Regarding presenting evidence of absence

[Vidyasankar Sundaresan]

On Sun, 8 Dec 1996, Ramakrishnan Balasubramanian wrote:

[...]

> A fair comparison entails that the
> sushupti avasthaa be examined from the same state, and not from jaagrat
> avasthaa. What I mean is, we perceive oneness in sushupti and do not question
> it there. The questions arise only in the waking state. So saying that
> "sushupti provides only the evidence that no objects are cognized" is only
 from
> the point of view of the waking state, which is not IMO, a fair comparison.

Yes, which is why once the questions about sushupti rise in the jAgrat
state, one takes recourse to Sruti to answer them. The advantage in using
Sruti is that it is accepted by all vedAntins as a valid pramANa. Else,
the dvaitin will just go back to his basic assumption about the waking
state. However, he has to pay attention to what Sruti says, although he
may twist its meaning to suit his interpretation. Then I can turn back and
say, "Hey, your interpretation of Sruti is not justified!" In my opinion,
this helps to keep argumentation with a dvaitin more focussed on the basic
divergences, rather than getting bogged down in peripheral details.

Vidyasankar

>From  Mon Dec  9 00:14:07 1996
Message-Id: <MON.9.DEC.1996.001407.0700.>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 1996 00:14:07 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: Silence is best
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.16.19961208014618.28bf5bf4 at mail.jetlink.net> from "Charles
        A. Hillig" at Dec 7, 96 05:46:18 pm
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Charles A. Hillig wrote:

>      First of all, I want to acknowledge Shrisha for  reminding me that
> advaitic non-dualism is, by virtue of the subject matter, an untenable
> position when argued from a logician's standpoint.  The moment that you say
> anything about anything, you automatically imply  the existence of its
> opposite and, as it was turning out in this case, it often triggers a long,
> endless string of "Yes, buts..."    I suspect that there would be no end to
> such a
> conversation because it would only lead to more point--counterpoint, etc.
 etc..
>
>      But pure consciousness, the Self,  has no opposite.
>
>      The truth is that no one can be argued, reasoned or "talked into"
> advaita.   After all, non-dualism flies in the face of our immediate
> experience of the world.
>
>      The quintessence of Advaita is quite beyond the dualistic realms of
 logic
> or debate.  We can explain its tenets, but we cannot (and I think should
> not) strive to convince anyone else using either inductive or deductive
> reasoning.  It's a waste of time.  Advaita either resonates within them or
> it doesn't.  Period.
>
>      Avaita can only be experiential, and it has nothing to do with faith.
> If you sense its truth, but still have no permanent experience of it yet,
> then  you can only point the way.
>
>      Once again, I don't think that Advaitans are ever really "argued into"
> this "path."  In a sense, this "path-less path" seems to find THEM through
> Grace.
>
>      I can well understand why Silence was Maharshi's highest teaching!

Isn't it self-contradictory to say "silence is best" and then come up
with a lengthy piece of prose?

That is also a condition indistinguishable from saying, "I don't have
the answers, but I'll irrelevantly wave my hands some more, just the
same."  And if it talks like a duck and walks like a duck, by Jove,
it's got to be a duck!

Regards,

Shrisha Rao

>                                                      Chuck Hillig

>From  Mon Dec  9 05:29:03 1996
Message-Id: <MON.9.DEC.1996.052903.0700.>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 1996 05:29:03 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <199612072229.QAA23805 at mail.tamu.edu> from "Kim Poulsen" at Dec
        7, 96 11:25:33 pm
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Kim Poulsen wrote:

> >> ....(without an umpire there may be little hope that
> >> the cat be made to conform to the ancient rules - and become
> >>  a pigeon.)
>
> > Or vice versa, unfortunately.
>
> You would have to sharpen your perception a bit, this excercise
> in simultaneous conducted discussions seems to be wearing
> you down :-)

Ah; that must be a mere perception of the waking state, and
an illusory one therefore.  Or, if you would have it otherwise,
it is not an illusion, and you are the one being worn down :-)

Seriously, there's many more where I came from, in case I
should stumble -- which is a marked improvement from the way it
was even eighteen months ago.  After all, this is just me
standing in for Guruprasad while he finishes up his end-of-term
work, and there are many others who can replace me completely.
Ananda Tiirtha, "who knows the words, the sentences, and the
pramaaNa-s," is a veritable conflagration that throws out a
trillion sparks.  It is the blaze that has to be worn down, not
the spark(s), for it alone possesses the ability to energize an
inert particle to create a spark; the particle has no value on
its own.

> >> Anyway dear Shrisha Rao, we must
> >> see if we can fend for ourselves, even with the prospect
> >> of facing dualistic mathematicians (or vice versa?), and all sorts
> >> of impressive entities.
>
> >I beg your pardon?  I don't understand.
>
> I thought these mathematicians to be something out of the ordinary
> in terms of mental capacity?
> Forget it, the serious part begins now.
>
> >...the "dvaitee" does not hold any state "in special regard,"
> >and would in fact completely deny that there is a difference between
> >the states as such (in being different states of reality rather than
> >different states of cognition of a continuous reality).
>
> >> A) From the standpoint of the human entity the dream state is
> >> pervaded by the waking state, its creations are dependant on it
> >> and is finally brought to a stop by the apparent reality of the
> >> waking state - the last thought-forms of the dream may even
> >> be caused directly by interference from the waking state (like
> >> an alarm-clock.)
>
> >Again, I'm sorry if I'm a little dense, but I don't gather your point
> >here.
>
> But the meaning hopefully? This was the simple part. Some people
> would ascribe a higher reality to the waking state because of the
> above, but. -
>   These four human states of consciousness are the
> correspondences to four states of being which constitute the
> framework of vedic thought. Furthermore they are associated
> with four human principles or bodies. In philosophy the terms
> macrocosmic and microcosmic are sometimes employed
> to differ between the universal and human principles.

