[Advaita-l] Debunking Drishti-Srishti Vada and Eka Jiva Vada - part 1

[Aditya Kumar]

I do apologise for the fact that I have not given proper references in my article so far. I was referring to the Sutra 2-2-29 which goes like this : vaidharmyAshcha na svapnAdivat. I will also quote the previous sutra that is 2-2-28 : nAbhAvaha upalabdEhe. 
I will give the English translations here : Non-existence of external things are not true on account of their being experienced.2-2-28 : According to them (Bauddha Idealists), the external world is non-existent. Does it mean that the objective world is absolutely non-existent like the horns of a hare, or does it mean that it is unreal even as the dreams. The sutra refutes the former view. In that case we could not have experienced it. The external world is an object of experience through the senses and therefore cannot be absolutely non-existent like the horns of a hare. The Buddhist may say that  he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that what is seen in his consciousness alone shines as something external. But then the very nature of consciouness itself  proves the existence of external objects different from consciousness for men are conscious of things or objects  of perception, and nobody is conscious of his perception merely. The very fact that the Bauddhas say that the internal cognition appears 'as something external' shows that the external world is real. If it were not real, the comparison 'like something external' would be meaning less. No one says that Devadutta is like a son of a barren woman.
Now the sutra that I was talking about 2-2-29:      vaidharmyAshcha na svapnAdivat
Eng translation : And owing to the difference of nature in the consciousness between waking and dream state, both cannot be equated.
The Bauddhas may say that the perception of the external world is to be considered similar to dreams and the like. In a dream, there are no external objects; yet the ideas appear as a twofold form as subject-object. The appearance of the external world is similarly independent of any objective reality. This sutra refutes that view. There is a difference between the dream and waking state. What is seen in the dream state is contradicted by waking state. The dream state is like a memory/impression but the waking state is real perception so it can';t be rejected as untrue. Moreover what is the proof of existence of consciousness except for experience? If that is so, why would not an object which is experienced be taken as existing? It may be said that even the Vedantins acknowledge the unreality of the external world, since it is contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman, and this view is based on shruti. But the bauddhas do not accept the authority of the vedas( and hence their view is flawed)
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Here Shankara clears all confusions that may arise. When Shankara says Vedantins consider that eternal world is unreal as per shruti, he means that - the world is independent of the observer and yet unreal because their cause cannot be determined. Not because, the perception of the external world by the senses are unreal/or like the dreams, as believed by idealists. This is where Maya comes in and this is where prakasananda sides with Buddhists when he vouches for subjective-idealism which has no basis.  

    On Saturday, 15 July 2017 10:24 AM, V Subrahmanian <v.subrahmanian at gmail.com> wrote:
 

 

On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:38 AM, Aditya Kumar via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Namaste Praveen Bhatji,
I did. I went through the emails exchanged on this forum as well as others. Some people even brought Quantum physics into the picture lol. I understand the importance of tradition in Advaita but this purely academic. As a matter of fact, Advaita tradition considers Vachaspati Misra as a stalwart in the lineage. Even he advocates aneka-jiva vada. 
I understand the fact, Vedanta is very esoteric. Notwithstanding any scholar's reputation, should we not give merit to the arguments alone? Considering that prakasananda is not as popular or as respected as Vachaspati Misra, doesn't that make him a mere scholar in comparison? 
I request you to give me the ref to the verse that you are speaking of. I think the context is clear though, as prakasananda repeatedly denies maya. He has explicitly stated maya is tuccha. He has even stated 'like hare's horn'. How can anyone overlook this?
I haven't written on the vijnanavada part yet. I actually got a copy of siddhanta muktavali and read it. He derives almost 99% of his thesis from Sunya vada and Vijnanavada. I will write about it in detail shortly. 
Briefly, Shankara says in BSB that dreams are sublated in waking state, the magician's magic is sublated when trick is revealed, but we never observe the objective world sublating in anything. 


In the BSB 3.2.21 Shankara says:
अथ अविद्याध्यस्तो ब्रह्मण्येकस्मिन् अयं प्रपञ्चो विद्यया प्रविलाप्यत इति ब्रूयात् , ततो ब्रह्मैव अविद्याध्यस्तप्रपञ्चप्रत्याख्यानेन आवेदयितव्यम् — ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म’ ‘तत्सत्यꣳ स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि’ (छा. उ. ६ । ८ । ७) इति — तस्मिन्नावेदिते, विद्या स्वयमेवोत्पद्यते ; तया च अविद्या बाध्यते, ततश्च अविद्याध्यस्तः सकलोऽयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः स्वप्नप्रपञ्चवत् प्रविलीयते — अनावेदिते तु ब्रह्मणि ‘ब्रह्मविज्ञानं कुरु प्रपञ्चप्रविलयं च’ इति शतकृत्वोऽप्युक्ते न ब्रह्मविज्ञानं प्रपञ्चप्रविलयो वा जायते । नन्वावेदिते ब्रह्मणि तद्विज्ञानविषयः प्रपञ्चविलयविषयो वा नियोगः स्यात् ; न, निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मत्वावेदनेनैव उभयसिद्धेः — रज्जुस्वरूपप्रकाशनेनैव हि तत्स्वरूपविज्ञानम् अविद्याध्यस्तसर्पादिप्रपञ्चप्रविलयश्च भवति ; न च कृतमेव पुनः क्रियते ॥

The points Shankara is making are:
   
   - The world is superimposed in Brahman that is unitary by / due to avidya
   - Brahman alone, by negating the world, is to be realized
   - By knowing Brahman, vidya, the vrtti, arises by itself.
   - This vidya destroys avidya
   - Thereupon the entire world superimposed by avidya, resolves like a dream world.
   - If Brahman is not realized, instructions such as 'realize brahman, resolve the world', even if given out hundreds of times, will not result in realization or world-resolution
Thus, there is evidence in the BSB for the world resolving due to sublation in Brahman.


You say:
In order for it to be sublated, Maya is essential which establishes the paramartha satya. This is the unique position of Vedanta. If maya is accepted, then objectivity of the world need not be denied. On the other hand, whether we accept maya or not, if we assert that world is only subjective, it needs a positive proof. No such proof or illustration can be given. This is the same refutation against the Buddhists.

Response:
The experience of everyone that I am in a world of duality, experience misery, etc. is itself the undeniable positive proof for the subjectivity of the world. The illustration of the dream-world for samsara and its resolution upon waking is given. For Buddhists there is no eternal substratum of Consciousness upon which the subjective world is superimposed. That is the difference.
vs