Question on method of arriving at conclusions

[Vidyasankar Sundaresan]

I'm sorry for the delay in responding to this discussion. Anyway, here goes.
The Vedas have been accepted as apaurusheya in the so-called orthodox schools.
Of these, the nyAya, vaiSeshika, sAm.khya and yoga schools do not have much
use for the Vedas as a source of knowledge, although they do not deny the
notion that the Vedas are apaurusheya. However, their definition of apaurusheya
is different from that of the mImAm.sA school. For example, nyAya-vaiSeshika
schools argue that every effect must have a cause, ergo the universe must
have a creator, who is ISvara, and that therefore the Vedas are ISvara's
words. In this interpretation, "apaurusheya" only means that the Vedas are
not human compositions, although they are God's compositions. This is not
much different from a simple notion that is found in all religious
communities, "The Holy Book comes from God", although human agency is admitted
when human beings are described as being an instrument in God's hands.

The mImAm.sA school however takes a different position. They deny the the kind
of ISvara that is admitted by the naiyyAyikas. In the mImAm.sA view, such an
ISvara is highly limited. They argue that we have no need to infer the
existence of ISvara from an argument of causality. Their objection does not
necessarily deny that ISvara exists, but denies the possibility of an
inferential argument ever arriving at the correct nature of ISvara. Such an
ISvara cannot be the author of the Vedas, in the mImAm.sA opinion.

To further elucidate their position, mImAm.sakas enumerate six ways of
obtaining valid knowledge - pratyaksha (perception), upamAna (analogy),
anumAna (inference), anupalabdhi (non-obtaining), arthApatti (stipulation/
postulation), Sabda (verbal testimony, i.e. Vedas). The first three, along
with a category called abhAva (non-existence) is accepted by the nyAya and
vaiSeshika schools. Now, the mImAm.sA contention is that the Vedas exist to
give us information that cannot be obtained from perception, analogy and
inference, i.e. from a process of inducto-deductive reasoning. Which is fine,
for the orthodox believer, as no amount of such knowledge can tell us how
to perform sacrifices for various results, be it obtaining a son or attaining
heaven.

We now get to the crux of the argument re: apaurusheyatvam of the Vedas. In
the mImAm.sA school, the statement "the Vedas are apaurusheya" has the status
of arthApatti. We do not perceive an author of the Vedas, as they are ancient
works. The mImAm.sakas have already pointed out the deficiencies of inferring
an ISvara who could be an author of the Vedas. The simplest deficiency is that
if you take the argument of causality literally, all evil in the universe
will also have to be caused by the same ISvara. Who is this ISvara who creates
the universe and also creates evil? There are various other arguments against
such an ISvara, whose existence is inferred by the nyAya technique. Read
Ganganatha Jha's translation of Kumarila Bhatta's Sloka-vArttikA for details.
Having demolished the validity of perception, analogy and inference in
describing an author of the Vedas, the mImAm.sA school now puts forth its own
position. This is arthApatti, which is set apart from inference.

Technically, an arthApatti is a conclusion that is arrived at to explain the
available facts, but it is not a direct inference from facts of perception.
In this sense, it is somewhat like a postulate in modern science, although
of course, the mImAm.sakas do not have such a highly refined view of postulation
as modern science does. For example, the idea that a scientific postulate
can be tested and either proved or disproved, is unknown to mImAm.sA. Anyway,
mImAm.sA now says the following:

1. The Vedas have a reputation for being "unauthored".
2. If the nyAya school says that ISvara is their author, this is denied,
   because the nature of the ISvara in the nyAya school is shown to be
   deficient. Such an ISvara cannot be the author of the Vedas.
3. Having denied the use of pratyksha, upamAna and anumAna in positing a
   non-human Creator who is also the author of the Vedas, we are left with
   the position that even ISvara is not the author of the Vedas.
4. This leaves us with the "arthApatti" that the reputation of unauthoredness
   must be correct. Ergo, the Vedas are apaurusheya.

This leaves the contention of the so-called "heterodox" schools like bauddhas
and jainas. They argue that the Vedas must be compositions of ancient human
authors, and that we have lost their names now. This is answered in the
following fashion.

1. The mImAm.sakas accept that different SAkhAs of the Vedas are named after
   humans e.g. kANva, vAjasaneya etc. However, this does not prove that the
   named human beings are the authors of their particular recensions. If that
   were so, every recension would be different in both content and import.
   However, we find that different recensions of the same Veda are remarkably
   uniform in content. Ergo, the name associated with each recension is not
   the name of the author of that recension, but only the name of the teacher
   who is most particularly associated with that recension.