All right, well and good.  However, note that your characterization
is species-chauvinistic, and also says nothing about the state of
awareness of the jiiva when dead, etc.  This is not specifically a
criticism of the Advaitic view, but a valid one nonetheless, I
think.

Also, your saying "states of consciousness" seems to be at variance
with Advaitic thought, which considers them states of existence;
while I do consider them states of consciousness, it would appear
that your view is not shared by your comrades or preceptors.

>   This correspondence is vital to the understanding of, at
> least, advaita philosophers. When Sureshvara in his
> commentary on the Dakshinamurti Stotra inserts the
> nihilistic views of buddhists regarding nirvana and let
> the shlokas treating of sushupti answer it, this is
> employing the principle of analogy. Maybe Dvaita
> philosophers works differently, I would not know.

No, not really; one finds a series of statements with "nanu..."
and then "ityAha," following which comes the main statement.  The
former gives a concise summary of the puurva-paksha position as
applying in that context, and the latter indicates how the
main statement answers it.  This is standard technique, meant to
illustrate the flow of argument.  If the puurva-paksha is not
correctly understood and appreciated, then the answers given to
it will sound irrelevant, and one will not pick up the thread of
presentation.

> So -
>
> >> B) From the standpoint of the ishvara the case is reversed,
> >> it is the state of the logos, the maya prakriti, which form
> >> the basis of our objective world, the nature of the 3 gunas.
>
> >Ishvara is not subject to dreaming or deep sleep at all, is He?  But
> >perhaps you meant something else?
>
>    Is this a trap - subject and ishvara?
> "Like the sun veiled by the cloud, parameshvara, the supreme
> lord himself, quite deluded by maya, appears to be of
> limited power and limited knowledge"
>                                             Dakshinamurti stotra 1.19
>
> The subjects here are the jiivas, the jiivabhuutam.
> We are dealing with the correspondences to the dream sleep, and
> these jiivas are in their subjective state - between two incarnations.
> These jiivas are essentially one on the plane above this - the real
> plane of the ishvara. This is the prakriti of the ishvara, where the
> maya shakti rules.
>   The two lower states, the subjective and objective (corresponding
> to the dream and waking states of man) are the fields for one type
> of cycle - the samsara, a self-exisiting, causal change between the
> subjective and objective.

So you're apparently saying that between births, the jiiva is in a
dream-state, or something close to it.  I'm not sure if this is a
characterization given in the canonical texts anywhere.  It would
hardly be appropriate to take it as an ad hoc hypothesis, one would
think.

Your equation of jiiva = jiivabhuutaM is also not convincing.  If
that is the case, why is the latter word applied at all?  There has
to be some distinction meant, even if we disagree on what exactly
that distinction is.

And last but not the least, I am not aware that Ishvara is ever
described as being "deluded by maya" -- perhaps it is that He
appears to be "of limited power," etc., to *us* who are so
deluded?  If that is the case, then your translation is not
right, for "ignoring the perceiver," etc., ironically.

>   But there is a higher cycle, the evolutionary. In its beginning it is
> the descent or creation from the higher planes to the lower. It is
> also the differentiation of prakriti, including the jiivabhuutam. In its
> end or ascending arc it is the path of the jiiva out of bondage and
> back to - the one reality. These are the pravrittimarga and
> nirvrittimarga.
>   The reason for the shruti to state that the sushupti is the path
> to knowledge is that there is no samsara here, its correspondence
> is the paramaarthika (and for that sake one of the buddhist states
> of nirvana.)
>
>   Following one you will return, Shrisha Rao, following the other
> you will not return, ityarthaH.

One question, though -- if the world of plurality can cease in the
sushhupti-state, and yet return, what guarantee does one have that
it will not return upon nirvANa as well?  And more to the point,
is it or is it not the case that anyone has so far reached mukti?
If yes, then why is the samsaara still continuing?  The single
deluded manifestation of the nirguNa-Brahman should have returned
to the true state, and all action ought to have ceased.  That it
continues shows that there has been no mukti until now in all
of time (which would raise doubts about if it will ever occur
in future either), or that there is actually more than one entity
needing liberation -- which would send non-dualism down the drain.

Also, there is no clear statement in Shruti that sushhupti is the
path to knowledge -- such is the *reading* of certain passages of
Shruti by you.  By its very nature, sushhupti is of the nature
of complete ignorance, and can hardly be advertized as the path
to knowledge.  That's like saying that pitch-darkess is the path
to light.  Highly unconvincing to say the least.

> >>    On the involutionary arc of the cycle the planes or states
> >> are reversed compared to the evolutionary. The waking state
> >> is merely the basis (neither must the three aspects be confused
> >> with the unity behind them.)
>
> >Sorry for sounding continually stupid, but we're clearly on different
> >wavelengths here.  I don't seem to catch what you're saying, and some
> >of the terminology/paradigms used ("involutionary arc of the cycle"?)
> >is completely unrelated to anything I've ever seen.
>
>     OK let's try some simpler stuff.
>  What am I saying is that not only the waking state but this physical world
> and the physical body must be taken in account when deciding the degree of
> reality.
>    Each higher plane is more subtle, its existences of longer duration -
> and more real than its lower counterpart.

Does not scan.  First of all, while your notion of reality has to
do with something not being obstructed in all states, etc., I do
not know if reality is accepted as being quantized on a continuous
scale with the qualification that something is more real if it
lasts longer.  If it lasts forever, then it's real, otherwise it's
not.  There is no middle ground, and there in fact cannot be,
because under the view that sushhupti is a state of non-existence
of plurality, all things, even the longer-lasting ones, cease, and
thus must be unreal.  Your thesis that "each higher plane is ...
more real" would have to be rejected as one that favors the waking
state, etc.

Of course, even the "unobstructed in three states" argument can be
shown to "favor the waking state," etc., as I've already done
earlier in this thread.  But still, that same point applies more or
less independently to what you're saying as well.

