[Advaita-l] tattvamasi - lakshaNA or mukhya vritti?

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste,
Came across something interesting when referring to vedAnta paribhASha on
another matter. In advaita, the relationship between words and meanings is
either direct (mukhya vritti) or implied (lakshaNA vritti). For example, in
the sentence "The Ganga is flowing", the word Ganga refers to the river
(direct meaning / vAcyArtha). In the sentence "The village on the Ganga",
the word Ganga refers to the riverbank by implication (lakshyArtha), as it
would be impossible for a village to be situated in a flowing river.

lakshaNA itself is sub-divided into three categories:

1) jahallakshaNA - where no aspect of the main meaning is retained, and
only the implied meaning is taken. Like in the instance of "viSham
bhunkshva" - the son seeks his father's permission to eat at a friend's
house. The father does not like it, so tells his son "go eat poison". Here
the intention of the father is not to instruct his son to eat poision.
Rather it is to tell his son, "do not go to your friend's place, consuming
poison would be a better option than eating there". In this instance, the
main meaning "consume poison", is discarded and only the secondary meaning
is taken.
2) ajahallakshaNA - the primary and secondary meanings are both fully
retained.  For example, when we go to a restaurant and tell the waiter "Can
I have idli?" what we actually mean is that we want not only idli
(vAcyArtha) but also sambar and chutney (lakshyArtha).
3) jahadajahallakshaNA - when some part of the main meaning is retained,
and another part is discarded. For example when we say "he is the same
person that I saw previously". There are two entities being compared - the
person who was seen at one time and place, with the person seen at another
time and place. In this case, the difference associated with time and place
in the two objects of comparison is discarded, and the person in each case
is retained.

This is relevant for advaita because sentences like tattvamasi are
explained within tradition using jahadajahallakshaNA. The sarvajna, sarva
shaktimAn Ishvara, who is the direct meaning of the word 'tat', is said to
be the same as the alpajna alpashaktimAn jIva, who is the direct meaning of
the word 'tvam'.

So how is the identity of the omniscient creator with the limited
individual possible?  The answer is that the creator is consciousness with
mAyA upAdhi and it is the apparent association of consciousness with mAyA
which is the reason for the omniscience, omnipotence and creative faculties
of the creator. The jIva on the other hand, is a limited individual and
that limitation is a result of the apparent association of consciousness
with avidyA.

Therefore, in understanding tattvamasi, it is the consciousness part of the
direct meaning that is taken up (tat = consciousness + mAyA, tvam =
consciousness + avidyA), and the avidyA / mAyA portion is discarded. Thus,
tradition calls this an instance of jahadajahallakshaNA.

The interesting thing about vedAnta paribhASha is that its author,
dharmarAja adhvarIndra, say that instances like tattvamasi are not
instances of lakshaNA at all, but fall under the operation of mukhya
/shakti vritti.

His basic argument is that in a vishiShTa artha, if the meaning of a word
to be conveyed is just the visheShya, that can be done with the mukhya
vritti itself. One does not have to resort to lakshaNA to convey the
visheShya. If it is insisted that  lakshaNA is required to drop the
visheShaNa in a vishiShTa artha, then several instances which are accepted
as vAcyArtha will end up as lakshyArtha.

To explain this will need an example, and some background.

Whenever we talk of any individual in a species, it is an individual
(vyakti) in whom the universal (jAti) is inherent, it is a jAti vishiShTa
vyakti. Thus a pot is actually ghaTatva vishiShTa ghaTa (a pot endowed with
potness), a cloth is paTatva vishiShTa paTa, etc. In nyAya and pUrva
mImAmsa, it is accepted that the jAti is eternal, whereas the vyakti is
perishable.
Now coming to the argument of dharmarAja adhvarIndra, he asks us to take
two examples and consider whether that is a case of lakshyArtha or
vAcyArtha.
1) ghaTo nitya: - The pot is eternal.
2) ghaTo anitya: - The pot is not-eternal.

In the first sentence, taking the direct meaning of the word ghaTa:,
pot, cannot be the intended meaning, because the pot is not eternal.
However, potness, which is a jAti can be said to be eternal. Thus one
conclude that the word ghaTa: refer to the universal, potness, by
implication, it is the lakshyArtha.

To clarify, a visheShaNa can only qualify a visheShya. It cannot qualify
another visheShaNa. The term rAjasevaka: (a king's servant) refers to the
servant, not the king. Thus, the servant is the visheShya and the king is
the visheShaNa in the term rAjasevaka:.  Now, when we try to add another
qualifier, vIra: and say rAjasevaka: vIra: (the king's servant is brave),
the anvaya (the connection) of bravery will only be with the servant, not
the king. If we wanted bravery to qualify the king instead of the servant,
we would have to reverse the visheShya-visheShaNa relationship between the
king and the servant and say vIrasya rAjna: sevaka: (the brave king's
servant).

Similarly, in the sentence ghaTo nitya:, the term nitya would normally have
anvaya with the visheshya - the individual pot, not the visheShaNa - the
universal potness. However as there is anupapatti, incompatibility in a pot
being eternal, we have to reverse the visheShya and visheShaNa and instead
of ghaTatva vishiShTa ghaTa, we have to take the meaning as ghaTa vishiShTa
ghaTatva, making ghaTatva the visheShya and thus causing the anvaya of
nityatva to occur with the visheShya ghaTatva.

That changing of the visheShya is the change from mukhyArtha to lakshyArtha.

In the second sentence, ghaTo anitya:, the pot is the direct meaning of the
word ghaTa: and such a direct meaning is compatible with the sentence
meaning the  "pot is non-eternal". Thus, here the same word is used to
denote the vAcyArtha.

dharmarAja adhvarIndra's argument is that, if in determining the meaning of
a word, discarding the visheShaNa and taking the visheShya is a case of
jahadajahallakshaNA (like tattvamasi), then in sentences such as ghaTo
anitya:, the pot would be the lakshyArtha of the word ghaTa:, even though
the pot is manifestly its mukhyArtha - for, here too, the visheShaNa (the
jAti,  ghaTatva) is discarded and only the visheShya (the vyakti, ghaTa:)
is retained. That would be erroneous.

Therefore, as the visheShya is within the scope of vAcyArtha, and so long
as that visheShya has no incompatibility in association with other words in
the sentence (no anvaya anupapatti), or with the intended meaning of the
speaker (no tAtparya anupapatti), the denotation of the visheShya by a word
occurs naturally by mukhya vritti, with no need for lakshaNA.

Extending that general rule, as consciousness is the visheShya of the terms
tat and tvam, and there is no incompatibility
in saying that the consciousness is identical, the intended meaning of tat
and tvam is the vAcyArtha of those words.

In this position, he stands independently of the traditional view.

Regards,
Venkatraghavan