[Advaita-l] DSV in the advaitasiddhi: sArUpya, adhikasattAkajnAna is not necessary for bAdha

[Anand Hudli]

na ca- idaM rUpyaM nedaM rUpyamiti jnAnayorbhinnaviShayatvena
bAdhyabAdhaka-bhAva-anupapattiriti- vAcyam|

The pUrvapakShin should not object: the two cognitions, "this is silver"
and "this is not silver", have different contents (refer to different
objects) and hence there is no bAdhya-bAdhaka-bhAva (sublated-sublater
relation) between them.

dRShTi-sRShTi-pakShe jnanabhedena viShayabhedAt- In DSV, two cognitions
must refer to two different objects. Why? Since sRShTi happens with dRShTi
or is the same as dRShTi and there is no pre-existing object before dRShTi,
two different cognitions will refer to different objects. If this is the
case, the illusory knowledge "this is silver" and the sublating knowledge,
"this is not silver" will not refer to the same silver. The sublating
knowledge, "this is not silver", negates not the silver seen earlier, but
another instance of silver. Thus, there cannot be any sublation of the
illusion, "this is silver", says the pUrvapakShin.

Madhusudana: bhinnaviShayatve api viShayayoH sArUpyAt
svapnabAdhyabAdhakayoriva bAdhyabAdhakabhAvopapatteH| Although the contents
of the sublated and sublater are different, due to the similarity between
the two, the sublater-sublater relation can be established, as (between)
the sublated-sublater cognitions in a dream. The first cognition is of the
form "this is silver" and the second cognition is of the form of an absence
(abhAva), "this is not silver, where the pratiyogi (counter-correlate) of
the abhAva is silver. While the silver that is the object of the first
cognition is not the same as the silver that is the abhAvapratiyogi in the
second cognition "this is not silver", due to similarity between the two,
the second cognition becomes the bAdhaka of the first, as it happens in a
dream.

na ca- rUpyAdibAdhasyApi dRShTi-sRShTitve tena
rUpyAdermithyAtva-asiddhiriti- vAcyam| The pUrvapakShin should not object:
Since the bhrama and bAdha both belong to dRShTi-sRShTi category (and hence
both are prAtibhAsika), you cannot establish the illusoriness of the silver
seen in the bhrama. The pUrvapakShin here erroneously thinks:
"bAdhyApekShayA adhikasattAkajnAnasya eva bAdhakatvAt prakRte
bAdhya-bAdhakayos-tulyasattAkatvAt", the sublater should belong to a higher
order of reality than the sublated for it to become a sublater, but in the
present case, both the sublated and sublater belong to the same order of
reality.

Madhusudana: bAdhya-anyUnasattAkatvameva bAdhakatve prayojakam, na tu
adhikasattakatvamiti asyopapAdidatvena vyAvahArikeNa vyAvahArikabAdhavat
prAtibhAsikena prAtibhAsikabAdha-avirodhAt| (The sublater's) not belonging
to a lower order of reality is necessary for sublation, not belonging to a
higher order of reality. A vyAvahArika sublater can sublate a vyAvahArika
(object) and a prAtibhAsika sublater can sublate a prAtibhAsika (object).
This has already been established (in the discussion on the second
definition of mithyAtva). While discussing the second definition of
mithyAtva, Madhusudana established that the negation of the world can be
vyAvahArika too, i.e. of the same order of reality as the world. The
sublater does not have to be of a higher order of reality than the
sublated, but it should not be of a lower order of reality. This is the
principle. For more details, see   http://www.advaitasiddhi.org/  Part 14.
One should (erroneously) claim that the world is being established as
vyAvahArika in DSV. The reference to the second definition of mithyAtva is
only to make the point that the sublater can be of the same order of
reality as the sublated. In fact, Madhusudana makes a reference to a dream
object being sublated in the dream itself, where the sublater is also
prAtibhAsika like the dream object.

Anand