[Advaita-l] HH Sri Paramananda Bharathi Swamiji attained mukti

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om Venkataraghavan ji,



1. //Everyone has the direct experience of ignorance. It is certainly
possible to infer ignorance, but the natural experience is one of
perception. The same applies to brahma jnAna. If someone asks you do you
have brahma jnAna, you will either say yes or no based on your sAkshi
pratyaksha, not inferring it from the presence or absence of the effects of
samsAra nivritti. If it is insisted that ignorance is only inferred, then
your knowledge of my ignorance is as good as my knowledge of my ignorance,
which clearly militates against common sense.//



Well any vishesha-jnAna has a corresponding vritti to it. Now I have never
had the experience of BrahmAkAra-vritti or AtmAkAra-vritti. I don’t have
even the remotest idea of it. It is just like dwindigoe for me. I just
don’t know what it means. However, on the basis of Shruti I know that
Brahma-jnAna i.e. a jnAna with BrahmAkAra-vritti is always accompanied with
absence of shoka-moha. These shoka-moha being sAkshi-vedya, I can pretty
well tell their absence also in my own case and hence I can infer the
absence of Brahma-jnAna.



I understand your statement that the presence or absence of Brahma-jnAna
itself is sAkshi-vedya but since Brahma-jnAna is like a dwindigoe for me, I
am not able to quite appreciate this.


// If it is insisted that ignorance is only inferred, then your knowledge
of my ignorance is as good as my knowledge of my ignorance, which clearly
militates against common sense.//



How exactly? I infer my ignorance on the basis of my sAkshi-vedya-jnAna of
presence of shoka-moha. However, I cannot know whether shoka-moha is there
in you or not. Hence, I can never infer ignorance in you. Hence my
knowledge of my ignorance is valid whereas my knowledge of your ignorance
will remain a guess work.



//While in nyAya it is held that the pramANa responsible for the cognisance
of the pratiyogi is the one responsible for the cognisance of its abhAva,
in advaita that does not hold good. The pramANa for the cognisance of the
pratiyogi can be any of the other five, but the cognisance of the absence
of something is always anupalabdhi.

Ignorance, on the other hand, is not accepted within advaita as pramANa
siddham, but sAkshi vedyam. So that itself indicates that the nature of
ignorance is not of the nature of absence.//



We will discuss this aspect later. There is a view in advaita itself that
BhAshyakAra does not admit anupalabdhi as a pramANa. We may take it up
later.



//2) Be that as it may, if I say "ghaTo nAsti", the counterpositive of that
absence is the pot. The pot contains many attributes, but the one that is
relevant for its counterpositiveness is the one that appears in the
counterpositive in the cognition of its absence. So here, that attribute is
potness. This is the pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma. Similarly, if I say
"jnAnam nAsti", the pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma is jnAnatvam. So if there
is even one jnAna, the cognition "jnAnam nAsti" cannot arise because the
pratiyogitAvacChedaka avacChinnam is virodhi to abhAva jAnam.//



How I think is as follows. BhUtala is anuyogi. Ghata is the pratiyogi.
Ghatatva is the pratiyogita-avachchedaka. And the abhAva (ghatAbhAva) is
nirUpita by the pratiyogitA which is avachchinna by ghatatva and also by
samyoga sambandha. We substitute ghata by jnAnam and thus jnAnabhAva is
basically that abhAva which is nirUpita by the pratiyogitA which is
avachchinna by jnAnatvam (and tAdAtmya sambandha in my opinion – though I
am not very sure of it). However, when ajnAna is stated as jnAbhAva, it is
not an abhAva which is nirUpita by a pratiyogita which is avachchinna by
general jnAnatvam but by something else because they hold ajnAna as
Brahma-jnAna-abhAva. That is, it is the absence of a vishesha-jnAna namely
Brahma-jnAna. And that involves a certain mano-vritti which is the
visheshani-bhUta-dharma of jnAna.



//Now if it is argued that when I say brahmajnAnam nAsti, what is meant is
not that I do not know brahman at all, but that a particular jnAna about it
is absent, the question that will be asked is how do you know that there is
a particular jnAna? If it is said that because I know there is a thing
called brahma jnAna, it follows that there is a particular type of that
jnAna which is absent in me, because if it had been there, I would have
been mukta, then even leaving aside arguments about the direct perception
of ignorance that one experiences, what is being said is that a visheSha
jnAna abhAva can be knowable even with the knowledge of a general jnAna.
That is, the pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma of a visheSha jnAna abhAva can be
sAmAnya jnAnatvam.//



This is not the argument in my case. I don’t say – “what is meant is not
that I do not know brahman at all, but that a particular jnAna about it is
absent”.  “what is being said is that a visheSha jnAna abhAva can be
knowable even with the knowledge of a general jnAna. That is, the
pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma of a visheSha jnAna abhAva can be sAmAnya
jnAnatvam.”



