[Advaita-l] Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 8

[kuntimaddi sadananda]

[We are discussing Vedanta ParibhASha by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in series- based on
my understanding]

          8. Some Clarifications Regarding Internal Peceptions

Q. If happiness is a mental mood that is perceived directly, then the recollection
of that happiness, etc., from one’s own memory should also be considered as
perception of happiness directly and immediately. 

If we recall the definition of a pramANa when recollection is allowed – it says
‘abAdhita arthaviShayaka jnAnatvam’ (a) ‘non-negatable’ and (b) objectifiable
entity. However the question here is, does this recollection of happiness come under
direct and immediate perception, since there is no object out side and recollection
involves some kind of mental mood or vRitti which is perceived as it forms. It is
somewhat similar to the original vRitti that is formed when we perceive the
happiness.  Since the original mental mood of happiness that was perceived is stored
in the memory, question pertains to the recollection of that also involves a vRitti
jnaanam or knowledge of mental mood, although this vRitti is recollection of the
precious mental mood or to say correctly it involves knowledge of recollected mental
mood. 

A. VP says that is not so. The recollection of the mental mood is not the same as
the experience of the original mental mood.  The recollection involves recollection
of previously collected event. Recollection is occurring in the present while the
object of recollection is from the past. There is no corresponding ‘object’(state of
happy mental mood) for the recollected vRitti.  The recollection is always ‘I was
happy’ than ‘I am happy’.  To state clearly, the limiting adjuncts for the
recollected mental vRitti and the limiting adjunct of the happy mental mood when it
was experienced belong to two different times. Hence the corresponding limiting
consciousnesses of two vRittis are different.  Therefore, the criterion for
perception is the two limiting consciousnesses must occupy the same space and time,
for the union of the two to take place. 

As we discussed before, the experience of happiness as a mental mood is immediate
and direct. The vRitti that is formed is lllumined and the limiting reflected
consciousness is the knowledge of that vRitti – contents of the vRitti is
attributive for anger and hatred etc the contents are those emotional feeling
themselves.  For happiness which is conditional happiness – where I am happy
because.. conditional happiness is limiting happiness as reflected consciousness or
reflected happiness itself at its attribute. Expression of these feelings in thought
forms is different from that the feelings themselves. That is, being happy is
different from stating or thinking that I am happy. The recollection of happiness
can only be a vRitti in the thought form since one cannot regenerate the same mental
mood via recollection.  This is viewed by VP as non-unity of the limiting
consciousnesses of the two vRittis, the past and the present since unity of limiting
consciousness is the criterion for direct perceptual knowledge. 

Here we raise an important issue – If we consider that emotions are some kind of
mental perturbations expressed as vRittis in a general sense, then how these
emotional feelings in terms of vRittis are stored in the memory, for one to
recollect back in the future? I recognize that some of the discussions can border to
speculation since I do not know if we know how mind stores the information in the
memory that it can recollect later. The same problem how the genetic information is
coded in genes and stored to pass on to the next generation.  We just marvel at the
programmer and bow down at this intelligence and speculate how it is done.  For the
case of perception of objects outside – this is jar –that is a cow, the attributive
knowledge is stored as information in the memory stamped along with time and space
as conceived by the mind (in relation to previous or subsequent events).  In terms
of emotions of happiness, fear, anger, etc, it is our experience that we store not
those mental perturbations directly but thoughts associated with those feelings. 
However, thoughts are not feeling per sec. Hence the thought that I am happy is not
the same as being happy. It is our experience that we cannot be happy by
recollecting I was happy since recollection of I was happy does not generate the
same mental emotional happiness that I was at that time. The same is true for anger
and other emotions.  Hence it appears what is stored in the memory is not the exact
contents of emotional moods of the mind as such but knowledge as a subsequent
thought of those moods.  The recollection therefore involves the recollection of the
thought of happiness and not the state of happiness experienced in the past.  Hence
we can say that the contents of ‘I was happy’ thought and the mental mood of
happiness that existed when I was happy are different – there is no unity in
contents. Essentially VP says is that by recollecting that I was angry, I cannot be
angry now. I can again be angry now, if I recapitulate all the thoughts or
situations that caused that original anger and still feel that those accounts have
not been settled. This time the anger could be even more or less intense depending
on how strong the rekindled emotions are. Negative emotions like anger, hatred, or
frustrations etc can be stronger since they are intense and continuous recollection
would only reinforce those emotions. One can get cocooned in those repeated emotions
and frustrations that one can become neurotic or mentally depressed. In such cases,
it is not the recollection of the emotions but recreation of those emotions, which
are perceived immediately as they rise in the mind. 

