[Advaita-l] AchArya on the Objects of the Waking State (B.S. II.2.29)

[br_vinayaka]

Dear Advaitins,

While commenting on the aforementioned sutra AchArya
makes the
following comment:

||jAgaritOpalabdham vastu na ksyAmchidapyavasthAyAm
bAdhyatE||

"Those things, on the other hand, of which we are
conscious in our
waking state, such as posts and the like, are 'never'
negated in 'any'
state"

What is he exactly conveying by this statement? Aren't
waking
objects negated in the dream and sushupti/samadhi
state? Can
anybody elaborate this abstruse topic which is
seemingly
contradicting the mAndUkya kArika(In my
understanding/mis-
understanding?)? I am giving the full commentary along
with the
sUtra for reference which is as under:

29. And on account of their difference of nature (the
ideas of the
waking state) are not like those of a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the
averment made by the
Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which
we are
conscious in the waking state, may arise in the
absence of external
objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being
ideas alike.--The
two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on
the same
footing, on account of the difference of their
character. They
differ as follows.--The things of which we are
conscious in a dream
are negated by our waking consciousness. 'I wrongly
thought that I
had a meeting with a great man; no such meeting took
place, but my
mind was dulled by slumber, and so the false idea
arose.' In an
analogous manner the things of which we are conscious
when under the
influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are
negated by our
ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other
hand, of which we
are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and
the like, are
never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of
a dream are
acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking
state are acts
of immediate consciousness; and the distinction
between remembrance
and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by
every one as
being founded on the absence or presence of the
object. When, for
instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not
directly
perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As
thus the
distinction between the two states is evident to every
one, it is
impossible to formulate the inference that waking
consciousness is
false because it is mere consciousness, such as
dreaming
consciousness; for we certainly cannot allow would-be
philosophers
to deny the truth of what is directly evident to
themselves. Just
because they feel the absurdity of denying what is
evident to
themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate
the
baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from
those ideas
themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their
having certain
attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming
state. But if
some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of
the latter's
own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the
thing having
certain attributes in common with some other thing.
Fire, which is
felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on
the ground of
its having attributes in common with water. And the
difference of
nature between the waking and the sleeping state we
have already
shown.

Yours in Sri Ramakrishna,

Br. Vinayaka.




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