[Advaita-l] Difficulty with Akhandakara Vrtti

H S Chandramouli hschandramouli at gmail.com
Sun Jun 21 02:00:18 CDT 2015


Dear Sri Ravi Kiran Ji,


 Reg your query


 << On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 7:28 AM, H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Dear Sri Anand Ji ,


 Reg << "This is that Devadatta", "You are That", etc. >> ,


 should not the complete statement of the knowledge be of the form << I
recognize This is that Devadatta . I recognize You are That etc >> . I feel
the determinate and indeterminate nature mentioned by you refers to the
Vishaya only and not to the complete understanding. The issue under
discussion is whether such knowledge ( determinate or indeterminate )
includes all three components “ I “ ( pramatru ) , “ recognize “ ( pramana
) and “ this is that Devadatta “ ( prameya ) or not . In my understanding ,
it does.


> In my understanding  it does. >>

What do you intend to say by the above understanding ?

Pl clarify the implication of this wrt svarUpa jnAna.."I recognize You are
That"

Thanks

Namaste >>



  Please refer to the thread on “ difficulty with akhandakara vritti “ . I
had posted my understanding of the term “ akhandakara vritti “ to which
certain objections were raised , specially with regards the triputi
pramatru, pramana and prameya. Sri Anand Ji had posted his understanding of
perception. I had sought clarification from him as above specifically
related to my understanding of “ akhandakara vritti “ and objections there
on. You would have seen his response also. Thankfully , he has confirmed my
understanding to be correct.


 That is the context . Sri Anand Ji had used the expression << This is that
Devadatta , You are That etc >> in his post. I just copied the same in my
query. It did not occur to me at that time , nor was it intended by me ,
that “ You are That “ may be construed as the Maha Vakya “ Tatvamasi “ . I
just took it as a common coloquial expression. I hope I am clear.