>    In the last analysis it is but the Absolute which is real, something
> finite cannot be absolutely real. Being not absolutely real it can be at
> best relatively real (and relatively unreal.) But the three other states
> may be
> found to have varying degrees of reality, based on their more or less
> fleeting nature..

As I already said, there is no clear way of defining "degrees of
reality."  Such a definition would run into the difficulty of
itself being only of a certain "degree of reality," etc., and the
definition would be subject to AtmAshraya, assuming itself prior to
its own action, etc.  Secondly, I don't know why you use the word
"finite" in this context.  Being "finite" or "infinite" is a
waking-state thing, is it not?  As such, how can one use it when
the sleep-state is the guide to knowledge?

>     The hardcore logician (like Nagarjuna) will find them all illusive,
> the opposite view will find them real in a relative sense, at best real for
> the time being (the latter a rather vague and inconsistent position -
> the word "real" does not really fit in.)

I know little of Nagarjuna, but from my general impression about
Buddhists, I would not be inclined to regard him as a hardcore
logician, although his use of logic would probably be impressive to
one untrained in it.  Udayana, Gangesha Mishra, et al. would be
better examples of logicians.

Coming to the core of the issue, I don't see why all of them being
real is only in "a relative sense," or why it is "a rather vague
and inconsistent position."  The reality can be quite absolute, and
in fact, from what we have seen so far, any use or ascribing of
illusion is what makes for a "vague and inconsistent" thesis, while
reality does not.

> >>   When Krishna takes the standpoint of the ishvara he distinctly
> >> states that his prakriti is higher than that of the gross elements -
> >> the objective.
>
> >...uhhh, and so?
>
> Higher in this respect will mean more real (not a position in space!),
> if not for other reasons then for its implication with the ishvara rather
> than 3 material gunas. That the highest of the three is by far the most
> real, aught to be beyond dispute. Please remember that deep sleep in
> the average person is a vague image of what that state may as an
> state of continual existence.

But as I've said, how does one accept or define the notion of levels
of reality?

> ..........
>
> Your view of equal reality ,using the human consciousness as an
> example, will make any confused, agnostic delusions as perceptive of
> reality, as the ideas created by the spiritual consciousness

No, it will not.  Because, for one thing, spiritual truths are not
decided merely by recourse to a "spiritual consciousness," but by
reference to hard and verifiable sources subject to a strict
regimen and procedure of understanding.  Second, because the
confused, agnostic delusions are subject to error, which can be
readily shown in fact.  Your thesis would only work if it were
that all states being real means that all perception or thought
is pramaaNa, which is not the case.

> >>   Such is the case viewed from both sides.
>
> >-- which, rather unfortunately, is opaque from both to me.
>
>   I've made a second attempt, can do nothing more than try. I, being
> somewhat acquainted with many systems of thought - but not the
> dvaita - are searching for arguments blindfolded. I sincerely hope we
> are working from roughly the same basis!

I hope so as well.

>   Furthermore you need not search for points of argument in all write,
> the more you fail to understand, the more I feel the need to
> illustrate the subjects with examples. If you still have no clue to
> what I'm sayng, it may be best to end the debate,

I think I understand, but I do not agree (surprise, surprise).

> thank you,

Likewise.

Regards,

Shrisha Rao

> Kim

>From  Mon Dec  9 05:31:02 1996
Message-Id: <MON.9.DEC.1996.053102.0700.>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 1996 05:31:02 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: Response to specific points in Shrisha's repsonse to my mail.
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.95.961208002109.11939A-100000 at piccolo> from
        "Vidyasankar Sundaresan" at Dec 8, 96 01:55:10 am
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Vidyasankar Sundaresan wrote:

> I see that this is getting cross-posted to the dvaita and advaita lists,
> so I'll keep it brief. I did say earlier that my first response would be
> the last, but evidently, I spoke too soon. After this post, I promise,
> silence.

Famous last words, famous last words...

> On Thu, 5 Dec 1996, Shrisha Rao wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > If you have no access to my dreams, how do you know that I dream too,
> > or that we even mean the same thing by "dream"?  Or "dream object"?
> >
>
> Fine, I have no wish to claim anything about you.

But you have done so often enough nonetheless, in what follows --

> [...]
>
> > I am not aware that there is any system except in things like
> > fingerprinting, where a match with a certain number of points of
> > congruence is expected for an analogy to be accepted.  An analogy
> > should correctly represent whichever aspect of the real thing it is
> > illustrating, that is all.  There is no need to have specific number
> > of congruences, etc.  And in fact, all this talk of congruences is
> > off-track, since I did not specify a need for such.  What I was asking
> > was if you were also drawing a parallel between the states of dreaming
> > and waking, on the one hand, and between waking and the absolute, on
> > the other, as you didn't like to see Guruprasad do? -- that's all.
>
> I was under the impression that tattvavAdins generally insist on a certain
> number of congruences for any analogy. Maybe it is only the Gaudiyas who
> do so, one forgets. In any case, it is besides the point.
>
> > > So long as the universe exists, yes, vide "yatra tu dvaitamiva bhavati".
> > > We advaitins do not deny that duality appears in the perceived universe,
> > > do we?
> >
> > In which case, as I was pointing out not too long ago, the universe,
> > and the dualistic truth, must be real as well?  Because the duality
>
> Real only in the vyAvahAric sense, not paramArthata:. Never overlook the
> force of the qualification, "So long as the universe exists". If you say
> that the universe always exists, then I say that you deny the possibility
> of any moksha at all. There is only the endless cycle of rebirths in your
> universe, if it is eternal.

Not at all.  The universe may exist eternally, but I may be out of
it.  It is only under *your* notion of mukti that there is a
conflict between the eternality of the universe and mukti.  In
fact, there are statements in the texts about people having
achieved mukti; Krishna says in the 'Gita that people have achieved
mukti in the past by doing some things He specifies, and asks
Arjuna to do the same.  Given that the universe exists, at whatever
level it may, either Krishna lied, or else that notion of mukti is
unacceptable because of the error you yourself have pointed out.

