[Advaita-l] A matter for Adjudication

[V Subrahmanian]

Namaste Madam,

Thank you for your perspective of the discussion.  Kindly permit me to offer
my comments, in between [  ]  on what you have said.

On Sat, Apr 10, 2010 at 2:16 AM, savithri devaraj <
savithri_devaraj at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Here is one interested member's opinion -
>
> This is not a matter for adjudication - where loukika pramANa and vaidika
> pramANa have not helped, how can consensus help?
>

[ I was not calling for a consensus in the sense that you might have
understood my post.  I was only aiming at an internal, individual, in-depth
study of the issue and arrive at an understanding that does not contradict
the Scripture and the Acharya's Bhashya.  In other words, what is intended
is only a qualitative exercise rather than a quantitative display of votes.]


>
> Vedanta is to be directly and individually intuited from sruti and teacher,
> not based on consensus.
>

[ I agree with you fully on this; samsaara is one's 'own' problem; no one
can share it.]

>
> Everyone's understanding is based on their own conditioning and
> capability/eligibility, and it should be left to that. The list serves the
> purpose of disseminating information, but can't go further than that. I
> don't think anyone can convince the other about their point of view, no
> matter how many times its argued and with any number of quotes, especially
> when both parties are using the saming quotes to promote their theory. Even
> if a million are against one, still the one can have his/her own valid
> understanding.
>

[ This is also very well said.  But I would like to add that history, both
contemporary and ancient, is replete with cases where people have given up
their very 'firm' stance and accepted other viewpoint (s) only being
influenced and ultimately convinced by others. I do not want to cite
cases.]

>
> It seems pointless to me to argue indefinitely whether a jnani has
> avidya-lesha. Then there really is no meaning for jnana. I don't see what
> the jnani has to do with the body or mind, isn't he/she beyond the triad of
> pramANa, prameya and pramAtru? For the ignorant onlooker he may seem to go
> on, but jnana removes avidya, hence jnani is beyond all avidya-kalpita
> samsara, why tie her down with avidya-lesha?
>

[ Madam. I am afraid, you are making the standard objection without actually
knowing what exactly the term/concept 'avidya lesha' means.  Is it not
reasonable, nay, essential,  on the part of a good student to really know
what he is admitting/accepting and refuting/rejecting?]

>
> How can knowledge remove beginingless avidya only partially? If so, veda
> would be only a partial pramANa, isn't it? Veda is a pramANa as it reveals
> our true nature, not because it creates new knowledge.
>
>
[  First of all, if you have read what the Acharyas have said about 'avidyaa
lesha', you will realize that they have explicitly stated that it is *not a
part of avidyaa.   *

If you read SSS's translation of the bhashyam for Brahma Sutra 4.1.15, you
will find that the Acharya says: Even though sublated, mithyAjnAnam, indeed
continues for some time....

Now,  your question can well be directed at Bhagavatpada:  How can
mithyAjnAna, even after being sublated, continue for some time?  Is it not,
then, that the Veda pramANa has not once and for all removed mithyAjnAna?
Your question addressed against the pUrvAchArya-s is very well applicable to
BhagavatpAda too.  Also, note how different is your charge (against
Bhagavatpada)  from that of the Dvaitins:

www.dvaita.org

 *Why does Tattvavâda deny **jîvan-mukti**?*

//*Because a **mukta**, or liberated person, should not even be physically
present in the material universe, unlike the un-liberated. A person who is
living in the world cannot be said to be free of sorrow born of material
contact, and also cannot be said to experience the joy of his own nature at
all times. The very act of living in a gross material body entails things
such as eating, sleeping, pleasure and pain, etc., which cannot be accepted
in a **mukta*.

*//The Advaitic concept of a **jîvanmukta** is also absurd because a person
who has surmounted the realm of perception and realized the Absolute (as
Advaita holds of a **mukta**) should not continue to exist within and
interact with the realm of perception that he has realized as being
not-Real—no one continues to perceive a snake after realizing that the
object of his perception is actually a rope. The suggestion that such
bondage to the world of perception continues for a while after the
occurrence of Realization, because of past attachments, is not tenable—such
attachments themselves are artifacts of the perceived world that has
supposedly been sublated, and should not continue to besiege the
consciousness of the Realized. If they do, then we have to either reject the
Realization that is said to have occurred, or else reject the notion that
the world of perception, as manifesting through the attachments on a
supposedly Realized person, can be sublated. In either instance, the notion
of **jîvanmukti** is not meaningful. //*

I have found Bhaskar ji's arguments over the years on this topic to be in no
way different from the above.  Would you join hands with the Dvaitins in
addressing these questions against Bhagavatpada? ]

( One may see this URL for a detailed, about 50 pages, response to the above
Dvaita objection :

http://atma.sulekha.com/blog/post/2008/06/shrigurubhyo-namah.htm  )

With warm regards,

subrahmanian.v





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