[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Does the Vivarana argument lead to an existent avidya? SSSS's comment

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om Michael ji.

--Any ignorance that is demonstrated by pramāṇas inevitably acquires the
> status of an object (prameya) and therefore existence (sattā).
>

How have you arrived at this conclusion that being prameya implies sattA?
Entire pramANa-prameya-vyavahAra is within the domain of ignorance, says
BhAshyakAra. Being within the domain of ignorance means, they are
non-existent appearances. So, just because
ignorance-coupled-with-adjectives is prameya does not imply that it has a
sattA.

Ignorance as a cause of the world cannot be a prameya, for the cause of
> superimposition cannot itself be accepted as superimposed.
>

The cause-effect-relationship is itself a product of ignorance. In a dream,
we see an illusory clay giving rise to an illusory pot through an illusory
cause-effect-relationship. Extending the same experiential analogy, an
illusory ignorance gives rise to an illusory world through an illusory
cause-effect-relationship. There is nothing incongruent here. Just as
illusory clay and illusory pot were prameya in the dream along with absence
of sattA, similarly ignorance-coupled-with-adjective-of-world-causehood is
prameya along with absence of sattA.

If you try to “know” avidyā by any pramāṇa you have already converted it
> into an ontological entity (bhāva), which is precisely what Śaṅkara never
> does.
>

What is known through pramANa is ignorance coupled with adjectives. These
adjectives are not sAkshi-bhAsya.

Sir, please analyse. Why are we both discussing the nature of ignorance,
but not the fact of ignorance? It is because we both agree on perception of
ignorance but we disagree on the nature of ignorance i.e. its adjectives.
Whether it is bhAvarUpa or abhAvarUpa, we disagree. But we agree on its
appearance. This itself clearly shows that avidyA is sAkshi-bhAsya but its
adjectives are not.

Now, abhAva is never sAkshi-bhAsya. It is always pramAtri-vedya. This shows
that sAkshi-bhAsya avidyA is not abhAva.



> Whether you call it “ignorance per se” or “qualified ignorance,” the
> moment you invoke arthāpatti, anumāna, pratyakṣa, etc., you have left
> Śaṅkara and entered the Vivaraṇa’s post-Śaṅkara construction.
>

Sir, Shankara is not a prophet whose words are to be believed on account of
having been spoken by Shankara. We are supposed to be seekers of truth and
not fanatic followers of a prophet. I do not distinguish between Shankara
and PrakAshatmA because the words of both are true. They are to be followed
on account of being true, and not on account of merely having been spoken
by them.

I explained to you that your inference of "prameyatva implies sattA" is
violated by dream-analogy. So, qualified-ignorance being prameya does not
mean that either ignorance or qualified-ignorance has any sattA.

We have no ignorance about ignorance. But we have ignorance about
qualified-ignorance. The ignorance about qualified-ignorance is removed
through pramANa. It however does not imply its sattA.

--Śaṅkara nowhere teaches a third ontological category apart from satya and
> asatya.
>

It has been explained a number of times that there is no third ontological
category. It has been categorically stated, even in this thread, that
ignorance is non-existent. So, your statement is putting words in the mouth
of the opponent. This is because of an incorrect understanding of the
opponent's views. When avidyA is stated to be sat-asat-vilakshaNa or
bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa, then its ontological status is not a matter of
discussion. Existence wise, it has been clearly said to be non-existent.
The existence which appears coupled to it is of the substratum.


> The term ‘anirvacanīya’ applies only to the *superimposed* object, not to
> the supposed ‘ignorance’ behind it.
>

Sir, is ignorance itself superimposed or not? If yes, then you yourself
admit that it will also be anirvachanIya. If not, then ignorance becomes
non-superimposed reality. Thus, you tie yourself in उभयतः पाशा रज्जु.

Śaṅkara uses ‘avidyā’ only as a name for the *fact* of adhyāsa, not for a
> substantive principle having real ontological status.
>

Enough has been said on it. And if despite having discussed it a number of
times, you think that VivaraNa holds ignorance as a substantive principle
having real ontological status, then there is some serious lack of capacity
to understand what the opponent is saying.

Regards.
Sudhanshu Shekhar.