[Advaita-l] Debunking Drishti-Srishti Vada and Eka Jiva Vada - part 1

[Praveen R. Bhat]

Reposting in 2 parts since I got a server response so:  Message body is too
big: 57888 bytes with a limit of 50 KB

​Part 1: ​

​​Namaste Adityaji,​

On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 2:54 PM, Aditya Kumar <kumaraditya22 at yahoo.com>
 wrote:

>
> ​If that, I am glad, but you are still sadly mistaken. Bhamatikara
> Vachaspati Mishra accepts DSV with NJV not EJV. That is not to say that he
> ​is against DSV. Someone who has Bhamati reference for this may kindly
> quote the same, since I haven't studied Bhamati text proper.
>
> A : I am not sure if Bhamati explicitly advocates solipsism, but here is a
> refutation of DSV with nana-jiva vada : -
>

​If its not from Bhamati, I am not interested in Dasgupta's hypotheses.​
However, I will just respond to just some points in the following.

> “Some Vedantists hold that there are many individuals and the
> world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person
> creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which
> forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people; just as
> when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a
> snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they
> have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and
> there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception
> of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective
> phenomena as its ground.
>
​I can use this to establish that there is EJV and not NJV,

This must be distinguished from the normal Vedanta view which holds that
> objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these are illusory only
> in the sense that they will not last permanently and have thus only a
> temporary and relative existence in comparison with the truth or reality
> which is ever the same constant and unchangeable entity in all our
> perceptions and in all world-appearance."
>
I am curious if there is any defence for this critique.
>
​Yes. Manudkya Karika says:
आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा
​ ​
॥ २.६ ॥
​
What does not exist in the beginning and in the end, that is so (
​=​
non-existent) even in the present.



> प्रकरणार्थोपसंहारार्थोऽयं श्लोकः — यदा वितथं द्वैतम् आत्मैवैकः परमार्थतः
> सन्, तदा इदं निष्पन्नं भवति — सर्वोऽयं लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारोऽविद्याविषय
> एवेति । This verse is for the purpose of summing up the entire section—
> when the duality is false and being only one in reality, then this is
> understood— “this entire group of worldly and Vedic transactions is indeed
> based on अविद्या”।
>
> तदा न निरोधः, निरोधनं निरोधः प्रलयः, उत्पत्तिः जननम्, बद्धः संसारी जीवः,
> साधकः साधनवान्मोक्षस्य, मुमुक्षुः मोचनार्थी, मुक्तः विमुक्तबन्धः ।Then,
> there is no dissolution, creation, transmigrating individual, one having
> means of liberation, one desirous of liberation, liberated.
>
> A : Okay. This says there is no transmigrating individual. How is this Eka
> jiva?
>
Why are you suddenly landing on EJV? You are objecting to tucchatva, aren't
you?
I could equally ask you
​ if tucchatva is not talked about but only mithyatva, how does that prove
SDV?​
 This bhAShya is leading to
​tucchatva
,
​the only reason by ​
which
​it ​
was quoted next.
​


> उत्पत्तिप्रलययोरभावाद्बद्धादयो न सन्तीत्येषा परमार्थता ।
> Due to absence of creation and dissolution, those bound, etc, are not
> there; this is the highest reality.
>
> A : Again, same thing.
>
​Again, same tucchatva.
​


>
> कथमुत्पत्तिप्रलययोरभाव इति, उच्यते — द्वैतस्यासत्त्वात् ।
> How is there an absence of creation and dissolution? This doubt is being
> answered— due to falsity
> of duality.
> //
>
> A : I am not contesting this.
>
​Oh, but you are. You can't differentiate jagat and Maya... here's why.​..
(...​continued in Part 2)​