[Advaita-l] Does Brahman's svaprakAshatvam make it mithyA?

[Anand Hudli]

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:44 PM, Bhaskar YR via Advaita-l
< advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> praNAms Sri Anand prabhuji
> Hare Krishna
>
> MithyAtva is the same as sad-asad-vilakShaNatva. So a mithyA vastu,
example a pot or illusory silver/snake, can neither be asat (like a hare's
horn), nor sat (Brahman). You may say mithyA objects can be classified as
vyAvahArika (pot) and prAtibhAsika (illusory snake). The statement "vimataM
mithyA, dRshyatvAt" indicates there is a vyApya-vyApaka relation between
dRshyatva and mithyAtva, similar to the relation between smoke and fire.
> Where there is smoke there is fire. Anything that is dRshya (can be
known) is also mithyA. pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA
mithyAtvam is one definition of mithyAtva which captures the fact that a
mithyA vastu will cease to exist in all three periods of time, once the
bhrama ends.
>
>>  thanks for your kind clarification prabhuji.  Hope you won't mind if I
seek further clarification on what you have written.
>
>>   I am finding it difficult to understand   mithyAtva is the same as
anirvachaneeya (sad-asad vilakshaNatva) and at the same time cessation  of
mithyA vastu in trikAla.  And the term asat  which has been clearly
explained by shankara that yadrUpeNa nishchitaM yat tadrUpaM vyabhicharat
anrutaM, This yadrUpeNa nishchitaM that vyabhicharati cannot be an atyanta
abhAva vastu like vandhyA putra or shasha vishANa..Because yadrUpeNa
nishchitaM cannot be attributed  to horn and putra and subsequently apply
the vyabhichAra.  Whereas vyabhichAra (changing) can be possible in
nishchita rUpa in  the sequence of clay-pot-clay-pitcher-clay-jug-clay etc.
>
>> And again when it comes to mithyA Vs anirvachaneeya.if we take the
example of rajju sarpa.  Sarpa is ofcourse mithyA it is mere kalpita jneya
due to the absence of yathArtha jnana of rajju.  And in this example where
can we accommodate sad-asad vilakshaNa when the rajju is kevala kalpita
jneya sarpa which was / is / will never be there in rajju ?? After
nishchita jnana of rajju would we say there was / is / will be
anirvachaneeya (or sad-asad vilakshaNa) sarpa in rajju?? I don’t think so
or am I missing something in this understanding?? Please clarify.

MithyA and anirvachanIya mean the same thing, sadasadvilakShaNa. Although
the traikAlika-niShedha holds for both the mithyA and asad vastu, the
crucial difference is that a mithyA vastu is perceived as existing
(sattvena pratIyamAna) in some substratum (adhiShThAna). In simple terms, a
rajju-sarpa, despite the realization that it never existed at any time, we
do admit it was perceived for some time in the rajju. This does not happen
for an asad vastu. We can never say that we saw the hare's horn somewhere
for some time and then realized it never exists. Or, in even simpler terms,
we have to admit a mithyA vastu to *appear* as real for some time in some
place, but an asad vastu will never appear as real at any place or during
any time period.

