely useful *imagination* which occurs in the present moment
alone. Thus,  ajñāta-sattābhāva is asserted, which is anathema for the
SSSS’s abhāva prakriyā.


Om

Raghav


>
> //Gauḍapāda establishes *dṛśyatva* (being perceived) only as a *mark of
> falsity (vaitathya)*, using dream as the illustrative case—not as a causal
> principle of origination. *Citations:* MK *2.4*, *2.7*, *2.15*, *2.31*,
> *2.38//*
>
> And vaitathya implies prAtibhAsikatva. That is DSV.
>
> //Dream–waking parity functions exclusively as a negation of waking’s
> privileged reality.//
>
> What is "exclusively"? There is no difference between waking and dream.
> BhAshya tells in Aitareya "three dreams", "there is perception of
> non-existent objects in waking just as in dream". (Aitareya).
>
> Dream-waking identity establishes complete identity.
>
> //The analogy shows that waking objects are no more real than dream
> objects; it does *not* assert that perception brings objects into
> existence.//
>
> None has claimed that perception brings objects into existence.
>
> There are two views - drishTi is srishti. OR. drishTi and srishTi are at
> the same time. Neither claims that objects are brought in existence. The
> seen objects are non-existent appearances.
>
> //Calling waking the ‘cause’ of dream does not grant waking ontological
> reality.//
>
> DSV does not state that waking is cause of dream. So, unwarranted
> assertion. When there is no claim, where is the need for rebuttal. DSV
> rejects kArya-kAraNa-bhAva.
>
> //Here Gauḍapāda concedes causal language only to immediately *neutralize
> it*, stating that waking is called the cause of dream *without thereby
> being real*. This preserves explanatory usefulness while blocking
> ontological commitment.//
>
> Waking is stated as cause of dream in SDV. Not in DSV.
>
> //Siddhānta-bindu, however, *operationalizes this causal talk*, folding it
> into a DSV framework that treats cognition as a functional origin-point
> rather than a merely didactic posit.//
>
> Useless stuff. kArya-kAraNa-bhAva is denied by DSV.
>
> //*Jīvas are compared to dream-beings, magical beings, and conjured beings
> to deny real birth, not to affirm perceptual creation.//*
>
> Nothing is being affirmed. It is adhyArOpa.
>
> //These analogies are cumulative and decisive: dream-beings, magical
> beings, and conjured beings all appear without ever being born. The
> emphasis is not on *how* they appear, but on the fact that *appearance does
> not imply origination*.//
>
> Fine. "How" of appearance is adhyArOpa. SDV says sequential, DSV says
> simultaneous. Both are adhyArOpa. They don't imply origination.
>
> //Siddhānta-bindu shifts the force of these examples toward *mind-dependent
> projection*, thereby reintroducing a subtle form of production that the
> Kārikās are at pains to deny.//
>
> Incorrect. Emphasis is not on that. It is within adhyArOpa, which is
> subsequently rescinded, on which emphasis is placed.
>
> //Jīvas and objects are reduced to citta-vikalpa only to negate independent
> existence.//
>
> They have no existence. Not even "dependent" existence. There is appearance
> of existence.
>
> //Reduction of objects and jīvas to citta-vikalpa serves to dissolve their
> independent ontological status, not to elevate mind into a creative
> principle.//
>
> Mind itself is imagination..none is elevating mind to creative principle.
>
> //The citta itself is immediately shown to be non-separate from the seer,
> preventing its reification. Siddhānta-bindu nonetheless treats citta as the
> site where appearance is generated, thereby granting it an explanatory role
> foreign to Gauḍapāda’s strictly eliminative use.//
>
> All VedAnta texts refer mind to be a drishya and hence non-existent
> appearance.
>
> //Ajātivāda decisively precludes any dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi causal thesis.//
>
> ajAti is apavAda. DSV is adhyArOpa.
>
> apavAda and adhyArOpa go together hand in hand.
>
> //The declaration that “no jīva whatsoever is ever born” functions as a
> global constraint on interpretation, ruling out physical, mental, and
> perceptual origination alike. Ajātivāda leaves no conceptual space for even
> a momentary arising dependent on cognition.//
>
> This is true. It is apavAda.
>
> //Siddhānta-bindu affirms ajāti verbally, yet retains DSV explanatory
> language, creating an unresolved tension between denial of birth and
> accounts of perceptual emergence. *Citation:* MK *4.71//*
>
> This statement is made because it does not understand adhyArOpa. DSV is a
> tool to reach ajAti. SiddhAnta Bindu too states the ultimate truth as
> ajAti.
>
> //The final purport is universal non-origination, not perceptual
> idealism.//
>
> Of course. This is the final purport. To reach there, one goes through DSV.
>
> //All prior analogies and inferences culminate in the denial of origination
> altogether, not in the assertion that perception creates the world.
> *Citations:* MK *2.32*, *4.71//*
>
> This assertion is part of adhyArOpa.
>
> Regards.
> Sudhanshu Shekhar.
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