[Advaita-l] Does Brahman's svaprakAshatvam make it mithyA?

[Anand Hudli]

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:06 AM, Bhaskar YR via Advaita-l
< advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> Yes, asat means non-existent and this fits the description of the hare's
horn. By imagination, I meant a vRtti which does not have a corresponding
object. But asat is not the same as mithyA, and the topic of dRshyatva has
to do with mithyAtva.
>
> praNAms Sri Anand prabhuji
> Hare Krishna
>
> The meaning of both terms i.e. mithyA and asat bit complicated &
confusing here I reckon.  What is asat??  As you know, shankara clarifies
in taitereeya about sat and asat,  that once determined to be of a certain
form, what never deviates from the form is the sat and once determined to
be of a certain form what deviates from the form is asat.  IMHO, hare's
horn example does not come in this category whereas vyaktAvyakta rUpa of
prakruti is more suited for this definition.  And mithyA is that which
never exists but cognized due to avidyA.  Shankara gives the examples of
dviteeya Chandra, snake on the rope etc. for the mithyA vastu.  To clarify
that after the dawn of correct knowledge / cognition, one realizes that
the mithyA vastu was / is / will never be existed.  Please clarify.

MithyAtva is the same as sad-asad-vilakShaNatva. So a mithyA vastu, example
a pot or illusory silver/snake, can neither be asat (like a hare's horn),
nor sat (Brahman). You may say mithyA objects can be classified as
vyAvahArika (pot) and prAtibhAsika (illusory snake). The statement "vimataM
mithyA, dRshyatvAt" indicates there is a vyApya-vyApaka relation between
dRshyatva and mithyAtva, similar to the relation between smoke and fire.
Where there is smoke there is fire. Anything that is dRshya (can be known)
is also mithyA. pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA
mithyAtvam is one definition of mithyAtva which captures the fact that a
mithyA vastu will cease to exist in all three periods of time, once the
bhrama ends.

Anand

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:29 PM, V Subrahmanian via Advaita-l
> < advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> > Dear Anand ji,
> >
> > Even though the 'vṛtti' definition of the Yoga sutra is not admitted by
> the
> > Vedantin for the reason stated by you (vikalpa), I heard from Sri Mani
> > Dravid Sastrigal's talks on the Advaitasiddhi that Madhusudana Saraswati
> > accepts the Yoga Sutra definition (perhaps even the Bhāmati accepts) of
> > 'vikalpa: śabadjñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ' which is a definition of
> > sorts for a asat vastu such as hare's horn. If such is true, then the
> > meaning of 'vikalpa' as per the Yoga sutra within 'vṛtti' cannot be
> > imagination, kalpitam, adhyastam, etc. but asadvastu.  Could you please
> > clarify?
> >
>
> Yes, asat means non-existent and this fits the description of the hare's
> horn. By imagination, I meant a vRtti which does not have a corresponding
> object. But asat is not the same as mithyA, and the topic of dRshyatva has
> to do with mithyAtva. That is exactly why the definition of dRshyatva has
> to rule out things which are asat, apart from ruling out Brahman itself, in
> order to eliminate the defect of the definition being too wide.
>
> Anand
>
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Nice presentation again by Shri Venkatraghavanji. I would like some of my
>> notes on this.
>>
>> A well known advaitic statement is "vimataM mithyA dRshyatvAt, jaDatvAt
>> pariChinnatvAt, shuktirUpyavat". In this and the following two sections of
>> the advaitasiddhi, MadhusUdana deals with the topics of dRshyatva, jaDatva
>> and pariChinnatva. The pUrvapakShi lists six definitions for dRshyatva and
>> proceeds to raise objections against each. These six definitions are 1)
>> vRttivyApyatva (being pervaded by vRtti), 2) phalavyApyatva (being pervaded
>> by phala), 3) sAdhAraNa (i.e. both 1 and 2), 4) kadAcit kathancit
>> cidviShaytva (at some time in some way being an object of consciousness),
>> 5) svavyavahAre svAtirikta-saMvidantara-apekShAniyati (depending on a
>> cognition different from itself for its activity), and 6) asvaprakAshatva
>> (not being self-illumined).
>>
>> In discussing vRttivyApyatva, we have to be clear about what a vRtti is.
>> For instance, Patanjali's yogasUtra includes valid cognition (pramANa),
>> viparyaya (erroneous cognition), vikalpa (imagination), nidrA and smRti
>> (memory) among vRttis. However, the laghuchandrikA-kAra has not accepted
>> this definition of Patanjali, and instead opts for the shruti based
>> definition from the brihadAraNyaka Upanishad vAkya ending in "hrIrdhIrbhIr
>> ityetat sarvaM mana eva" (1.5.3), the reason being Patanjali's definition
>> includes vikalpa or imagination. If vikalpa were to be admitted as a vRtti,
>> we would have to accept the vRtti produced by a fictitious thing as a
>> hare's horn and this in turn would make dRshyatva a property of the hare's
>> horn. This would mean a hare's horn is mithyA too like the observable
>> objects in the world. But this is against the definition of mithyAtva, for
>> example, pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA
>> mithyAtvam, which rules out fictitious objects. Another thing to note here
>> is that vRtti must also include avidyAvRtti, not just antaHkaraNavRtti. To
>> explain, whenever an illusory object, such as silver in nacre,  is seen
>> or pleasure (sukha), etc are experienced, the corresponding vRtti is
>> avidyAvRtti, and we do accept the illusory object and sukha, etc, as mithyA
>> too. Also, by denying dRshyatva to objects of avidyAvRtti, there would be
>> defect of "sAdhanavaikalya" in the above mentioned rule "vimataM...", as
>> chandrikAkAra points out.
>>
>> More later.
>>
>> Anand
>>
>
>