[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Akhandarthavaada Criticism - Slokas 1-972 to 1-980

[Anand Hudli]

The fundamental problem between the two schools in this context lies in the
fact that Dvaitins do not accept nirvikalpaka jnAna, but only savikalpaka
jnAna, while for advaitins nirvikalpaka jnAna plays a vital role. The
section called satyAdivAkyAkhaNDArtha-upapattiH (second pariccheda) in the
advaitasiddhi addresses the objections to the akhaNDArthatva of shruti
vAkyas such as satyaM jnAnaM anantaM brahma. This is an attempt to address
VAdirAja's objections with material drawn from the advaitasiddhi. In reply
to the dvaitin's contention:  "svarUpajnAnasya prAgeva sAmAnyato jAtatvAt
tajjnAne naitataddvArApekShA", since the general svarUpa (of Brahman) is
already known, this knowledge (of Brahman) through this (provided by the
satyAdi vAkya) is not necessary, Madhusudana says: jnAnamAtre asya
dvAratvAbhAve api saMshayAdinivartakaitajjnAne taddvArApekShaNAt, although
the general knowledge of Brahman is not through this (vAkya), it is
necessary for the removal of doubt, etc. The dvaitin further says: kiM
candralakShaNamity-asAdhAraNa-dharma-prashnottare prakRShTaprakAshAdivAkye
vyabhicAraH, the answer to the question ''what is the moon?" which asks for
specific properties of the moon, in the form "the preeminent light is the
moon" is a deviation (from the expected answer). Madhusudana replies: tatra
hi na candrasvarUpaparatvaM kiMtu prakarShAshrayo yaH prakAshaH
tatsvarUpaparatvam tathAca
prakarShopalakShita-prakAsha-vyakti-svarUpamAtra-pratipAdaktvena tatrApi
akhaNDArthatva-avirodhAt, in this case the (answer) does not only convey
the essential nature of the moon, but also it conveys the essential nature
of the light which is characterized by preeminence and the essential nature
of the individual that is light characterized by preeminence. So it does
not contradict the akhaNDArthatva.

The dvaitin raises what appears to be a valid objection, based on the
assumed principle of not allowing secondary meaning (lakShaNA) when the
primary meaning (vAcyArtha or abhidhA primary denotation) is not ruled out.
The objection reads thus: nanu dRShTAnte sAdhyavaikalyam, tathA hi
prakRShTaprakAshAdivAkyaM na tAvadabhidhayA akhaNDArthaniShThaM
prakRShTAdipadasyAkhaNDe abhidhAyA abhAvAt, tvayAnangIkArAcca, nApi
lakShaNayA, prakRShTaprakAshasya dravyasya guNasya vA candre
anvayopapatteH, anvaya-anupapattirUpalakShaNAbIja-abhAvAditi., There is a
defect in what is to be proved in the example. There is neither akhaNDArtha
in the prakRShTa-prakAsha sentence due to its primary meaning, nor do you
accept it so. There is no akhaNDArtha due to the secondary (implied)
meaning, since there is consistency in the literal (syntactic) context of
preeminent light as a substance or property of the moon. There is no ground
for using implication, since there is no inconsistency in the literal
(syntactic) context.

The central question here is: what is the ground (bIja) for using lakShaNA
instead of abhidhA? Is it anvaya-anupapatti (inconsistency in the literal
meaning)? Or tAtparya-anupapatti (inconsistency with the intention of the
speaker)? The example of gangAyAM ghoShaH" seems to suggest
anvaya-anupapatti, since there is no possibility for a village to exist
literally in the river waters. So we end up using the lakShyArtha of gangA
as the river bank (tIra). The dvaitin argues, therefore, anvaya-anupapatti
is the ground for using lakShaNA. However, in the example, "yaShTIH
praveshaya" (bring the sticks), there is no inconsistency in the literal
meaning, since it *is* possible to fetch the sticks. The intention of the
speaker (tAtparya) here is, however, not to bring the sticks but the stick
bearing persons for the purpose of feeding. There is an inconsistency of
tAtparya, although there is no anvaya inconsistency. So "yaShTi" here has
to be taken in the secondary (implied) meaning of "yaShTidhara" and the
tAtparya of the sentence is "yashTidharAn praveshaya". Note that lakShaNA
is resorted to here due to an inconsistency with the tAtparya, not due to
an inconsistency in the anvaya. Summarizing this principle of using
tatparya-anupapatti as the lakShaNA-bIja, VishwanAtha nyAya-panchAnana
says, in his siddhAnta-muktAvali, yadi anvaya-anupapatir-lakShaNA-bIjaM
syAt, tadA yaShTIH praveshayetyAdau lakShaNA na syAt| yaShTiShu
pravesha-anvayasya-anupapatterabhavAt| tena tatpraveshe
bhojanatAtparya-anupapattyA yaShTidhareShu lakShaNA| If anvaya-anupapatti
were to be the ground for using lakShaNA, then in sentences such as "bring
the sticks", there would be no lakShaNA. (But) by bringing the sticks,
there would be an inconsistency with the intention of the speaker and
(hence) the implied meaning of "persons bearing sticks" is used.

