[Advaita-l] Avidya is virodha or abhava?

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Jaishankaji,
Here is a response to your first objection in your 12 page assail upon
SSSS. I take your arguments seriously - they deserve response. I will ask
your forgiveness but I have taken the assistance of Chatgpt to compensate
for my own scholarly limitation. However, I stand behind these comments
making note where I might disagree with Chat.

You pose a summary with 7 objections - let's deal one by one. First, //1.
नञ्pratyaya meaning in the word avidyA is vidyA-virodhi and not
vidyA-abhAva. I give supporting  statements from the bhAshya... ... नञ
्pratyaya
meaning

avidyA is vidyA prefixed with नञ् pratyaya. नञ् can have six different
meanings but the relevant  ones here are विरोधः (virOdha) and अभािः (abhAva).
jnAna-abhAva proponents claim in words like  avidyA and ajnAna it is jnAna
abhAva. The traditional teachers including my Guru taught us that in
avidyA and ajnAna the meaning is to be taken as jnAna virOdhi. Now I will
give BhAshya reference  where bhAshyakAra explicitly states avidyA is
vidyAvirOdhi

योऽयं लौकििो िैदििश्च व्यिहारः स उत्पन्नवििेिज्ञानस्य स्स्ितप्रज्ञस्य
अविद्यािाययत्िात्अविद्याननित्तृ ौ ननितयते, अविद्यायाश्च
विद्याविरोधात्ननिवृत्तः, इत्येतमिं स्फुटीिुिनय ्आह — BG 2.69 intro BhAshya

Here bhAshyakAra clearly states अविद्यायाश्च विद्याविरोधात्ननिवृत्तः -
avidyAyAsca
vidyAvirOdhAt  nivrttih - avidyA being opposed to vidya - its destruction.
This avidyA cannot be vyakta adhyAsa as  claimed by jnAna-abhAva proponents
as the BG verse is talking about the difference in a jnAni's  drishti
versus an ajnAni's drishti. So dvaita-perception is not a problem but how
one perceives is the  problem. So once mUlAvidyA is destroyed dvaita is
seen as asat and brahman alone is seen as sat.
Further Br Up. Bh 3.3 Intro he says अनभभव्यस््तः अज्ञानम ्अभभव्यस््तलक्षणेन
ज्ञानेन विरुध्यते ; - Ignorance which is non-manifestation (covering) is
opposed to Knowledge which manifests (brings to  light). //

& CHATGPT response to 'define (sic) jnana abhava in this passage':

To define *jñāna-abhāva* from the passage you've quoted—and *refute* its
acceptance in Śaṅkara's Advaita per *Swami Satchidānandendra Saraswati
(SSSS)*—we need to analyze the claims and their assumptions:
------------------------------
🔍 What This Passage Claims:

   1.

   *avidyā = jñāna-abhāva*, where *abhāva* is taken in the sense of
   "absence" (नञ् = अभावः).
   2.

   Some proponents argue that words like *avidyā* and *ajñāna* mean
simply *absence
   of knowledge*, i.e., *jñāna-abhāva*.
   3.

   The author here argues against that view, asserting that *avidyā should
   be understood as jñāna-virōdhi* (opposed to knowledge), not merely the
   *absence* of it.
   4.

   He supports this using Śaṅkara's *Bhagavad Gītā 2.69 bhāṣya* and
*Bṛhadāraṇyaka
   3.3 intro bhāṣya*, where Śaṅkara clearly uses the language of *virōdha*
   (opposition), not absence.

------------------------------
✅ Śaṅkara’s Actual Position:

The quotes *do* show that Śaṅkara says *avidyā is viruddha to vidyā*, but
this *does not refute jñāna-abhāva* *in the sense intended by Śaṅkara* and
*SSSS*. Here's why:
------------------------------
🧠 Definition of *jñāna-abhāva* (according to SSSS and Śaṅkara):

   -

   *Not ontological absence* (as in abhāva-padārtha),
   -

   But *epistemic non-apprehension* — *agrahaṇa*.
   -

   It is not the *complete absence* of the jñāna-śakti (power of
   knowledge), but *the absence of right knowledge of the Self* (ātmajñāna).