Question related to dharma and adharma: 

Q. What about then the merits and demerits, dharma or adharma or righteous and
unrighteous. One may be righteous and unrighteous in himself as his character, but
consciously become aware of it only through other’s verbal testimony as- “you are
righteous,” or “you are unrighteous,” - or by subsequent reactions that the
righteousness or unrighteousness cause in terms of pleasant or unpleasant situations
in one’s life.  In these cases, the verbal testimony of others occurs at different
times and places in relation to the acts of righteousness or unrighteousness. 
Similarly, the reactions in terms of good and bad occur at different times and
places.  Thus in relation to the mental moods of righteousness and unrighteousness
and the verbal testimony or its reactions in terms of good and bad, there is a unity
in the limiting consciousnesses of the past and present since one become conscious
of these only by the testimonies and reactions.  There the requirement of perception
is being fulfilled – that is the requirement of the unity in the limiting
consciousnesses – yet there is no direct and immediate perception of righteousness
or unrighteousness. Hence the objection is that requirement of unity of limiting
consciousnesses is not sufficient for perceptual knowledge or unduly extensive for
perceptual knowledge. 

Note: Questions involved extension of the concept of perception to abstract ideas or
‘objects’ whose attributes are not well defined, but normally known through Agama
pramANa or shabda pramANa or through moral established codes of conduct.  They are
not tangible like objects or experienced like emotions. That righteousness or
unrighteousness form mental moods need to be established first before one inquires
of the unity of limiting consciousness of these with that of verbal testimony or
good and bad effects in life.

A. VP answers in specifying what constitutes the perception in more solid ground.
For perception, the object perceived must have attributes that qualify the object –
hence we stated before that all objective knowledge is attributive knowledge and
that is formulated on firmer grounds here. Those attributes must also be perceptible
either through the senses or through the mind. Even if one considers the
righteousness and unrighteousness are attributes of the mind, they are not
perceptible.  They can be known only though their effects or by verbal testimony. 
VP says certain attributes are perceptible and certain others are not and that
depends on the intrinsic nature of the object they qualify. For example, we learn in
Chemistry that water is colorless, odorless, tasteless, liquid which are actually
non-perceptible attributes that do not identify what water is but identify what is
not water. Vedanta uses the similar language in indicating Brahman, starting from
imperceptible, infinite, non-dual, unthinkable, etc. Nyaaya system of philosophy
considers that righteousness and unrighteousness are attributes of the self, similar
to happiness. In Advaita, Self has no attributes, and happiness is not attribute of
the self but its intrinsic nature – which is limitless; and limitlessness is
happiness, anatam eva anandam. 

However, the verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptual knowledge under certain
cases, says VP, if the object that is being indicated is right there being
experienced.  For example when one is happy and if another says, ‘you are happy’,
the knowledge arising from the verbal statement coincides with the knowledge of the
mental mood that is present.  This becomes clearer in the example of the missing
tenth man story, where the verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptual knowledge
of the tenth man, who is experienced right there.  When ten people crossed the river
and each one counted to make sure everyone in the group has crossed the river.  Each
one came up with only nine when he counted, and everyone concluded that the tenth
man is missing.  A wise man came to their rescue and asked them to count again and
when the counting stopped at nine, the wise man said – ‘you are the tenth man’ –
Thus although all the ten were there, each one was missing to count himself and
therefore coming up one short. Here the verbal statement – you are the tenth man –
immediately and directly leads to perceptual knowledge, since the object that is
pointed is right there in front, which is immediately accessible ether to the senses
and/or to the mind. Hence verbal testimony can lead to direct and immediate
perceptual knowledge if the object of perception is direct and immediately
perceptible. 

We already discussed about the composite perceptual and inferential knowledge
involved in the knowledge taking the example of -there is fire on the distant hill. 
The hill and the smoke are directly perceived by the senses, while the fire is
inferred using logic of cause (hetu) and effect (sAdhya) relationship (vyaapti
jnaanam). The hill is on fire is an inferential knowledge while that the hill and
the smoke on the hill are direct perceptual knowledge. Thus there is a combination
of mediate and immediate knowledge. 

