Shankara's Brahma Sutra Bhashya

[Vidyasankar Sundaresan]

On Fri, 11 Oct 1996, Sankar Jayanarayanan wrote:

[....]

> 1) The SBSB begins with a preamble, and then proceeds onto commenting on
> the Brahma Sutras. The style is that of an (advaita) Vedantin either arguing
> with an opponent or resolving doubts [of a student of advaita Vedanta].
> The opponent is so well read and argues with such force and clarity that it
> becomes evident that the opponent too is none but Shankara himself!

This is standard practice in traditional philosophical writing in India.
The arguments put forth by the opponent are called "pUrvapaksha" and the
position the writer expounds is stated finally, as the "siddhAnta". Any
writer of note constructs opposing arguments, thus anticipating what an
opponent would say, and then goes on to establish his own view, but only
after refuting the opponent(s) first.

> 3) In SBSB(1.1.4), Shankara argues that mukti is not a thing to be acquired,
> for it is ever-present: "...And no dependence on work can be proved by
 assuming
> liberation to be a thing to be acquired; for it being essentially one with
> one's very Self, there can be no acquisition. Even if Brahman be different
 from
> oneself, there can be no acquisition, for Brahman being all pervasive like
> space, It remains ever attained by everybody..."

In the brahmasUtra bhAshya, Sankara most often addresses pUrva mImAm.sA
opponents. He is most interested in establishing that brahman is not to be
attained by work. That is why he considers the possibility that brahman
may be different from the self.

>
> What struck me as strange was why Shankara should even consider the
 possibility
> of Brahman being different from the Self. The argument that liberation is
> eternal since Brahman is one's Self seems quite sufficient.
>

Changing courses,

Giri wrote:

[...]

>         Vidya, thanks for responding. My point was no sentence in the
> prasthana traya could support an advaitic position *exclusively* since
> some others would interpret it differently to suit their philosophy.

Let us see - The advaitin says statement X supports advaita *exclusively*.
The dvaitin says that the same statement X supports dvaita *exclusively*.
Similarly with the follower of Ramanuja or Vallabha or Srikantha. Now,
statement X can support only one of all these possible explanations. The
fact that different people interpret statement X differently is a
completely different thing altogether. The truth might well be that the
given statement supports advaita *exclusively*, but that the others
interpret in their own fashion anyway. Or the truth might be that it
supports dvaita *exclusively*. But we have to assume that every sentence
in the prasthana-trayi supports only one *exclusive* system. Which
*exclusive* one is to be decided by the student. Without this assumption,
there can be no study of vedanta. Also, not to assume this is equivalent
to saying that none of the existing systems of vedanta is true to the
original meaning of the texts. If so, one should be prepared to expound
what the real "original" meaning of the text is. Either this, or one
should hold that the statements in the prasthana-trayi are meaningless in
and of themselves.

>
>         For example, Shankara and Ramanuja interpret the simple sentence
> 'Thou art That' in different ways.

But both interpret it on the basis of a well-known principle of
interpretation, called sAmanyAdhikaraNa. The differences between
Sankara's and Ramanuja's interpretations arise from the different
assumptions that go into their two systems. Sankara assumes that
superimposition is operative in this world, so that he explains tattvamasi
on the basis of removal of the superimposition. Ramanuja assumes a
SarIra-SArIrin relationship, and interprets tattvamasi accordingly.
This does not mean that tattvamasi does not support advaita *exclusively*.
In the final analysis, Ramanuja's interpretation is also a kind of
"advaita" - it may not be Sankara's kind, but it is an advaita
nonetheless.

In my opinion, Sankara is more faithful to the intent of the text in which
the statement "tatvamasi" occurs. This is because, right at the beginning
of the teaching, the upanishad emphatically states that change in name and
form is one of speech only (vAcArambhaNam nAmadheyo vikAram), and that the
underlying reality does not change. This is taught through various
examples (as in mrttiketyeva satyam). Then through further examples, the
Atman (aitad Atmyam idam sarvam) is explained as the underlying reality
(tat satyam sa AtmA), and then comes the teaching tattvamasi. Sankara's
explanation draws attention to the substratum, which is asserted to be
"satyam" in the upanishad. Ramanuja's explanation in terms of the
SarIra-SArIrin relationship is no doubt attractive, but note that the
upanishad does not bother itself with asserting anything about "idam
sarvam" - the SarIra in Ramanuja's analysis. All the attention in this
section of the upanishad is on the AtmA, which is asserted to be Real.

What I mean to say is this - tattvamsi can be explained only on the basis
of a teaching of non-duality or unity, not otherwise. Whether one says
"non-duality" or "unity" is a function of differing emphases, not of
substantial differences.

S. Vidyasankar