Shastra - as a pramana?
Anand Hudli
Anand_Hudli_at_USININ31 at BMC.BOEHRINGER-MANNHEIM.COM
Thu May 22 15:17:50 CDT 1997
Sadananda wrote:
>Vidya, thanks for the response.
>>Regarding Sadananda's comments on the apaurusheyatvam of Sruti :-
>>
>>As I see it, advaita vedAnta can have two functions, one that is pure
>>philosophizing (advaita) independent of source texts, and one that is
>>textual exegesis (vedAnta). As textual exegesis, advaita vedaanta has also
>>functioned as religion. Now, in a religious tradition, one has to follow
>>certain norms that define the source texts. It is convenient to follow
>>those laid down by the mImAmsA sUtras, whose primary function was textual
>>exegesis.
>With this and the analysis Vidya has provided I have no disagreements. As
>a science, I can appreciate vedas and all other knowledge as apourusheya,
>and again Advaita not as religion but as a fact.
>But pramana as a different connotation. Eyes are pramanas for seeing -
>say colors - ears for sound etc implies that no other means avaible
>other those particualar indriyas. Vedanta as the only pramana implies is
>that there is no other means available for knowing. Discussion on Sutra 3
> - shaastrayonitwaat - has been done to establish that the Veadanta is the
>only pramana. My arguments presented in the earlier note said that I
> donot need vedanta to prove my existence, my reality as single, and that
> it is non-negetable and hence the finality of the advaitic state. To
>establish that I am sat and chit I do not need any pramana and I am ananda
> is by analysis of experiences.
I read your interesting article to which Vidya replied. Due to lack of
time, I was unable to write something convincing. I will still try.
As far as I understand, using logic, it is possible to conclude that
advaita is *plausible*. Shriharshha has shown in his khaNDanakhaNDa
khaadya, in arguing with the realism of Nyaaya, that logic is
insufficient to prove certain things, for example, the reality of the
world. Logic can give us a perfectly *plausible* theory, but that is
it. There is always scope for counter-arguments.
It follows that you cannot conclusively prove that there is a thing
such as Brahman, and you are That Brahman. You make a good case in
proving that the "I" (Atman) is devoid of all associations and
relationships. But that does not conclusively show that the Atman
is the same as the ultimate reality and that the Atman in you is the
same as the Atman in me and the Atman in the next person. Is the
Atman in me and the Atman in you the same? Are they different?
Are they the parts of a bigger Atman? Or are they somehow
simultaneously the same and different? Many such difficult
questions assail the purely logical approach. If you say
my Atman is the same as yours, I can use logic to support some other
theory, such as, the two are parts of a bigger Atman. Even if the
Atman in you is the same as the Atman in me, I can still say they
are no doubt identical, but parts of the bigger Atman. This bigger
Atman will have many such identical Atman's as parts.
So what we need here a mahaavaakya from the Vedaanta that tells us
conclusively "tat tvam asi, shvetaketo!" (You are That.)
Your Atman is the same Brahman as my Atman is. The Atman of
everybody is the same. There is no bigger Atman which includes the
sum of all these identical Atmans. There is just one Atman and
everybody's Atman is It. This Atman is all there is.
The subjective idealist will do a little better, but not a whole
lot. The idealist can argue that there is only one individual, and the
whole world, including other individuals, is a mental creation of
this individual. But again,
how do you guarantee that this individual, who imagines the
world, is eternal? As long as the individual exists, there is
only one entity that exists, but if and when it perishes,
there will be a void (shuunyataa). So we will be dangerously
close to nihilism, if we make a purely idealist argument.
Again, Vedaanta comes to the rescue, because it says,
"etasya vaa aksharasya prashaasane gaargi!", "by the
command of this imperishable, O Gaargi!" (Br. Up.), and also
the Giitaa, which says, "aksharaM brahma paramaM",
"The supreme Brahman is imperishable."
In conclusion, logical thought must be *guided* by Shruti. Logical
thought independent of Shruti can *point* to the *possibility* of
advaitic conclusions, but cannot conclusively prove them. That is
because, just as logic can make advaitic conclusions *plausible*,
it can also make other theories so.
Now, some people may be perfectly happy with accepting something
which is *plausible* to be indeed the truth. But no
true seeker will accept it. However, the true seeker will accept
something as the truth, if it is both logically plausible and
supported by the words of the infallible Veda.
Also, from a practical point of view, advaitins have recognized that
hearing, relfecting, and meditating (shravaNa, manana, nididhyaasana)
of Vedaantic texts to be the means to Self-realization. In fact,
the standard position is that through Vedaantic texts alone, and not
by any other means, is self-realization attained. Lest people think
that logic has no role to play in advaita, it must be mentioned that
logic is used at every step, but only *guided* by shruti.
I will try to find out more from Shriharshha's work. His main
arguments are directed at the Nyaaya realists, but they also
apply to subjective idealists. Modern philosophers classify
him as an idealist, but this is inaccurate. Shriharshha was
an advaitic logician par excellence. advaitins are neither realists
nor idealists. They are just that - advaitins!
>As I pointedout that for Dwaitins, I see the need to establish Vedanta as
>Pramana, provide a santity as Apourusheyatwam. Otherwise they have no basis
>to prove that Lord Narayana is the supreme God Head! But I donot see the
>need for that advaitins, other than politically (same as religiously!) it
> is good!
>Apourusheyatvam for the vedas per sec obviously is a belief, you can call
> it as an axim if you like. Belief need not be questioned and to be
> argued or debated.
>My comment is only that Apourusheyatwam is not necessory to establish
>Advaita as the truth.
It is not so much the apaurusheyatva as the infallible nature of the
Vedas that is important in establishing advaita. As you pointed out,
even physics can be called apaurusheya, because physicists did not
write physics; they discovered physical laws. But laws of physics
discovered by Newton were proved wrong (to some extent at least) by
those laws which Einstein discovered. But in the case of the Vedas,
that does not happen. What was revealed to one Rishi is as infallible
as what was revealed to another Rishi.
>Well- end of my comments.
>Hari Om!
>Sadananda
Anand
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