In many instances the inferential knowledge is based partly on perceptions.  Take
the example of a statement after seeing a piece of sandal wood from a distance –
‘that is a fragrant piece of Sandal wood’  - in this statement what is perceived is
only the sandal wood and based on prior experience one is making the statement that
the sandal wood has fragrance, although the fragrance is currently not perceived by
the nose.  Here we have both immediate knowledge – which is the perception of the
sandal wood and mediate knowledge that it is fragrant based on previous memory
involving experience of the connecting link - sandal wood and its fragrance. Thus we
know from the past experiences that if it is sandal wood it must have fragrance –
That is the concomitant relation between sandal wood and its fragrance is already
established before using past experiences.  If one never had that experience, then
he cannot make a statement ‘that is a fragrant piece of sandal wood’ – all he can
say is ‘that is a piece of sandal wood’.  If he does not know that how sandal wood
looks like, then he can say ‘that is the piece of wood’.  VP makes a distinction
here of imperceptible attributes which are different from the above cause where the
fragrance is not perceptible, not because it is imperceptible but because the object
is too far for the ocular knowledge to take place. In contrast there are certain
imperceptible attributes. Imperceptibles are when they are beyond the capability of
the instruments of perception – like eyes can see only the visible spectrum, etc. –
X-rays cannot be seen by the eyes, they are imperceptible.  

Question related to Jaati: 

In the example of ‘this is a fragrant piece of a sandal wood’ – there is mixture of
both immediate and direct as well as mediate and indirect knowledge. That is
considered in Nyaaya philosophy as defective and is called ‘sankara’ – a cross
between two diagonally opposite entities – direct and immediate on one side and
indirect and mediate on the other.  Hence the next objection is based on position of
Nyaaya philosophy. 

Q. If we admit the cross between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge as in the
example above then we have problem of discarding or rejecting jaati or genus as
distinct category.  

The objection is based on the philosophical position of Nyaaya which admits that
jaati as fundamental and eternal category which does not allow co-existence of
mutually opposite characteristics – in our case the immediate on one side and
mediate on the other related to objective knowledge.  We discussed jaati before as
general characteristics of given species like jaati of cows is different from that
of horses.  Jaati corresponds to generic characteristics that are common for all
cows which make a cow a cow and not a horse. Hence jaati of cow is different from
that of horse. Suppose we find an animal that has some of the cow characteristics
and some of the horse characteristics, then it can be called cow and horse
simultaneously or neither a cow nor a horse. We are now violating the jaatis of
both. That is we are putting mutually exclusive characteristics in one locus, i.e.
jaati of cow excludes jaati of horse. More importantly, we have a problem of
separating cow jaati from horse jaati. If we have animals that have grades between
the cow and horse, the naming of cow jaati separate form horse jaati becomes
meaningless.  Hence this cross between diagonally opposite entities makes jaati a
non fundamental and non-eternal category.  There is a problem and hence an
objection. 

A. A simple answer by a Vedantin is – So What? – The reason is advaitin does not
admit jaati as fundamental and eternal category. He is only concerned about the
attributes and if they form into a class or jaati, let that be so, but if they do
not form then there is no violation.  The necessity or requirement for the
attributes to fall into categories (jaatis), for perception to be valid is the
problem.  Adviata take the attributes as they exist – we cannot force the attributes
to fall into categories that we have set a priory. Hence if the objection is that
jaati as fundamental category is being compromised, the answer is that is good. It
only shows that jaati is not a fundamental eternal category. VP says in the
perception of an object ‘this is a jar’ there is already proof of existence of an
attribute ‘jarhood’ which makes a jar a jar and not a flower vase.  We have no
preset jarhood category into which all jar have to belong.  There is no requirement
that for the perception to be valid there has to be also some generic attribute for
it to be a jar. Hence generic attribute as an entity itself is a fictitious. Not
only such a generic attribute cannot be perceived but it can not be inferred either.