2. The knowledge imparted by the Vedas is not obtainable by perception and
   inference. If the claim is that some ancient human being composed the
   Veda, the question arises, "how did that human being obtain this knowledge?"
   The answer can't be perception, because such perception should be
   accessible to us, here and now. As we are not capable of perceiving that
   performing the jyotishToma rite will take us to heaven, so also no human
   being, however ancient, could have had access to such perception. Thus,
   the ancient r.shis must have "seen" the Vedas somehow, but this means that
   the Vedas already existed, for them to be seen by the r.shis. The r.shis
   cannot therefore be called authors. They are therefore described as
   "mantra-drashTas" - the seers of the mantras.

The sum of all this is that no human could have composed the Vedas, the ISvara
who is called the Creator by the nyAya school cannot have been the composer,
ergo the arthApatti that the Vedas are apaurusheya cannot be disproved. This
leaves the cArvAka contention that the "knowledge" imparted by the Vedas is
just fanciful imagination, and not real knowledge. This is answered not so
much by logical reasoning, as by condemnation of the cArvAka. Also, the
ethical behavior of those who follow the Vedas is pointed out as evidence that
the Vedas cannot just be somebody's fanciful imagining.

The mImAm.sA position is very carefully thought out. However, to a loarge
extent, it is dependent on their own exegesis, which divides the Vedas into
mantra and brAhmaNa, concommittant with the other division into vidhi
(injunction) and arthavAda (explanatory comments). The "knowledge" that the
Vedas impart, is primarily in their statements of injunctive force. The
karma-phala that is mentioned in these injunctions is not known by perceptual
means. The arthavAda is subsidiary to the injunctions, and are not always
upheld as "unauthored". For example, in the br.hadAraNyaka upanishad, there is
a specific statement to the effect that the preceding portion is yAjnavalkya's
exposition of the Sukla yajus formulas obtained from the sun. (AdityAnImAni
Sukla yajUmshi yAjnavalkyena vyAkhyAyate). The mImAm.sakas do not deny that
some portion of the AraNyakas and upanishads are human compositions, but this
does not affect their argument, because all AraNyakas and upanishads are
clubbed together as arthavAda, to be interpreted in the context of vidhi, in
this particular case, the ASvamedha yajna for the br.hadAraNyaka upanishad.

We now turn to the vedAnta position. The mImAm.sakas contention that all the
AraNyakas and upanishads are to be interpreted in the context of vidhi, is
denied. Sankara states that there is "knowledge", specifically AtmavidyA,
that is imparted in these portions of the Veda that have nothing to do with
vidhi and yajna, and are not obtained by pratyaksha and other valid ways of
obtaining knowledge. However, the mImAm.sA notion that some portion of the
Vedas is arthavAda is not denied. Sankara himself describes quite a few
portions of the br.hadAraNyaka and chAndogya upanishads as arthavAda. What is
denied is the mImAm.sA contention that *all* the material of the upanishads
constitutes arthavAda. Another mImAm.sA notion that is accepted by all schools
of vedAnta is that the Vedas impart knowledge about karmas and their fruits,
which are again not obtained perceptually. However, Sankara subordinates the
knowledge obtained from the karma-kANDa to that from the jnAna-kANDa. The
karma-kANDa presupposes desire in the mind of the potential sacrificer for
the fruits of the sacrifice, and is therefore addressed to a different audience
than the jnAna-kANDa, which presupposes vairAgya (detachment) in its audience.
Even if one were to argue to nishkAmya karma (desireless action), such action
is meant for citta-Suddhi (mental purification) only. What all this means for
the argument about apaurusheyatvam is that the mImAm.sA notion is accepted,
but in a qualified fashion.

This is done by attacking the mImAm.sA notion of "apUrva". We have noted that
the mImAm.sA school had already denied the ISvara as the Creator of the
 universe. The question that now arises is, "by what means do the fruits of the
sacrifice accrue to the sacrificer?" For example, someone who performs the
jyotishToma rite does not go to heaven at once. Presumably he does so on death.
How does this particular fruit, i.e. heaven, accrue to the sacrificer? The
mImAm.sakas state that the correct performance of a sacrifice generates a
mysterious entity called "apUrva" (i.e. that which was not there before), which
mediates the result of the sacrifice. Note that this is more or less an ad hoc
statement, which is again an arthApatti. The statement about "apUrva" is made
to explain how the mImAm.sakas think of karma and karma-phala. vedAnta,
especially advaita vedAnta, denies that there is such a thing called apUrva.
ISvara, i.e. saguNa brahman, is brought in to explain how the karma-phala
is mediated to the one who performs the karma. The mImAm.sA objections to
an ISvara, whose existence is inferred via the nyAya route is noted. vedAnta
then denies that ISvara is inferred. As ISvara is nothing but saguNa brahman,
and brahmavidyA, i.e. AtmavidyA, is obtained from the jnAna-kANDa of the Vedas,
the ISvara that vedAntins talk of is known directly from the Vedas. Once this
saguNa brahman is accepted as the one who mediates karma-phala, there is no
harm in saying that brahman is also the one who gives the Vedas to humans.
This is supported by upanishad statements where rudra or nArAyaNa is described
as the one who gave the Vedas to hiraNyagarbha at the beginning of creation.