 Pranams and Regards



On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 11:14 PM, Ravi Kiran <ravikiranm108 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> Dear Sri Chandramouli Ji
>
> Didn't see your response to Sri Sadananda Ji in the forum. Not sure your
> response got posted in the forum , as sometimes it dont appear.
>
> Pl fwd a copy of the response to my email id.
>
> On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 7:28 AM, H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>> Dear Sri Anand Ji ,
>>
>>
>>  Reg << "This is that Devadatta", "You are That", etc. >> ,
>>
>>
>>  should not the complete statement of the knowledge be of the form << I
>> recognize This is that Devadatta . I recognize You are That etc >> . I
>> feel
>> the determinate and indeterminate nature mentioned by you refers to the
>> Vishaya only and not to the complete understanding. The issue under
>> discussion is whether such knowledge ( determinate or indeterminate )
>> includes all three components “ I “ ( pramatru ) , “ recognize “ ( pramana
>> ) and “ this is that Devadatta “ ( prameya ) or not . In my understanding
>> ,
>> it does.
>
>
> > In my understanding  it does.
>
> What do you intend to say by the above understanding ?
>
> Pl clarify the implication of this wrt svarUpa jnAna.."I recognize You are
> That"
>
> Thanks
>
> Namaste
>
>
>> Kindly clarify.
>>
>>
>>  Regards
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>
>> > The tarka saMgraha defines savikalpaka (determinate) and nirvikalpaka
>> > (indeterminate) jnAna (cognition) thus: tatra niShprakArakaM jnAnaM
>> > nirvikalpakam| saprakArakaM jnAnaM savikalpakam. An indeterminate
>> cognition
>> > is one without an attribute (or adjunct). A determinate cognition is one
>> > with an attribute (or adjunct). Any savikalpaka-GYAna can be broken down
>> > into three components, as per nyAya. Or more precisely, any
>> > savikalpaka-GYAna has an objective content (viShaya) consisting of 1) a
>> > visheShya or qualificand, 2) a visheShaNa (also prakAra), ie. a
>> qualifier,
>> > and 3) a saMsarga or relation between the qualificand and qualifier.
>> This
>> > also corresponds roughly to the subject-predicate form of a sentence in
>> > natural language. Consider the Sanskrit sentence "nIlo ghaTaH" (the pot
>> is
>> > blue.) Here the visheShya is "pot", the visheShaNa is "nIla" and the
>> > relation between them is that of inherence of blue color in the pot.
>> Such a
>> > relation is called "samavAya" in nyAya. The naiyAyikas (logicians) hold
>> > that the qualificand, the qualifier, and even the relation between them
>> is
>> > presented in an undifferentiated form in a nirvikalpaka cognition.
>> > JayantabhaTTa, in his nyAyamanjarI remarks that whatever reality is
>> > presented in a savikalpaka cognition is also presented in a nirvikalpaka
>> > one, the difference being that the nirvikalpaka cognition cannot be
>> > expressed in words, unlike the savikalpaka cognition which can. "tasmAd
>> ya
>> > eva vastvAtmA savikalpasya gocaraH sa eva nirvikalpasya
>> > shabdollekhavivarjitaH". Later logicians of the navya nyAya school, led
>> by
>> > ga~ngesha, further reduce the importance of the nirvikalpaka cognition
>> to
>> > being a mere supplier of the ingredients (qualificand, qualifier, and
>> the
>> > relation) to the savikalpaka cognition. In the logician's hands, the
>> > nirvikalpaka cognition is "raw perception", such as for example, the
>> > perception of a cow for the very first time by a child. In other words,
>> a
>> > nirvikalpaka cognition does not involve any *concept*, while the
>> > savikalpaka cognition is said to involve concepts.
>> >
>> > While advaitins have no great objection to the way the savikalpaka
>> > cognition is described by the logicians, there is a crucial difference
>> > between the two groups in the way the nirvikaplaka cognition is defined.
>> > For example, the vedAnta paribhAShA says: tacca pratyakShaM dvividhaM
>> > savikalpakanirvikalpakabhedAt| tatra savikalpakaM vaishiShTyAvagAhi
>> jnAnaM,
>> > yathA "ghaTamahaM jAnAmi" ityAdi jnAnam| nirvikalpakaM tu
>> saMsargAnavagAhi
>> > jnAnaM, yathA "so.ayam devadattaH", "tat tvamasi" ityAdivAkyajanyaM
>> jnAnam|
>> >
>> > Perception is of two kinds - determinate and indeterminate. The
>> determinate
>> > is the cognition which involves apprehending relatedness, as for example
>> > the cognition "I cognize a pot". The indeterminate, however, is the
>> > cognition which does not involve apprehending any relation, such as, for
>> > example, the cognition produced by the statements, "This is that
>> > Devadatta", "You are That", etc.
>> >
>> > So nirvikalpaka jnAna is not mere "raw perception", despite its not
>> > involving comprehending any relation. The reason is quite simple. A
>> > savikalpaka cognition may be expressed as aRb where two things a and b
>> are
>> > related by a relation R. However, the nirvikalpaka cognition cannot be
>> > expressed in the form aRb. Why? aRb implies a duality, between two
>> things a
>> > and b. The advaitin is unwilling to accept even the simple identity
>> > relation (tAdAtmya) in a nirvikalpaka cognition, as the laghuchandrikA
>> > states -  yatra tAdAtmyaM na sambhavati tatra akhaNDArthatvAt,
>> > jIvatveshatvopahitayoH tAdAtmya-asambhavAt akhaNDArthatvam.
>> >
>> > Taking the example of "this is that Devadatta", the Devadatta seen
>> earlier
>> > may have had a different appearance from the Devadatta seen presently.
>> > However, by discarding the contradicting features of the Devadatta seen
>> > earlier and the Devadatta seen now (jahadajahallakShaNa), one may
>> arrive at
>> > the conclusion "This is that Devadatta." The relation is not technically
>> > identity (tAdAtmya), but svarUpa-abheda, the natural non-difference
>> between
>> > the Devadatta seen earlier and now. The same process is briefly
>> described
>> > in the samkShepa shArIraka I.196-197. As CitsukhAchArya says:
>> > saMsargAsa~ngisamyagdhIhetutA yA girAmiyam uktAkhaNDArthatA, the
>> capacity
>> > of the words to produce a valid cognition not involving a relation is
>> said
>> > to be the property of impartite sense (of the words).
>> >
>> > Finally, the dvaitins hold that all perception is determinate only. As
>> BNK
>> > Sharma says, "all Pratyaksha is considered to be fundamentally
>> Savikalpaka
>> > or determinate in origin and nature..." (Philosophy of Madhvacharya,
>> page
>> > 144).
>> >
>> > Anand
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