> > appears, and "nAsato vidyate bhAvaH, nA.abhAvo vidyate sataH," etc.;
> > nothing that is not real would appear, and nothing that appears is
> > not real.
>
> nAsato vidyate bhAva: = na asato vidyate bhAva: = the unreal cannot
> appear. Your translation says the same thing. However,
>
> nAbhAvo vidyate sata: = na abhAvo vidyate sata: = "the real cannot
> disappear". It does *not* mean "nothing that appears is not real". Your
> translation reads into the Sanskrit a meaning that is not originally
> there. Let me modify your translation slightly - "nothing that appears is
> unreal". You cannot object to this modification, because not real is the
> same as the unreal, in your categorization, is it not?

There is no need to go into specific characterizations of whether
not-real is the same as unreal, etc.; the literal meaning is quite
adequate, and whether a certain categorization is in tune with it
can be studied independently.  That is standard procedure, in fact,
for imposing conflicting notions on meanings of words before
analyzing the conflict makes for confusion and incorrect
understanding.

Given that you have already interpreted `nAsato vidyate bhAvaH' as
"the unreal does not appear," to interpret `nAbhAvo vidyate sataH'
as "nothing that appears is unreal," is wrong, and the latter
should be interpreted as "the does-not-appear is not real" (or:
"the not does-not-appear is real") rather than "the real cannot
disappear," because there is no sense of "can" or "cannot"
conveyed, nor is there any suggestion of "disappear," which is
different from failing to appear. Figure it out: under your style,
`na' = not, `sat' = real, `asat' = unreal, `bhAva' = appears,
`abhAva' = does-not-appear.

This, however, leaves a gap, because while one knows that the
unreal by your definition does not appear, and that something which
does not appear is not real, one does not know the difference
between the unreal and the not-real (from the verse), and one also
does not know anything about the real; sure, that which
does-not-appear is not real, but since the unreal also does not
appear, vide the first part, there is no distinction shown.  If you
take the meaning of the second part as "the not does-not-appear is
real," then one knows that the unreal does not appear, and that the
real does appear (not-does-not), but one again does not learn of
the difference between unreal and not-real from the verse, and in
fact the existence and characteristics of the not-real are left
unstated completely.

In summary, no matter how you try, the verse does not clearly
indicate that there are three kinds: real, not-real, and unreal,
and give the significant characteristics of each.  Something extra
has to be supplied from outside to make things click for you, while
no such postulation is needed if the `not-real as different from
unreal' idea is dropped (which however would make the verse
completely dualistic in purport).

Let's try a different approach:

na =         no; not
asato =      non-being; not-real
bhAvaH =     existent; existence
abhAva =     non-existent; non-existence
vidyate =    is present; has
sataH =      being; real; reality

All the word-translations may be checked with a dictionary for
confirmation; I already have done so for the writing.

Thus, `nAbhAvo vidyate sataH' has to be "non-existence has no being,"
or "the non-existent has no reality."   Similarly, `nAsato vidyate
bhAvaH' has to be "the non-being has no existence," or "the not-real
is not existent."

> However, even if I provisionally grant that this modified translation has
> some merit to it, advaita is not refuted. Remember that for us, the unreal
> and the false are two different categories. We do not say that the world
> appearance is wholly unreal. We only say that it disappears in the
> paramArtha view.

That's very illogical reasoning.  For one thing, it is very
incorrect to impose the meaning of "unreal" on the literal
"not-real" and then "provisionally" reason on that basis.  Let's
just keep things straight and reason firmly rather than
provisionally.

In fact, one notices that Krishna is clearly saying that the
non-real has *no* existence; if one does not grant your thesis of
unreal and false being two different things, etc. (which itself
is not a derivative of the 'Gita, but is supplied externally to
interpret it in a certain way), it follows that because something
that is not-real has no existence, the world appearance, etc., is
not not-real, i.e., is real.

To refute the same, you would have to say that `nAsato vidyate
bhAvaH' does not mean "the not-real has no existence," but that
"the unreal has no existence," with your own extraneous distinction
between not-real and unreal in mind.  However, if one were to take
`asat.h' as "unreal" then besides the verse being incomplete in
purport, all hell would break loose for you -- Shruti's statement
`asat.h vA idamagra AsIt.h' would mean "the unreal alone existed
before this." Thus, it would indicate that an empty void alone
existed out of which Brahman was born, making Brahman also
"not-real" under your own three-time-frames rule of reality.  Or,
it would brand Brahman, who is explicitly specified by Shruti
elsewhere as "idamagra AsIt.h," etc., as being unreal, if Brahman
is taken as the referent of `asat.h' in coherence with those.  In
the one case, Brahman has the same reality level as the world of
plurality, while in the other there is no such thing at all.

Also, to consider `asat.h' as "unreal" rather than "not-real" with
a difference between them, and to consider `abhAva' as both
"inexistent" and "non-existent" is vyabhichaara -- lack of
fidelity. If you postulate a third truth value or logical value for
the one, it would be only just that you do so in the other as well.
If there is some special rule by which the one has a third value
while the other does not, then the same should be stated and
justified as well; it cannot be simply assumed as an unstated ad
hoc hypothesis.

And last but not the least, if `asat.h' is "unreal" rather than
"not-real," then what is the Sanskrit equivalent for the latter,
and where is it found?  One finds plenty of both sat.h and
asat.h, but none of whatever stands for "not-real."

As such, it stands concluded that the distinction between "unreal"
and "not-real" is riddled with holes, and even if made, does not
serve the Advaitic cause well in the quoted verse, which firmly
equates reality with existence.