Relation between an attribute and its substantive:

At this juncture VP addresses another philosophical aspect that concerns about the
relation between attribute and it substantive. Here I am providing some background,
although this will be discussed in detail again.  Suppose we say this is a blue
lotus.  General understanding is blue is an attribute or visheShaNa and lotus is
substantive or visheshya. A question is posed in philosophy – how is the attribute,
blue, related to its substantive, lotus.  The first assertion is they are
inseparable. I cannot remove blue from the lotus. If they are two separate objects,
the relation between the attribute and the substantive is called samyoga – that is
temporarily joining together which are separable. For example, consider a ‘book on
the table’.  The table qualifies the book since book on the table is different from
the book on the floor. In this case even the book qualifies the table too as table
with a book on it compare to another table without a book on it. They have samaana
adhikaraNa – each equally qualifies the other and therefore separable. samyoga
brings two dravyas or substantives together.  These are called incidental
qualifications or taTastha lakshaNa. However if we talk about blue lotus, I cannot
remove blue color from lotus. In addition blue cannot exist without a locus for its
existence while lotus can exist without being blue although we cannot call it
anymore as blue lotus. Hence for blue lotus to be blue lotus, the two are
inseparable. Also blue is not the same as lotus and lotus is not the same as
blueness. Although they are mutually exclusive, one depends on the other and they
remain inseparable. How are the two related, that is how is blue connected to the
lotus, since they are two distinct entities? (We are using the term ‘entity’
loosely, since blue cannot be a substantive of its own and always need a locus. That
is blue color cannot exist separately without being associated with some noun or
substantive like blue powder, blue pencil, blue car, blue sky, etc. One is a
dependent entity while the other is independent entity) According to Nyaaya
vaiseshikas or tarkikas (Indian logicians), the two – the inseparable but distinct
attribute and substantive - are related by what they call samavaaya, meaning
inherence. The blue color is inherent in the blue lotus since they are inseparable. 
Like jaati that we discussed above, this ‘inherence’ or samavAya’ is considered by
Logicians as fundamental eternal relation relating visheShaNa and visheShya or
attribute and its locus. Other philosophers criticize this concept heavily using
dialectic arguments. The normal objection is that bringing a separate relation to
relate attribute and substantive would result in infinite regress, since we need to
bring in another samavaaya to relate this samavaaya relation, and so on, while the
Nayyayikas claim we do not need another samavaaya to relate samavaaya. Then how do
the other philosophies address this relation between attribute and its noun or
substantive? VishiShTAdvaita contends that there is no need to have a separate
relation to relate the two – since they are inseparable –and that is how they are
related -  they call it as apRitak siddhi – essentially means inseparable
relationship. Actually this is not saying much other than stating the fact.   But
the problem comes if we ask a more pertinent question – what is a lotus or how one
defines a lotus.  Blue lotus can be defined a lotus with a blue color. However, the
term blue lotus becomes relevant only if there are other lotuses that are not blue.
If there is no other lotus that has color different from blue, then calling it as
blue lotus is more or less unnecessary – like calling my daughter as my first
daughter when I have only one daughter. The definition of any object should be such
that it distinguishes uniquely from all other objects in the world.  All definitions
are only attributive in the sense we define an object using its attributes. This
implies that without those distinguishing attributes one cannot define an object
uniquely to separate it from others. Here we arrive at attributes that are
swAbhAvikam or inherent – that is attributes that are inherent with the object in
contrast to tatasta lakshaNas which are incidental attributes, like book on the
table, etc. These inherent attributes cannot be separated from the object that they
define. Even in these inherent attributes, swAbhAvika, we can make further
distinctions – those that are necessary and those that are necessary and sufficient.
Since both are necessary to define the object, they are swAbhAvikam but among these,
there are those that are necessary and sufficient to define the object
unambiguously.  This can be illustrated by taking example of Sugar.  We know that
Sugar is sweet; the sweetness is its attribute. Hence sweetness is its inherent
qualification or swAbhAvika lakshaNa.  It is also a necessary qualification since if
it is not sweet it cannot be sugar, even if it looks like one. Yet, sweetness is
necessary but not sufficient qualification to define sugar. To qualify it as
necessary and sufficient qualification, it has to satisfy a converse statement.
Converse of ‘sugar is sweet’ is ‘sweet is sugar’. The converse statement states that
if something is sweet, it has to be sugar – if that is applicable at all times then
sweetness becomes both necessary and sufficient qualification to define sugar. The
necessary and sufficient qualification is called swarUpa lakshaNa. SwarUpa lakshaNa
forms a very rigorous definition for any object to distinguish uniquely that object
from the rest of the objects in the universe. We find that sweetness is not a
swarUpalakshaNa for sugar, since if something is sweet it could be many other things
as well, besides sugar – like glucose, fructose, aspartame, etc. Hence sweetness is
not swarUpa lakshaNa although it is swAbhAvika lakshaNa. Then what is the swaruupa
lakshaNa of sugar? According to Chemistry the unique definition of sugar or sucrose
is C12H22O11 – the chemical structure, perhaps to be written in correct format to
distinguish it from its isomers.  Sugar is C12H22O11; and C12H22O11 is sugar, and
there are no two ways about it.  It is necessary and sufficient condition to qualify
as swarUpa lakshaNa of sugar. SwarUpam also means its intrinsic structure and
rightly its chemical structure defines it swarUpam. In fact in any chemical
analysis, if an unknown compound is given, chemists arrive its chemical structure or
swarUpa lakshaNa by evaluating all its physical and chemical properties along with
its molecular weight. Once the structure is determined, all its intrinsic qualities
are known. To recapitulate again, the swarUpa lakshaNa is determined by applying a
converse statement – In the case of sugar example the direct statement is ‘sugar is
C12H22O11’ and the converse statement is ‘C12H22O11  is sugar’. Similarly H2O is
water, NH3 is ammonia, etc.  

