[Advaita-l] Is difference known by perception?

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste,
One of the important concepts in advaita is the absolute identity of
everything. There is no difference whatsoever. The basis for this,
according to advaita, is the shruti, which talks of sarvAtmabhAva - the one
principle that is all - and denies any kind of multiplicity and difference
(नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन, नात्र काचन भिदास्ति, etc).

Other schools of philosophy argue that this universal identity is incorrect
- arguing that difference is known either directly through perception, or
through inference, or by presumption (arthApatti). In this context, an
interesting discussion arises in the Advaita Siddhi, borrowing heavily from
the ideas outlined in the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya of Sriharsha.

We will consider the first proposition - that difference is known through
perception - in this email.

The basic argument of other schools is that if the two objects, whose
difference we are going to consider for discussion, are known through
perception, the difference also must be known through perception.

One sub-group within this view holds that the knowledge of the object is
also the knowledge of the difference of the object versus other objects -
that is, svarUpa jnAna itself is bheda jnAna. Another group holds that the
knowledge of difference is different, arriving simultaneously, or
subsequent to the knowledge of the object.

Is svarUpa jnAna bheda jnAna?

The advaitin's argument is that the cognition of difference cannot be the
same as the cognition of the object. If that were to be the case, there
would be no erroneous cognition of identity at all. When anyone sees a
shell, they would see the difference of shell with everything else in the
world. The erroneous cognition of the identity of silver with shell would
never occur.

In the prAbhAkara school of pUrva mImAmsa, which believes in the akhyAti
theory of error, there is no error at all in the cognition "this is silver"
when a shell is seen. Rather, they hold that there are two cognitions -
one, a perception of the proximate shell as "this", and another, the memory
of "silver", triggered by the shininess of the shell. Because both
cognitions arise temporally close to each other, the seer does not
differentiate between perception and memory, and conflates the two into the
cognition  "this is silver". A perception and memory are different and when
they are both seen, their difference should also be automatically seen, so
why does the person conflate the two?

Thus, there are instances where the absence of the perception of
difference  leads to a particular activity. If difference were universally
perceived whenever an object was perceived, the activities dependent on the
lack of perception of difference, would not occur.

Moreover, even the group that holds that the perception of the object is
the perception of difference has to admit that the perception of a pot as
endowed with potness (ghaTatva prakAraka ghaTa jnAna) and the perception of
difference as endowed with difference-ness (bhedatva prakAraka bheda jnAna)
are different.

Does svarUpa jnAna lead to bheda jnAna?

Coming to the second sub-group - this group holds that the perception of
difference is different from the perception of the object, but it
necessarily occurs after the perception of the object.

The advaitin's argument is that such a view leads to infinite regress.
Everyone admits that as a rule, the perception of difference requires the
perception of the objects as its cause. This perception of difference will
have to be different from the perception of the objects, because if it is
identical, we will have to say that perception of difference causes itself,
which would be logically flawed.

Now, the shruti says that all objects are identical. The opponent argues
that that is not the case, because there is an independent perception of
difference between the pot and the cloth, and that perception overrules the
shruti.

However, what reveals that such a perception is different from the
anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the pot and the cloth, whose difference the
difference-cognition reveals)? In the absence of any other cognition
revealing that difference, the shruti which reveals identity will prevail,
and that difference-cognition ends up identical with the object pair. If it
ends up identical with the objects, this suffers from the same flaw
identified where bhedajnAna was the same as svarUpa jnAna.

Thus, in order for that difference-cognition (say cognition-1) to reveal
difference, another difference-cognition (cognition-2) will have to reveal
the difference (difference-2) between cognition-1, its object
(difference-1), and the anuyogi-pratiyogi-pair for difference-1. For
cognition-2 to reveal difference-2, we need cognition-3, and so on and so
forth, leading to infinite regress.

There would be no possibility of sleep, or the cognition of anything else.

To avoid this, it may be argued, that such an infinite regress is not
necessary, and that at some point, there is a final difference-cognition
that reveals the difference between cognition-(n-1) and cognition-(n-2).

However, there is no other cognition that will reveal the difference
between the final difference-cognition (cognition-n), difference-n, and its
anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the previous pair of difference cognitions). That
final difference-cognition is therefore defenceless against the shruti
revealed cognition of identity, and so, it will end up identical with all
of the above. Similarly, each difference-cognition becomes identical with
its previous pair of difference-cognitions, and their difference. This goes
all the way back to the first difference-cognition, which becomes identical
with the pot, the cloth and the difference between the two.

Thus there is no independent perception of difference that is not identical
with the pot and the cloth themselves. That being the case, there is no
cognition to overrule the shruti which teaches that there is no difference
at all, and the pot and the cloth end up identical.  Not just that pair,
but that is true for every pair of objects.

Here, it may be argued that even if the difference-cognition is identical
to the difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals,
it can still reveal difference. However, by this, it follows that the pair
of objects themselves are identical (because each is identical with the
difference-cognition). That being so, the cognition is both revealing the
difference between the object pair and their identity. In other words, the
cognition is overruling itself.

To avoid this that the difference exists, but there is no need to know it.
That is, the difference-cognition is different to the difference and to the
pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but there is no need for
another cognition to reveal such a difference. However, then what is to say
that the cognition has difference as its object and therefore it is valid?

Thus, the position that difference is perceived is invalidated.

Sriharsha invokes a military example from the nitishAstra in the
khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya to illustrate this.

सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||

The king desirous of victory has to face up to a series of foes - starting
from the enemy king, his friends, the king's secondary enemy, their friends
etc. and all the way to the पार्ष्णिग्राह, the final line of defence, foot
soliders. Even if the king has traveled very far and has defeated everyone
else, if he is defeated by the last man standing, he suffers a defeat.
Similarly, the series of cognitions (required to overrule shruti) may
travel very far, and prove many things, but the entire sequence gets
overthrown by the advaita shruti in the end.

We will consider a refutation of the view that difference is known by
inference and presumption separately.

Kind regards,
Venkatraghavan