> Before you say that it cannot so disappear, prove to me
> that you really know what the paramArtha of advaita is. But you cannot,
> can you, since the paramArtha of advaita is indistinguishable from a
> hare's horn for you. What a pity!

Indeed it's a pity.  But actually, a rabbit's horn *is*
distinguishable from "the paramArtha of advaita," in that it can at
least be sensibly defined, if not actually found, unlike the
latter.

> Anyway, since the world appearance disappears in the paramArtha view, it
> is not wholly real either, because you see, according to the correct
> translation of the gItA verse, the really real cannot disappear. In the
> paramArtha view, there is only the one brahman, therefore it is the only
> real we really accept. The universe disappears, so we do not accept it to
> be ultimately real.

The correct translation of the 'Gita says nothing at all about the
"really real," etc.  All that has to be supplied from the outside, and
even then fails to result in anything sensible.

> [irrelevant digressions about scientific theorem proving deleted]
>
> > > Furthermore, I would like to point out that we advaitins never leave the
> > > experiencer out of any analysis of experience. When we say, "valid by
> > > itself", we always mean that "valid by itself for the perceiver". It gets
> > > tiresome to repeat "for the perceiver" everytime, so we leave it out. I
> > > was after all writing the above on an advaita list, where everybody knew
> > > my assumptions, presumably. I honestly did not know that you were a list
> > > member too. I will be more careful in my choice of words the next time
> > > around.
> >
> > That wanders...
>
> Your habit of "evaluating" something another says is very tiresome and
> irritating. I'd appreciate it if you would, for a moment, remove your
> tinted glasses and again read what I said. If you want any advaitin to
> take your criticism of advaita seriously, you have to first make the
> effort to understand advaita properly. And to do that, remember that no
> statement is made in advaita without a tacit reference to the perceiver.
> In the absence of a proper understanding of advaita, your ad hoc
> criticisms merit no reply.

In spite of which you made one, at such length?  Fiddlesticks!

> [..]
>
> > Yes, they are, but they are unable to make a detailed exposition of
> > the concept of prAmANya-svatastva, &c.  That is what I said.
> >
> > > However, so long as they are under error, they never know it. They
> > > assume that they are right.
> >
> > Strictly not true!  If that were the case, then there would never be
> > any error-correction at all.  It is only when one is in error and one
> > knows it, that one is motivated to change.  If it were that when one
> > is wrong one does not know that one is wrong, then one will forever be
> > wrong only.
>
> Why so? You tend to talk too much in absolutes. Is there no role for a
> guru in correcting error? No one corrects a fundamental error unless it is
> pointed out by another, or by a contradiction resulting from assuming the
> error to be true, or from another perception that contradicts the first
> perception that caused the error. Till such time as this event does not
> take place, the error continues, and the man subject to error does not
> know it.                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  ^^^^^^^^

All well and good, but you contradict what you said before, in the last
part of the final sentence, since it is evident that it is possible
for someone to be subject to error and to know the same, unlike the
previous, where you said that one would never know it.

> Besides, you seem to be arguing for the sake of argument. I said, "so long
> as one is in error". You add a qualifier to my statement, "when one is in
> error, *and one knows it*", the portion between *'s being completely
> absent in my statement. As such, your criticism is totally unfounded. The
> moment one knows one is in error, one obviously takes steps to correct it.

The portion between the asterisks is the significant part where I was
pointing out error; of course it isn't there in yours, because you
expressly denied the possibility.

> My point is that the revealing knowledge, that shows the previous
> knowledge to be erroneous, is self-valid. I leave ample room for error
> correction. As an aside, I would feel much more comfortable debating with
> you if you did not jump to conclusions so.
>
> [...]

There is no jumping to conclusions; I was merely pointing out a
natural consequence of your own statement.  If said statement was
inaccurate and did not convey your intended purport exactly, that
is hardly something I can be blamed for.

> > > Quite obviously, you and I mean
> > > very different things by pramANa svatastva. I would appreciate it if you
> > > kept *my* meaning in mind when you respond to a statement *I* make. Do
> > > not impose your meanings on my statements.
> >
> > Is there an exposition of your style of prAmANya-svatastva?  I'd be
> > interested, genuinely.  As far as I know, your concept is strictly
> > your own, not even that of your school as such.
>
> This from a man who once argued with me on srv, that Kumarila Bhatta was
> not a Purva Mimamsaka at all. I am not convinced that you know any of the
> philosophical systems or the authors you claim to know well: not Mimamsa,
> not advaita. Please read the standard treatises on the topic of prAmANya
> svatastva in advaita. Your comment about my understanding of advaita's
> handling of prAmANya svatastva might earn you some brownie points from
> some, nothing more.
>
> [...]

That's fine.  But there's one point to note here; in debate, if one
asks a question, and is given an answer of the form you gave, saying
"read the texts" or some such vague thing instead of a *specific*
text, a specific something, etc., then that is considered an error
on the part of the one so saying.  The analogy given to illustrate
is that if someone asks for water and one says "dig a well."

I bet you can't give me an offhand quote from any Advaitic text about
prAmANya-svatastva; your statements above might win you some brownie
points from some, nothing more.

> > > But you are mistaken if you think that this is a
> > > flaw in our system. Sruti denies multiplicity in ultimate reality,
> > > including multiplicity of perceivers, and we advaitins see no reason to
> > > doubt it, or to explain away the explicit Sruti.
> >
> > -- even if it means having to explain away "explicit" cognition of
> > multiplicity, and "explicit" Shruti that says otherwise?  On what
> > basis is there a decision to favor one explicit Shruti over another,
> > although it means junking the explicit experience as well?
>
> We do not need Sruti to give us knowledge which is obtained by other
> pramANas.

In which case, why does it give that knowledge at all?  Also, even
if it is the case that one does not need Shruti to give knowledge
otherwise-known, that is not license by which Shruti can deny that
which is otherwise-known.  There is no rule of logic that if
some pramaaNa is not needed to know something already known, then
that pramaaNa may be used to dismiss that same already known;
that is against the grain, and in fact, one could do the same in
reverse.  One does not need pratyaksha to know the Advaitic truths
known from Shruti, and thus, pratyaksha can be used to discard
the same.