Looking at swarUpa lakshaNa or intrinsic structure, it is also clear now that every
object is made up of components arranged in a particular order. In the case of
sugar, the components are Hydrogen, Carbon, and Oxygen.  Further examination reveals
that each one of them is again made up of smaller components but arranged in each in
some fixed order.  For example, the constituents of sugar, Carbon, hydrogen, and
Oxygen are made up of electrons, protons and neutrons, but organized in a particular
order. This is true for any object. Since each object is divisible into finer
components and each component has its own swarUpa lakshaNa – it implies that every
object is only relevant with its intrinsic structure until is further divided its
constituent objects. Hence no object is final or in philosophical terms is
absolutely real. They have only validity in their sphere of application or
transaction. The relative realities are called vyaavahaarika satyam or transactional
reality. 

Hence every object in the universe is made of finer components.  If so, what is the
fundamental basis or material cause for the whole Universe?  Science has yet to find
the ultimate particles. According to Vedanta, consciousness alone is the ultimate
and it is part-less that is it is not made of any further components. That is
defined as Brahman. Interestingly Vedanta defines Brahman using the converse
statement ‘consciousness is Brahman’, prajnaanam brahma, instead of stating directly
that Brahman is a conscious entity. Converse statement is rigorous statement and as
discussed above it defines the intrinsic structure or swarUpa lakshaNa, that is,
both necessary and sufficient qualification for the object defined. It means not
only Brahman is consciousness, consciousness is Brahman and there are no two ways
about it.  Implication is that if there is consciousness anywhere, by definition it
has to be Brahman – similar to the fact that if there is H2O anywhere it has to be
water. Vedanta defines Brahman using three converse statements – Satyam, jnaanam,
anantam brahma –existence-consciousness or knowledge and limitless is Brahman. Since
they are defined conversely they form the swarUpa lakshaNas for Brahman. Hence
wherever there is existence – that existence part is Brahman. Wherever there is
knowledge, that knowledge part is Brahman – a statement that parallels to the VP
declarative statement related to perceptual knowledge is pure consciousness.
Finally, wherever there is limitless which expresses as happiness, that is Brahman. 

All this discussion is intended to arrive at fundamental level that the substantive
for any object in this universe is nothing other than Brahman.  If the substantive
is Brahman and attributes belong to the object, then the question is how the
attribute is related to its substantive? Hence according to Advaita Vedanta, there
cannot be any valid relation. One can talk about relation only for entities that are
ontologically the same.  But for objects where there is no fundamental substantive
other than Brahman, and there cannot be any valid relation between Brahman and the
attributes of the objects that I perceive. Taking the example of snake that is
projected where there is a rope, what is the relation between the rope that is three
and snake that I see?  There cannot be any valid relation between the two – other
than saying it is an error of superimposition or adhyaasa. When all pervading
existence-consciousness Brahman is seen as varieties of objects just as gold is seen
as verities of objects, the relation between the forms and the names is only
adhyaasa, an error of superimposition.  What is the relation between ring and the
gold? Gold has nothing to do with ring or bangle, since it exists just as Gold all
the time without undergoing any mutations. Ring is just form for a name; the
relation is adhyaasa, a superimposed form on gold and name for that form. 

