advaita-siddhi 10 (Second definition of MithyAtva)

[Anand Hudli]

Continuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we will study
 next the second definition of mithyAtva that is defended by
 MadhusUdana SarasvatI. Other articles in this series may be
 retrieved by searching for "siddhi" in the subject line.
 It is especially useful to be familiar with basic nyAya terminology
 as explained in the third and fourth parts of the series.
 Without such  familiarity, the discussion below may not make
 much sense at all!

  atha dvitIyamithyAtvopapattiH
  -----------------------------

 advaita-siddhi text:

 pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |

 Alternatively, mithyAtva (unreality) of something is that which is the
counter-positive or absential adjunct (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation
(a negation for all three periods of time, past, present, and future) in
the very substratum where it (the thing) is cognized.

 This is the second definition of mithyAtva that is taken up by
 MadhusUdana in his defense of mithyAtva of dvaita. This alternative
 definition is based on shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti
 kiJNchana", as BrahmAnanda says in his gauDabrahmAnandI, "neha
 nAnAstI"tyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha".

 The second definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman, the
 author of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa.

 It is important to understand this definition and the significance of
 the terms involved. As in the case of the first definition of mithyAtva,
 what is alIka or a fictitious entity is NOT the mithyAtva that is
 used to describe the world. The mithyAtva of the world is akin to the
 illusion of the snake over a rope or silver in nacre. Upon realizing
 that the snake is illusory, one exclaims "The snake is unreal. The snake
 was never there to begin with, it is not there now, and it will never be
 there in the future!"

 This is the mithyAtva (unreality) of the world that is being talked
 about.

 One important point to remember is that the in order for a thing to
 be mithyA or unreal according to this definition, it MUST be cognized
 or perceived in some susbtratum. This is a necessary condition for
 something to be called mithyA. What is perceived is  mithyA.
 That which can never be perceived, a chimera such as the horns of
 a hare, is NOT being called mithyA. Rather it is asat. And Brahman
 is sat. MithyAtva is different from these two, ie. mithyAtva is
 sadasadvilaxaNa.

 BrahmAnanda, in his gaUDabrahmAnandI commentary on the advaita-siddhi,
 therefore, defines the term pratipanna-upAdhi as follows:

 pratipannaH svaprakArakadhIvisheshhyaH ya upAdhiradhikaraNaM tannishhTho
 yastraikAlikanishhedho .atyanta-abhAvastatpratiyogitvamityarthaH |

pratipanna means the qualificand of the cognition that has the (thing
that is mithyA) as the qualifier. Such a qualificand that is the substratum
is "pratipanna-upAdhi". The counter-positive of the absolute negation or
the negation for all periods of time in the substratum (is called
mithyA). This definition rules out equating what is mithyA with alIka, a
fictitious entity. Yet another type of negation is also being ruled out
in the definition. What is fictitious is not perceived anywhere. The other
extreme is the negation that is always empirically perceived. For example,
a pot is NOT perceived as existing in the threads that make a cloth.
There are things in the empirical world that are not cognized as
existing in things different from themselves.
If the advaitin means by mithyAtva a fact such as a pot's being negated
in the threads of a cloth, he is stating what is already established
and therefore open to the objection of "siddha-sAdhana doshha".
But this is type of negation is being ruled out by the term
"svaprakArakadhIvisheshhya". In order for the definition of mithyAtva
to apply to the negation of the pot in threads of a cloth, the pot
will have to have been perceived as existing in the threads of a
cloth. But no such cognition of a pot in threads of a cloth ever
occurs. So the definition of mithyAtva does not apply to such
obvious negations.

 ViTThalesha (who comments on the gauDa-brahmAnandI) therefore remarks:

 vastutastu svaprakArakatvopAdAnaM tuchchha-ativyAptivAraNAya

 Actually, the mention of "having it as the qualifier" is for
 the purpose of ruling out something that is trivial (fictitious entity)
 and a definition that is too wide (ativyApti).

 Another type of negation or absence is also being ruled out by the
 insertion of the term "traikAlika" in the definition. This is to
 counter an  objection as follows. There is an absence of a thing
 such as a pot before it comes into being, called the prAgabhAva.
 After the pot is destroyed, there is another type of absence (abhAva)
 called "dhvaMsa-abhAva." Does the advaitin mean by mithyAtva an
 absence that is one of these types? Or does he mean the mutual
 negation (mutual-absence or anyonya-abhAva or bheda) that is
 perceived between things such as a pot and the pieces of the pot
 after it is destroyed? In either case, the advaitin is committing
 the mistake of siddha-sAdhana, proving what is already established.
 In order to reject this objection, the definition of mithyAtva
 has the term "traikAlika". The negation that is being described
 in the definition is traikAlika, that holds for all times. In the
 case of prAgabhAva, dhvaMsa-abhAva, and bheda in the above
 examples, there is no absolute negation (atyanta-abhAva), that
 which holds for all times.

 Therefore, BrahmAnanda says:

 kapAladinishhThabheda-dhvaMsAdipratiyogitvamAdAya siddha-sAdhanaM
 syAdatastraikAliketi |

 (The opponent may) charge us with "siddha-sAdhana" by taking the
 pratiyogitva (counter-positive-ness) of the abhAva (absence) to be the
 difference or posterior negation (dhvaMsa-abhAva) in things such as the
 pieces of a pot. (To counter this we have added the term) "traikAlika"
 in the definition.

 In the next part, we will see how the opponent raises an important
 objection to this definition.

 Anand

--
bhava shankara deshikame sharaNam

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