Even if you say --

> Sruti takes note of multiplicity in the universe, but it denies
> multiplicity in the state of moksha, which is brahman.. Therefore it
> says, "he who sees multiplicity here, is afraid. He who sees only One is
> unafraid and goes beyond fear."

-- that, however, does nothing to explain why Shruti creates the
phantom of an Ishvara, who is not known from any other pramaaNa.
That is a multiplicity of its own creation; if it is real and not
of its own creation, then non-dualism is lost, while if it is not,
then Shruti is contradicting itself needlessly, and creating an
additional illusion that we could do without; it can just easily
take note of the universe which one knows otherwise, and then
refute the same.  Why bring in an Ishvara at all?

> If you wish to assert that this Sruti
> upholds multiplicity in moksha, fine, let us go our separate ways. We get
> back to atattvamasi vs. tattvamsi, and then there can be no further
> discussion. We can each roundly denounce the other, and then shut up.
>
> But let me point out that we advaitins are the ones who are not afraid of
> moksha, we assert only One. If you wish to remain in a state of fear and
> assert multiplicity, it's your choice.

I am not in a state of fear; thanks for the concern.  As far as I
know, no school describes moksha, or its conception of the same, as
one involving fear.

> > By the way, if you see no reason, here's one: there are two kinds of
> > opposition of pramaaNa -- `virodha' and `pratirodha'. The former is
> > when something is opposed by a stronger pramaaNa, and the latter when
> > something is opposed by a pramaaNa of like strength.  When there is a
> > case of pratirodha, then both mutually-opposed pramaaNa-s tie each
> > other up completely and cannot be used to decide the case, which needs
> > recourse to some other source.  When there is virodha, the stronger
> > pramaaNa runs over the weaker and decides.
> >
> > Now, the explicit Shruti statements supporting and denying duality are
> > in a position fo deadlock, for being both Shruti and of the same
> > worth.  Thus, the non-dualistic conclusion from Shruti is pratiruddha,
> > and duality is decided by the evidence of experience, which has no
> > barrier at all.  One cannot assert that the abheda-Shruti is
> > generically a stronger pramaaNa and that there is virodha, since the
> > opposite conclusion, that the bheda-Shruti is stronger, is also
> > possible with equal efficacy, and there is no way of favoring the one
> > over the other except due to a pre-existing bias.
>
> I can see that you have absolutely no idea of the concept of Mimamsa into
> Sruti. So be it. Ever heard of arthavAda? For the rest, regarding
> multiplicity in moksha, see above. Sruti is not strengthened by agreement
> with pratyaksha. You are implicitly giving pratyaksha a higher status than
> Sruti in your argument, because you seem to think that pratyaksha can
> decide in the case of a deadlock between Sruti vAkyas that mention duality
> and those that deny it.

I have a pretty good idea of arthavAda, thank you, and know it well
enough to know that Jaimini does not discriminate between bheda-
and abheda-Shruti-s while calling the purport of some as arthavAda.
It is you who have not understood this and have bastardized the
concept by applying it only to the bheda-Shruti.  There is no way
that you can apply the concept of arthavAda to discriminate between
bheda- and abheda-Shruti; show me a statement of Jaimini, or
Bhatta, or whichever Miimaamsaka, if you think you can.  If it
cannot be used to so discriminate, then why bring it in at all?  It
is irrelevant in this context.

Also, I do not think that there is any deadlock in Shruti at all;
such only appears to occur because of your external postulations
imposed in its interpretation.  Shruti itself, and other affiliated
texts, say it is of like purport everywhere, an idea you have no
use for.

> "Dhik" on your so-called allegiance to Sruti.

How sweet.  Now I understand why the Moksha-dharma says

   aikAtmyaM nAma yadidaM kechid.hbrUyuranaipuNAH  |
   shAstratattvamavij~nAya tathA vAdabalAJNjanAH  |
   kAmakrodhAbhibhUtatvAdahaN^kAravashaM gatAH  |
   yAthAtathyamavij~nAya shAstrANAM shAstradasyavaH  |

... etc.

> [..]
>
> > Your sleep is very unique, I must say. That, however, seems to
> > conflict with the idea that the "I" is the only thing common between
> > the three states.  At least in your case, Shruti also is in common.
> >
> > > Sometimes I
> > > even get the impression that I understood it better while asleep than ever
> > > before.
> >
> > Sometimes I get the impression that I could fly better while dreaming
> > than awake; that's hardly the point.
> >
>
> Maybe, but can you really fly as well, once you wake up? On the other
> hand, the understanding about something gained in a dream state continues
> into the waking state as well. Let me quote your own example to you:
> Kekule's theory about the structure of benzene. Note that unlike what you
> think, this does not say anything that goes against advaita. All this says
> is that the waking and the dream state are at the same level of reality.

If they are, then that simplifies matters a lot; a lot different
has been said at times.

> In fact, this goes against your penchant for giving a higher reality to
> the waking state.

I do not give a higher reality to the waking state, and do not espouse
gradation of reality, in fact.  They are all as real as each other, and
Tattvavaada says that dreams are real.  So where's the question?

> > > I do not see any reason to assert that the knowledge gained from
> > > Sruti is channelled only through the waking state. At least for me, it is
> > > channelled through waking, dreaming and sleeping states.
> >
> > -- which, as I said, is a straightforward conflict with the notion
> > that only the "I" is common to all three.
>
> Shrisha, I keep forgetting that with you, every word and every sentence
> takes the character of philosophically rigorous, iron-clad proposition.

Thank you.  One tries.

> I was using "sleep" in a rather loose way here.

As you were using a lot of other things "in a rather loose way" lately?