(rudra is mentioned in the SvetASvatara and nArAyaNa in the mahAnArAyaNa
upanishads, as "yo brahmANam vidadhAti pUrvam, yo vai vedAm.Sca prahiNoti
tasmai." Both upanishads are from the kr.shNa yajurveda.)

This is the advaita vedAnta position on the apaurusheyatvam of the Vedas. The
dvaitins have completely different takes on all the issues involved. To
begin with, AnandatIrtha denies that there is something called arthApatti.
It is just a special case of inference, according to him. I think it is
basically wrong to describe arthApatti as a special case of anumAna. A statement
made as an arthApatti is something that *explains* the facts, not something
that is directly inferred from the facts. But this will open up a completely
different discussion on epistemology, so I don't want to go into it now.
Needless to say, there is a major element of belief in the mImAm.sA and vedAnta
positions on the apaurusheyatvam of the Vedas. This belief underlies the
assumption that goes into the arthApatti. Obviously, a Christian, a Muslim,
a Buddhist, a Jain and an atheist would not share this belief and the whole
argument is pointless. The dvaitin argument seems to come dangerously close
to a fundamentalist Christian position, I think. The fundamentalist Christian
upholds the Bible as the *only* true holy book. Similarly with the
 fundamentalist Muslim and the Kuran. So also with the dvaitins and their stand
 on the
unauthoredness of the Vedas. The advaitins have no trouble in understanding
the limitations of each approach. Because ISvara is accepted as the one who
gave the Vedas to mankind, by an extension of the argument, He can also be
supposed to have been the one who gave the other books to the respective
audiences, based on the principle of adhikAra. This supposition is implicit
in one of Sri Candrasekhara Bharati's statements. He once wrote to an European
who wanted to convert to Hinduism, where he advised the man to first outline
his dissatisfaction with Christianity, and try to be a better Christian first.
If he were still dissatisfied, then he would consider the next step.

As far as the positions taken by different advaitins on the valid ways of
acquiring knowledge goes, we can look at it in terms of the different vAdas
(ajAti, dr.shTi-Sr.shTi etc.), or we can look at it in terms of the major
post-Sankaran schools of advaita, namely the vivaraNa school and the bhAmatI
school. The vivaraNa school follows the line of reasoning given by padmapAda,
Sankara's disciple, in his pancapAdikA, and prakASAtman, in his vivaraNa
on the pancapAdikA. The bhAmatI school follows vAcaspati miSra's bhAmatI
commentary to Sankara's brahmasUtrabhAshya. Both vidyAraNya and dharmarAja
adhvarIndra, whom Anand Hudli quoted earlier, are supposed to be followers
of the vivaraNa school. This school specializes in epistemology, i.e. in
analyzing how we know what we know. The bhAmatI school concentrates more
on the issues of mAyA and avidyA. There are some differences among these
schools on the positions they take on different issues, but all of it is
minor, I suppose, in that all these schools uphold the ultimate brahman-
Atman identity. So long as this identity is disputed, there will always be
other details over which words of learned length and thundering sound can
be expended. Once this identity is accepted, every view is seen as partial
attempt at understanding, and as gauDapAda says, can be accepted to some
extent, as non-conflicting with advaita (avirodha-vAda).

The advaita position on apaurusheyatvam of the Vedas, on ISvara being the
saguNa brahman who gives us the Vedas, and so on, come mainly from the
vivaraNa school. Notice that so long as one talks of saguNa brahman, there is
no major emphasis on non-duality. It must be remembered that advaita vedAnta
also fulfils a function of Vedic exegesis, and in that role is as much mImAm.sA
as the Kumarila Bhatta school. This is the reason why the old mImAm.sA schools
are called pUrva mImAm.sA and the vedAnta is called uttara mImAm.sA. advaita
takes care of this apparent emphasis on a dualistic view, by saying that even
the Vedas and saguNatvam of brahman are to be transcended ultimately.

S. Vidyasankar