Anand

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 12:20 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:06 AM, Bhaskar YR via Advaita-l
> < advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> > Yes, asat means non-existent and this fits the description of the hare's
> horn. By imagination, I meant a vRtti which does not have a corresponding
> object. But asat is not the same as mithyA, and the topic of dRshyatva has
> to do with mithyAtva.
> >
> > praNAms Sri Anand prabhuji
> > Hare Krishna
> >
> > The meaning of both terms i.e. mithyA and asat bit complicated &
> confusing here I reckon.  What is asat??  As you know, shankara clarifies
> in taitereeya about sat and asat,  that once determined to be of a certain
> form, what never deviates from the form is the sat and once determined to
> be of a certain form what deviates from the form is asat.  IMHO, hare's
> horn example does not come in this category whereas vyaktAvyakta rUpa of
> prakruti is more suited for this definition.  And mithyA is that which
> never exists but cognized due to avidyA.  Shankara gives the examples of
> dviteeya Chandra, snake on the rope etc. for the mithyA vastu.  To clarify
> that after the dawn of correct knowledge / cognition, one realizes that
> the mithyA vastu was / is / will never be existed.  Please clarify.
>
> MithyAtva is the same as sad-asad-vilakShaNatva. So a mithyA vastu,
> example a pot or illusory silver/snake, can neither be asat (like a hare's
> horn), nor sat (Brahman). You may say mithyA objects can be classified as
> vyAvahArika (pot) and prAtibhAsika (illusory snake). The statement "vimataM
> mithyA, dRshyatvAt" indicates there is a vyApya-vyApaka relation between
> dRshyatva and mithyAtva, similar to the relation between smoke and fire.
> Where there is smoke there is fire. Anything that is dRshya (can be known)
> is also mithyA. pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA
> mithyAtvam is one definition of mithyAtva which captures the fact that a
> mithyA vastu will cease to exist in all three periods of time, once the
> bhrama ends.
>
> Anand
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:29 PM, V Subrahmanian via Advaita-l
>> < advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>> > Dear Anand ji,
>> >
>> > Even though the 'vṛtti' definition of the Yoga sutra is not admitted by
>> the
>> > Vedantin for the reason stated by you (vikalpa), I heard from Sri Mani
>> > Dravid Sastrigal's talks on the Advaitasiddhi that Madhusudana Saraswati
>> > accepts the Yoga Sutra definition (perhaps even the Bhāmati accepts) of
>> > 'vikalpa: śabadjñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ' which is a definition of
>> > sorts for a asat vastu such as hare's horn. If such is true, then the
>> > meaning of 'vikalpa' as per the Yoga sutra within 'vṛtti' cannot be
>> > imagination, kalpitam, adhyastam, etc. but asadvastu.  Could you please
>> > clarify?
>> >
>>
>> Yes, asat means non-existent and this fits the description of the hare's
>> horn. By imagination, I meant a vRtti which does not have a corresponding
>> object. But asat is not the same as mithyA, and the topic of dRshyatva has
>> to do with mithyAtva. That is exactly why the definition of dRshyatva has
>> to rule out things which are asat, apart from ruling out Brahman itself, in
>> order to eliminate the defect of the definition being too wide.
>>
>> Anand
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Nice presentation again by Shri Venkatraghavanji. I would like some of
>>> my notes on this.
>>>
>>> A well known advaitic statement is "vimataM mithyA dRshyatvAt, jaDatvAt
>>> pariChinnatvAt, shuktirUpyavat". In this and the following two sections of
>>> the advaitasiddhi, MadhusUdana deals with the topics of dRshyatva, jaDatva
>>> and pariChinnatva. The pUrvapakShi lists six definitions for dRshyatva and
>>> proceeds to raise objections against each. These six definitions are 1)
>>> vRttivyApyatva (being pervaded by vRtti), 2) phalavyApyatva (being pervaded
>>> by phala), 3) sAdhAraNa (i.e. both 1 and 2), 4) kadAcit kathancit
>>> cidviShaytva (at some time in some way being an object of consciousness),
>>> 5) svavyavahAre svAtirikta-saMvidantara-apekShAniyati (depending on a
>>> cognition different from itself for its activity), and 6) asvaprakAshatva
>>> (not being self-illumined).
>>>
>>> In discussing vRttivyApyatva, we have to be clear about what a vRtti is.
>>> For instance, Patanjali's yogasUtra includes valid cognition (pramANa),
>>> viparyaya (erroneous cognition), vikalpa (imagination), nidrA and smRti
>>> (memory) among vRttis. However, the laghuchandrikA-kAra has not accepted
>>> this definition of Patanjali, and instead opts for the shruti based
>>> definition from the brihadAraNyaka Upanishad vAkya ending in "hrIrdhIrbhIr
>>> ityetat sarvaM mana eva" (1.5.3), the reason being Patanjali's definition
>>> includes vikalpa or imagination. If vikalpa were to be admitted as a vRtti,
>>> we would have to accept the vRtti produced by a fictitious thing as a
>>> hare's horn and this in turn would make dRshyatva a property of the hare's
>>> horn. This would mean a hare's horn is mithyA too like the observable
>>> objects in the world. But this is against the definition of mithyAtva, for
>>> example, pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA
>>> mithyAtvam, which rules out fictitious objects. Another thing to note here
>>> is that vRtti must also include avidyAvRtti, not just antaHkaraNavRtti. To
>>> explain, whenever an illusory object, such as silver in nacre,  is seen
>>> or pleasure (sukha), etc are experienced, the corresponding vRtti is
>>> avidyAvRtti, and we do accept the illusory object and sukha, etc, as mithyA
>>> too. Also, by denying dRshyatva to objects of avidyAvRtti, there would be
>>> defect of "sAdhanavaikalya" in the above mentioned rule "vimataM...", as
>>> chandrikAkAra points out.
>>>
>>> More later.
>>>
>>> Anand
>>>
>>
>>
>