I have to reword my original
> statement. Take away the word sleeping. I did not mean it in the sense of
> the deep sleep of sushupti. One would have to characterize any state of
> sleep in which there is any object at all, as a kind of a dream state. In
> sushupti, there are no objects.

In which case, we have a fourth state, one which is not deep sleep, waking,
or dreaming, but is a "kind of dream state."  I'm sure you can see why
that conclusion comes.

Regards,

Shrisha Rao

> Vidyasankar
>
> ps. The point of all my postings on this thread is this. If you wish to
> prove that advaita is internally contradictory, well, good luck. You
> cannot prove internal contradictions in advaita unless you assume the
> advaita assumptions and then come to a reductio ad absurdum conclusion.
> Every dvaita argument that tries to prove that advaita is internally
> contradictory, does so by first imposing assumptions that are foreign to
> advaita itself. This is not a valid method of argumentation, and I have no
> wish to point this out every time I see a fallacious argument following
> this line.
>
> Henceforth silence, I absolutely promise. Shrisha's response to this
> will elicit no further response from me. However, remember, that is not to
> be mistaken as a sign of defeat. Nowhere is it accepted that he who talks
> the most or the loudest, wins. Shrisha can, "although vanquished, argue
> still, with words of learned length and thundering sound." I do not wish
> to give him the opportunity.

P.S.:

  yastityAja sachividaM sakhAyaM na tasya vAchyapi bhAgo.asti
  yadIM shR^iNotyalakaM nahi praveda sukR^itasya panthAm.h  ||

>From  Mon Dec  9 05:36:49 1996
Message-Id: <MON.9.DEC.1996.053649.0700.>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 1996 05:36:49 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <199612071712.MAA14244 at zebra.ecn.purdue.edu> from "Ramakrishnan
        Balasubramanian" at Dec 7, 96 12:12:30 pm
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
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Ramakrishnan Balasubramanian wrote:

> I wanted to make my previous response on this thread the last one. However,
> let me try to make this the last one.

Famous last words, I'm sure :-)

> Shrisha wrote:
>
> >not.  There is no question of it being caused by something else, etc.,
> >and variety exists even when one is in deep sleep, only one is not
> >aware of it.
>
> There is nothing perceived in deep sleep other than the self. This is my
> experience and also every other person I have talked to (who has experienced
> deep sleep). This is also explicitly supported and stated in shruti:
>
> na tu dvitiiyamasti tato.anyad.h vibhaktiM yat.h pashyet.h - But there is
> nothing second, which is different from itself it can see, bR^ihadaaraNyaka
> upanishhad while describing sushhupti. It has a whole section which says how
> there is nothing apart from the self which is perceived in deep sleep.
>
> sushhupti kaale sakale viliine - In the time of deep sleep (with) everything
> vanished ..., kaivalya upanishhad.h (KU). The KU goes on to say how the unity
> behind the 3 states has to be realized.
>
> "The state where, he, asleep, no more experiences any desire and sees no
> vision is deep sleep", nR^isimha puurva taapaniiya upanishhad.h, translation
> from Deussen's `60 Upanishads of the Veda'. This upanishhad.h is quite close
> to the maaNDuukya upanishhad.h in these passages.
>
> Note it does not say that there is multiplicity and it is not perceived. It
> says there is _no_ multiplicity, period. The BU is in particular, explicit
> about this. If you say there is multiplicity and it's not perceived, you must
> realize that is just your point of view from the jaagrat avasthaa and not
> otherwise. This again boils down to a liking for considering the jaagrat
> avasthaa as somehow superior. Again, such an analysis has no basis in shruti.

Unfortunately, _your_ analysis has no basis in Shruti, *even* under the
Advaitic reading of those verses.  That passage from the Br. Up. is
taken as referring to the state of mukti in Advaita, not the state of
deep sleep; unfortunately, that's one of the distinctions that has not
been kept straight by the Advaitin arguments in this thread.  Nobody
takes deep sleep and mukti to be identical or alike, for doing so would
make mukti reversible, which is not accepted.  I will not go into
detail about the interpretations of the passage at the present time,
because the material on both sides is vast enough to require five or
six full-length postings at least; even a synopsis would require some
6000 words or so, I'm sure.  This matter has to do with the different
readings of the Suutra `OM jagadvyApAravarjam.h OM' (which is clubbed
by Sri Shankara with the next, `OM prakaraNAsannihitattvAchcha OM').
Consideration of the way the Suutra has been commented by various
people, and how the Upanishad is understood, etc., is a weighty topic,
and I will save it for a future series of postings for the Dvaita list,
perhaps some time next year.

Coming back, even granting that your style of translation is plausible
here and for the other Shruti quotes, it still does not follow that the
Shruti proves that there is no multiplicity in sleep rather than that
the existence of such is not perceived.  The fact that events involving
multiplicity do occur while one is asleep, is a matter of common
experience; one may miss phone calls, appointments, etc., while asleep
for instance.  The statement by Sri Shankara that no statement by
Shruti will turn fire cold, is apt in this context, for denial of
multiplicity in sleep is of a piece with a denial of heat in fire, as
both are facts of experience.  Otherwise, one would have to dilute
Sri Shankara's statement as also being "from the point of view of
the jaagrat avasthaa," which I'm not aware has been done.

Reject even that view: but note that the analysis you give, that
sushhupti is a state of existence where multiplicity does not exist,
assumes as its core that sushhupti is a state of existence (as
distinguished from one of cognition).  Shruti itself is not saying that
sushhupti is a state of existence; it is only by assuming that it is a
state of existence that one can arrive at the meaning that it is a
state of existence where nothing but the Self exists.  This is a point
to be carefully appreciated: there is no way on Earth that one can
interpret that statement to mean that sushhupti is a state of
existence, per se.  It is only by taking that as an assumption that you
can interpret it as you do.  But that very thing, that it is a state of
existence rather than one of cognition, is what you were supposed to be
proving by quoting the Shruti in the first place.  Thus, your style
assumes the very consequence that is sought to be proved, and is in
error therefore.