📘 As SSSS clarifies:

“avidyā is not a bhāva (entity), nor a total vacuum, but a beginningless
error (anādi adhyāsa) that results from non-apprehension (agrahaṇa),
leading to misapprehension (viparīta-grahaṇa).”

------------------------------
🔁 Reframing the Text’s Argument:

Let's carefully interpret the *two bhāṣya quotes* and see how they fit with
the *agrahaṇa* view.
------------------------------
📖 *BhG 2.69 bhāṣya (Intro)*:

*avidyāyāś ca vidyā-virōdhāt nivṛttiḥ* —
"Destruction of avidyā happens due to its being opposed to vidyā."

✅ This is correct, but does *not contradict* the definition of *avidyā as
jñāna-abhāva*.
In fact, *non-apprehension (agrahaṇa)* is naturally *opposed to knowledge*.
Knowledge *destroys* non-apprehension just as *light removes darkness*.

So, Śaṅkara using the term *virōdha (opposition)* does *not contradict* *abhāva
in the epistemic sense*. They are *complementary*, not exclusive.

🪶 *SSSS Explanation*:
He shows repeatedly in *Mūlāvidyā Nirāsa* that *abhāva* of jñāna is *only
relative*, not absolute—*it lasts only until true knowledge arises*. Thus,
the *virōdhatva* is *not proof of bhāvarūpa* avidyā, but a pointer to the
nature of knowledge: *it alone negates non-apprehension*.
------------------------------
📖 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.3 intro bhāṣya*:

*anabhivyaktasthaḥ ajñānam abhivyakti-lakṣaṇena jñānena virudhyate*
— "Ignorance which is in the form of non-manifestation is opposed to
knowledge, which is of the nature of manifestation."

Here Śaṅkara *explicitly calls ajñāna "anabhivyaktasthaḥ"* — i.e., it is
*non-manifestation* or *covering* (āvaraṇa), which SSSS explains as
*agrahaṇa*, not as a reified object.

✅ So this quote *actually supports* the idea that *avidyā is jñāna-abhāva
in the sense of anabhivyakti (non-manifestation of reality)*.
------------------------------
📌 Therefore, the Definition of *jñāna-abhāva* is:

Avidyā is *not a positive entity*, but the *non-apprehension (agrahaṇa)* of
the Self (ātman), which leads to misapprehension (viparīta-grahaṇa) such as
“I am the body,” and saṁśaya (doubt). It is *opposed to knowledge* not
because it is a separate force, but because when knowledge arises, the
error disappears, just as light dispels darkness.

------------------------------
🔨 SSSS’s Refutation of Reifying "virōdha":

SSSS explains that *later schools (like Vivaraṇa)* take virōdha to
imply *mutual
exclusion between two entities*—i.e., that avidyā is a bhāva opposing
another bhāva (vidyā).

SSSS responds:

“This is *not* Śaṅkara’s intent. His view is that *the arising of
Self-knowledge simply dispels the non-recognition*, as when a rope is
known, the snake disappears—not because the snake was a real ‘entity’ that
‘opposed’ the rope.”

Thus, the term *vidyā-virōdhi* is a *figurative description* of the
function of knowledge, not a statement about avidyā’s ontological status.
------------------------------
✅ Conclusion:

The term *jñāna-abhāva*, when understood properly per Śaṅkara and SSSS,
refers to:

An epistemic absence of Self-knowledge (*agrahaṇa*), not a positive entity
nor a reified *abhāva*. It is *dispellable by knowledge*, and hence said to
be *vidyā-virōdhi*. The term *virōdhi* describes the *mutual exclusivity of
appearance*, not the clash of substances.

Hence, the argument in your passage *misreads virōdha as refuting agrahaṇa*.
In fact, Śaṅkara’s own words (anabhivyakti, viruddha) confirm the *agrahaṇa
view* upheld by *SSSS*.