Why this should be so? If we say “daNdI grihe nIsti” – here the impugned
abhAva is nirUpita by the pratiyogitA which is avachchinna by daNda. It is
avachchinna by neither purushatva  nor daNdatva. DaNdatva is the
avachchedaka of pratiyogitA-avachchedaktA. Since daNda is the
visheshaNiBhuta-dharma of daNdI, it can very well be the avachchedaka of
pratiyogitA which is the nirUpaka of impugned abhAva. Similarly, it is not
the (general) jnAnatvam which is the avachedaka of pratiyogitA which is the
nirUpaka of vishesha-jnana-abhAva but that particular mano-vritti (let us
say BrahmAkAra-vritti) which accompanies Brahma-jnAna. Hope I conveyed.



//But this will mean that even when a pot is on the ground, it is possible
to say that there is no pot, because some other pot is not there. Every
locus, even one containing a pot, will contain the absence of all other
pots. Similarly, even when a person knows a pot, he can say "I do not know
that pot" because there is the absence of a subsequent cognition of the
same pot. Thus a specific pratiyogi cannot be referred to using a general
attribute.



Even after the rise of brahma jnAna, he will keep saying I do not have
brahma jnAna.//


This would have certainly been true had jnAnatva been the
pratiyogitA-avachchedaka of vishesha-jnAna-abhAva. But as I understand, it
should not be so. It is the BrahmAkAra-vritti which accompanies
Brahma-jnAna which is the pratiyogitA-avachchedaka being the
visheshaNibhUta-dharma of pratiyogI. Pl correct if I am wrong.



3) //If abhAva itself is bhAvarUpa, what purpose is served by saying avidyA
is abhAvarUpa?//



I think here we need to appreciate a little carefully as to what is meant
by bhAvAtmakatA of abhAva. Literally, it does not make sense to say that
abhAva is bhAva. Does it? Anyonya-abhAva is basically that abhAva which is
nitUpita by the pratiyogitA which is avachchinna by tAdAtmya sambandha.
TAdAtmya-sambandha is the sambandha through which abheda of pratiyogI and
anuyogI is understood (like sundaro narah). So when BhAshyakAra says that –
pata itself is ghatAbhAva and hence ghatAbhAva is bhAvAtmaka (because pata
is bhAva) – then we need to appreciate that pata is bhAva by its swarUpa
and is said to be abhAva by virtue of being the AdhAra of abhAva which is
nirUpita by the pratiyogitA which is avachchinna by tAdAtmya (between the
anuyogi (pata) and pratiyogi (ghata)). Basically, the intent of BhAshyakAra
here does not appear (to me) to establish the bhAvatva of abhAva (either in
vyavahAra or paramArtha). Because if that abhAva is the pratiyogi itself –
then the sixth vibhakti is inadmissible (ghatasya abhAvah). If it is other
than the pratiyogI– then it is inferred *just as in the case* of
anyonya-abhAva. When we say pata is ghatAbhAva, we say it as a matter of
usage and we are not actually saying that ghatAbhAva is pata. Because then
there will be no fixation as to what ghatAbhAva is – it can be pata, daNda,
hasti, Simha.. anything. So we need to appreciate that based on the general
usage – bhAshyakAra is replying to naiyayika by tushyatu-durjana-nyAya that
there is bhAvAtmakata of abhAva.





Regards,

Sudhanshu.