A similar situation occurs in the sentence "kAkebhyo dadhi rakShyatAm",
protect the curds from the crows. Although the literal meaning is not
inconsistent at all, the intention of the speaker is to protect the curds
not only from crows, but also from all creatures that could possibly spoil
it! kAkapadasya dadhyupaghAtuke lakShaNA sarvataH
dadhirakShAyAstAtparyaviShayatvAt, says VishwanAtha. This principle of
tAtparya-anupapatti as the ground for lakShaNA is accepted by advaitins and
Madhusudana makes use of it in his response to the above objection by the
dvaitin.

advaitsiddhi text: yaShTIH praveshayetyAdau loke tarasamayAH puroDAshA
bhavantItyAdau vede ca yathAshruta-anvayasaMbhave api yathA
tAtparyaviShayIbhUtAnvaya-anupapattyA yaShTidharapuruSheShu
savanIyahavirmAtre ca yaShTipuroDAshashabdayorlakShaNA AshritA tathaiveha
tAtparyaviShayIvhUta-anvaya-anupapattinimittayA lakShaNayA
akhaNDArthaparatvopapatteH, kashcandra iti candrasvarUpe pRShTe
tanmAtraparasyaivottarasyocitatvAt
Just as in the case of the laukika example, "bring the sticks" and the
vadika example, "the puroDAshas (sacrificial cakes) should be made of
flesh", although a literal meaning is possible, but due to the
inconsistency with the intention of the speaker (tAtparya), the implied
meanings (lakShaNA) of the words, "sticks" and "sacrificial cakes" as
"persons bearing sticks" and "savanIya cakes" (offered during the soma
pressing ceremony) are resorted to, similarly here (prakRShTaprakAshaH
candraH"), due to the inconsistency with the intention of the speaker, the
implied meaning has akhaNDArtha (impartite sense). Since the questioner
intention in asking "who is the moon?" is to know the svarUpa of the moon
(but not the properties of moon), it is appropriate for the answer to
convey just the svarUpa of the moon.

The laukika example is clear but the vaidika example needs explanation.
BrahmAnanda, in his commentary on the above, has provided the vaidika
context, which is the twenty second adhikaraNa in the Jaimini sUtras 3.8,
ie. 3.8.42-44, consisting of the sUtras māṃsaṃ tu savanīyānāṃ
codanāviśeṣāt, bhaktir asaṃnidhāv anyāyyeti cet , and syāt prakṛtiliṅgatvād
vairājavat . There is a thirty-six year long sacrifice called the
shAkyAnAmayana, the sacrifice of the shAkyas. saṃsthite saṃsthite 'hāni
gṛhapatir mṛgayāṃ yāti, sa tatra yān mṛgān hanti, teṣāṃ tarasāḥ puruḍāśāḥ
savanīyā bhavantīti. As part of this sacrifice, the master of the house
goes hunting every day, and the flesh of the animals that he kills are used
to make the savanIya cakes on the following day. tatra saṃdehaḥ - kiṃ
savanīyānām anyeṣāṃ ca saṃbhavatāṃ puroḍāśānāṃ sthāne tarasā uta
savanīyānām eveti. The doubt there is: does flesh take the place of all
puroDAshas (sacrificial cakes) or just the savanIya cakes (used during the
soma pressing ceremony, savana). The siddhAnta position is that only the
savanIya cakes have to be made of flesh, not all puroDAshas. However, the
savanIya puroDAshas are one of five materials used in the soma pressing
ceremony (savana). These are: 1) dhAnA, 2) karaMbha, 3) parIvApa, 4)
puroDAsha, and 5) payasyA. Now, the question is: does flesh take the place
of all the five materials or just the savanIya puroDAsha. The siddhAnta
position here is that flesh is used in the place of all the five savanIya
materials, not just the puroDAsha. This is similar to the kAkebhyo dadhi
rakShyatAm example above. Although the literal meaning is possible, it
would mean only the savanIya puroDAsha is made of flesh but not the others
such as dhAnA. Again, considering tAtparya-anupapatti that would result as
a consequence of taking the literal meaning, one would have to take the
implied meaning (lakShaNA) of the word "puroDAsha". This would mean that
flesh is to be used not just for the savanIya puroDAshas but also in the
place of others such as roasted barley (dhAnA), etc in the savana ritual.
The tAtparya here is derived from a similar implied meaning (lakShaNA) of
the word "puroDasha" in the original primary sacrifice (prakRti)
jyotiShToma.  Śābarabhāṣya - prakṛtau jyotiṣṭome dhānādiṣv ayaṃ
puroḍāśaśabdo bhāktaḥ, saṃnihite prayuktaḥ, ihāpi bhākta eva prayokṣyate.

Anand