You of course may object that even a dualistic conclusion requires that
one assume sushhupti is a state of cognition rather than one of
existence, and so the same error is made if the passage is interpreted
in a dualistic sense.  One can accept the charge, because it will only
mean that the passage is not decisive of either dualism or non-dualism.
However, it is not needed to decide dualism; it is needed only by you
to decide non-dualism.  Thus, the canonical statement that you quote as
proof of something, requires that very same something as its premise to
yield the meaning that you give it, which actually comes to mean that
you are presenting an extraneous thesis with the process of laundering
it through Shruti to make it appear Vedantic.

> I don't see any scope for argument here actually.

Can you say that even now?

> As I said, only advaita, as
> expounded by gauDapaada, the aachaarya and sureshvaraachaarya and some others
> follow this approach.

Which is just as well, I suppose.

> It's a good thing that when my father taught me, he
> followed this approach and not the approach of the later bhaamati, vivaaraNa
> schools etc. A `coherent' cosmology and theory of creation is largely
> irrelevant, actually completely useless, IMO. It is somewhat akin to arguing
> how the building seen in the dream was built, while in the dream. The
> comments of shrii sacchidaanandendra sarasvatii on back to the basics, i.e.,
> the aachaarya's works are quite pertinent, IMO. Theories of creation are
> merely arthavaada and were originally designed to satisfy people and quickly
> draw them to the analysis of the 3 states. However, that is not very
> successful, at least sometimes, as seen by some people reading arthavaada
> from the bhaagavatam and then arguing endlessly that the universe has the
> shape of a tree, man did not go to the moon (demigods diverted them to
> Rahu), the US government lied about the moon trip etc.

The concept of arthavAda is Jaimini's, and he makes no distinction
between statements propounding creation, and those propounding
non-creation; he is primarily concerned with performing sacrifices,
etc., and all that is external to his primary concern is arthavAda to
him.  You really have no business taking the j~nAna-kANDa parts of
Shruti convenient to you and rejecting the rest as propounding
arthavAda.  Even `yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati', `tattvamasi', `ahaM
brahmAsmi', etc., are arthavAda-ish to Jaimini, and there is no basis
for deciding between dualism and non-dualism on that basis; to label
only inconvenient statements so is a rather disingenious ploy in fact.

The rest is a strawman -- no one has said here that the universe has
the shape of a tree; it is true that in Shruti as well as in the
statement `UrdhvamUlamadhashshAkhamashvatthaM prAhuravyayaM' in the
Bhagavad Gita one finds the upside-down Ashwattha metaphor being given,
but this is not to be condemned as arthavAda; it has a significant
meaning, and that it does is accepted by all the great scholars of old.
The fact that some have made foolish interpretations of such
statements, and have even gone further in making other implausible
claims, etc., is not evidence against the original statements,
especially since neither of us gives any credence to them in deciding
matters of purport, and said statements are not even part of the
present discussion in any event.

> Finally, of course with ingenuity, passages can be given any meaning one
> chooses, depending on one's predilection for considering the jaagrat.h
> avasthaa.

The point is, again, that there needs to be a predisposition to enable
the considering of the "jaagrat.h avasthaa" as having a certain nature,
in order even to give your style of interpretation.  However, said
predisposition is not coming from Shruti at all, and your accusation
might well apply to yourself with very slight change.

> But the import of the passages I see in shruti urge otherwise.
> As Vidya correctly observed, the basic premises in advaita and dvaita are
> radically different and there is no point discussing ad nauseam about all the
> tangential issues (read, issues in which the observer is removed from the
> discussion). Classical examples of tangential issues, "How did Ishvara
> appear?", "Why is he free from Maya?", so on and so forth.

This idea, that these are "tangential issues," appears to be a rather
original and recent creation, based upon what questions an Advaitin can
_hope_ to answer, and which he cannot.  Those which he can somehow
answer, albeit not with any chance of defending against criticism, are
"radically different," and by that it is hoped that those few points at
least might be insulated from any kind of analytical assault.  All the
rest, which cannot be so insulated at all, are "tangential issues,"
babies abandoned to the pursuing wolves so that the core of the tribe
may survive.

If you actually look closely, this entirely subjective distinction of
"basic premises" and "tangential issues" is not made by any of the real
scholars, and to do the same would simply label one's thesis as a
non-doctrine.  Even the qualification "where the observer is removed
from the discussion," is not sufficient, since that itself can be
considered a point of difference.

> In another response Vidya wrote:
>
> >> svataH pramANa, even) for there being many perceivers; what cognition
> >> exists to show that there is only one?
> >
> >No cognition, but Sruti. "yatra tvasya sarvam AtmaivAbhUt ...", "neha
> >nAnAsti kincana", etc. We cannot present evidence for absence of anything,
>
> Such a cognition exists in deep sleep, does it not? From the point
> of view, of the waking state, what you say is perfectly true
> though. An impartial analysis would of course say that "cognition to
> show that there is only one", exists in deep sleep, or swoon. So
> says shruti, too (BU in particular). This is ofcourse rejecting the
> possibility of no perceiver, by using our old friend, the infinite
> regress.

It is amazing that you continually find it convenient to bring up logic
just whenever it appears to suit your purpose, and yet say the next
moment that logic does not help reach the ultimate purpose, etc.

And as I already said, scratching beneath the surface, Shruti does not
indicate that in sushhupti there is only one; such a postulation is
needed as an ad hoc hypothesis that is needed to interpret Shruti in
that fashion, and thus cannot be presented as its conclusion.

> Ramakrishnan.
> --
> Utinam logica falsa tuam philosophiam totam suffodiant (May faulty logic
> undermine your entire philosophy)           -- strong Vulcan curse

How ironic you should say that...

Regards,

Shrisha Rao