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 3:43 AM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste Sudhanshu ji,
> My first impression on reading your email was the same as Praveen-ji's,
> but on a second reading it became apparent what you meant.
>
> A few observations:
> 1) Everyone has the direct experience of ignorance. It is certainly
> possible to infer ignorance, but the natural experience is one of
> perception. The same applies to brahma jnAna. If someone asks you do you
> have brahma jnAna, you will either say yes or no based on your sAkshi
> pratyaksha, not inferring it from the presence or absence of the effects of
> samsAra nivritti. If it is insisted that ignorance is only inferred, then
> your knowledge of my ignorance is as good as my knowledge of my ignorance,
> which clearly militates against common sense.
>
> While in nyAya it is held that the pramANa responsible for the cognisance
> of the pratiyogi is the one responsible for the cognisance of its abhAva,
> in advaita that does not hold good. The pramANa for the cognisance of the
> pratiyogi can be any of the other five, but the cognisance of the absence
> of something is always anupalabdhi.
>
> Ignorance, on the other hand, is not accepted within advaita as pramANa
> siddham, but sAkshi vedyam. So that itself indicates that the nature of
> ignorance is not of the nature of absence.
>
> 2) Be that as it may, if I say "ghaTo nAsti", the counterpositive of that
> absence is the pot. The pot contains many attributes, but the one that is
> relevant for its counterpositiveness is the one that appears in the
> counterpositive in the cognition of its absence. So here, that attribute is
> potness. This is the pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma. Similarly, if I say
> "jnAnam nAsti", the pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma is jnAnatvam. So if there
> is even one jnAna, the cognition "jnAnam nAsti" cannot arise because the
> pratiyogitAvacChedaka avacChinnam is virodhi to abhAva jAnam.
>
> Now if it is argued that when I say brahmajnAnam nAsti, what is meant is
> not that I do not know brahman at all, but that a particular jnAna about it
> is absent, the question that will be asked is how do you know that there is
> a particular jnAna? If it is said that because I know there is a thing
> called brahma jnAna, it follows that there is a particular type of that
> jnAna which is absent in me, because if it had been there, I would have
> been mukta, then even leaving aside arguments about the direct perception
> of ignorance that one experiences, what is being said is that a visheSha
> jnAna abhAva can be knowable even with the knowledge of a general jnAna.
> That is, the pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma of a visheSha jnAna abhAva can be
> sAmAnya jnAnatvam.
>
> But this will mean that even when a pot is on the ground, it is possible
> to say that there is no pot, because some other pot is not there. Every
> locus, even one containing a pot, will contain the absence of all other
> pots. Similarly, even when a person knows a pot, he can say "I do not know
> that pot" because there is the absence of a subsequent cognition of the
> same pot. Thus a specific pratiyogi cannot be referred to using a general
> attribute.
>
> Even after the rise of brahma jnAna, he will keep saying I do not have
> brahma jnAna.
>
> 3) Anyway, let us leave that also aside. If you read the ghaTa bhAShyam of
> the brihadAraNyaka (1.2.1) carefully, ShankarAchArya makes a profound
> statement. According to him, abhAva itself is bhAvarUpa.
> "न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? *भावरूप एव* । एवं घटस्य
> प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात्, घटेन
> व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; *तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।"  *Like
> anyonyAbhAva, all the other abhAva-s prAg, pradhvamsa, atyantAbhAva are all
> of the nature of bhAva.
>
> If abhAva itself is bhAvarUpa, what purpose is served by saying avidyA is
> abhAvarUpa?
>
> Regards,
> Venkatraghavan
>
> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 7:15 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>> Hari Om Praveen ji,
>>
>> The way I used A's effect is not in the sense of effect of material cause.
>> Just take A=Brahma-jnAna and B= A's effect = ~shoka-moha. It will make
>> sense and argument remains valid. A=>B and ~B=>~A.
>>
>> Regards.
>> Sudhanshu.
>>
>> On Fri 2 Aug, 2019, 20:36 kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l, <
>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >     On Friday, August 2, 2019, 07:31:57 AM PDT, Praveen R. Bhat via
>> > Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > Since the AvaraNa is said to be eliminated, it has to exist to be
>> > eliminated; in that, it was necessarily bhAvarUpa. In such a case, its
>> > kAraNa cannot be abhAvarUpa.
>> > Praveenji - PraNAms
>> > My understanding may be wrong. Bavaruupatvam requires not just existence
>> > but should have a capacity to project.
>> > If someone asks me ' Do you know gaagaabuubu?"
>> >  I can say -never heard of it. I do not know what it is? - response by
>> my
>> > mind? - at this stage only aavarana due to avidya. When someone points
>> to
>> > object on the floor that I also see, and he says that is 'gaagaabuubu'.
>> Now
>> > the ignorance of gaagaabuubu is gone. At this stage, there is no
>> vikshepa
>> > involved. - only the naama aspect is established - just one example.
>> > Projection can start only if have some partial knowledge of an object
>> but
>> > not complete knowledge as it - there is an object there - 5 feet long -
>> > coiled - soft when I stopped on it and is lying on the aisle. 'There is
>> > (something)' - the projection of the mind viskhepa later as it is a
>> snake,
>> > etc.
>> > Question is only do we attribute the vikshepa shakti to avidya or to the
>> > mind which is empowered by maaya shakti at the individual level to
>> project
>> > the snake on the object that is perceived with incomplete attributes?
>> > Lack of knoweldge is one thing but projection of something else where
>> the
>> > object is different  -to separate the aavarana vs vishepa - or
>> ignorance vs
>> > maaya.
>> > This may be samantics but separation makes it easy to comprehend that
>> > muula avidya is gone but projection continues for a jeevan mukta as
>> long as
>> > BMI losts.
>> > Hari Om!Sadananda
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
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