Coming back to topic, NyayavaisheShikas consider samavAya that relates an attribute
to its substantive as fundamental eternal entity.  VP dismisses this as baseless. VP
says the whole universe is transitory, that is, it keeps changing continuously.  If
something is changing continuously, then there has to be some substantive that
remains changeless in the changing things.  If ring changes into bangle, and bangle
into necklace, there has to be a substantive that is different from a ring or
necklace that remain as changeless in all these changes.  In this case gold remains
changeless as the ring changes to bangle and bangle to necklace, etc. Hence if the
world is continuously changing as we can see, then there has to be a changeless
entity in the changing things. Hence Brahman alone can be changeless substantive for
the transient universe. Given the transitory nature of the universe, to talk about
jaati and samavAya as eternal and inherent entities is meaningless. To talk about
the generic attributes like jarhood or cowness or horseness, etc., as eternal
entities, when the whole universe itself is transient, also has little meaning.
Similarly all attributes and their knowledge are valid only at vyaavahaarika level
and other than Brahman nothing else is fundamental and eternal. Hence objection that
jaati is being compromised by admitting simultaneously both mediate and immediate
knowledge has no relevance.  In fact, if we examine closely it is not the same
knowledge that is simultaneously categorized as mediate and immediate knowledge.  In
the statement – ‘that is fragrant piece of sandal wood’ – immediate part of
knowledge and mediate part of knowledge are different. Hence both mediate and
immediate knowledge do not corresponds to the same attributive knowledge, to cause
any contradiction. They correspond to two different sense inputs which do not
overlap. 

In a statement ‘the hill is on fire’, the mental states or vRittis are different for
the hill and for the fire. Hill is directly and immediately perceived. Fire is not
directly and immediately cognized.  Fire is inferred since we can see smoke on the
hill, since there cannot be smoke without a fire. We conclude that hill is on fire.
Knowledge of fire is deduced based on the perceptual knowledge of both the hill and
the smoke.  The Vritties associated with hill and smoke have their attributes
grasped by the senses. Hence cognition of hill and smoke is direct and immediate. 
The mind has to go through the deductive reasoning to arrive that the hill is on
fire. This vRitti is different from that of hill or smoke.  For the fire vRitti,
there are no corresponding attributes of the fire, since there is no sense data of
fire on the hill.  The knowledge that the hill is on fire therefore is only mediate
and indirect. Hence there is no contradiction involved with respect mediate and
immediate knowledge occurring simultaneously regarding the same limiting
consciousness. In fact knowledge of the fire could be debatable, since it is a
deductive knowledge, which can be faulty if the vyaapti (relation between cause and
effect) is defective.  That is if the logic is not fool proof, the deduction (that
hill is on fire) based on the observed perceived fact (hill and smoke) could be
erroneous.  There are many theories in science which were proved wrong by subsequent
data.  Hence not only we have valid knowledge about the presence of hill and smoke
but also possibility of invalid knowledge of fire if vyaapti (related to smoke and
fire) is not fully established. With this example, VP summarizes the criterion for
perceptual knowledge. 

Perceptual knowledge which is direct and immediate occurs when the vRitti or mental
mood arises in the form of an object. i.e. in the form containing all the attributes
of the object, thus establishing one to one correspondence between the object and
the vRitti formed.  That insures the limiting consciousness (existence) in the form
of an object coincides with the limiting consciousness in the form of vRitti in the
mind.  In both the object and the vRitti – two things are same. One is the
substantive that is the existence is the same in both the VRitti and the object (it
could manifest also as reflected consciousness in the Vritti since vRitti is part of
the mind which as a subtle matter can reflect consciousness much more than the inert
object outside). Second, the attributes are also same in both the object and the
vRitti to the degree that the senses could measure. Hence as long as the attributes
are measurable by the appropriate senses and to the degree they are measured, the
vRitti of the object is formed.  The vRitti thus formed is immediately illumined as
it forms and the reflected consciousness reveals the object to the subject, insuring
the direct and immediate perceptual knowledge of the object. 

Hari Om!
Sadananda