An Interesting article - any response?

[egodust]

Shrisha Rao wrote:
> Frank Maiello wrote:
>
> > The entire dvaitic conception is based on the idea that the jiva is real.
> > On the 'path' to moksha, what does it matter if it's considered so or not?
>
> It matters because unless there is a real entity needing moksha, there
> cannot be moksha at all.  Just as unless there is a real person
> needing food, there cannot be a meal.  Thus, any path that does not
> consider the mumukshu to be real is not a path to moksha at all.
>

Concur.  Thus there is no 'path' leading to 'moksha.'  'Moksha' is clearly a
fiction applicable to the fiction of relativity, where jnana and ajnana are
conceivable.  These are conjurable phantasms of the alleged Mind that somehow
spins its own astoundingly fantastic maya.  When its epic adventure into
infinite delusion is shattered, the whole polemic argument [of dvaita/advaita]
collapses as clean as a fog in a dream upon awakening to the fresh blast of
sunrise.

namaste.

_____________

Frank Maiello
"Who am I apart from Thee?"
http://digital.net/~egodust

>From  Fri Dec  6 15:15:33 1996
Message-Id: <FRI.6.DEC.1996.151533.0700.>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 15:15:33 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <M.120696.162528.83 at ddi.digital.net> from "egodust" at Dec 6,
        96 09:25:28 pm
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Frank Maiello wrote:

> Shrisha Rao wrote:
> > Frank Maiello wrote:
> >
> > > The entire dvaitic conception is based on the idea that the jiva is real.
> > > On the 'path' to moksha, what does it matter if it's considered so or not?
> >
> > It matters because unless there is a real entity needing moksha, there
> > cannot be moksha at all.  Just as unless there is a real person
> > needing food, there cannot be a meal.  Thus, any path that does not
> > consider the mumukshu to be real is not a path to moksha at all.
> >
>
> Concur.  Thus there is no 'path' leading to 'moksha.'  'Moksha' is clearly a
> fiction applicable to the fiction of relativity, where jnana and ajnana are
> conceivable.

Non sequitur.  Your conclusion does not follow from your premise.  The
fact that any path that does not consider the mumukshu to be real is
not one to moksha, does not imply that moksha, or any path to it, is
fiction.  There is no inference rule that would lead from that premise
to such a conclusion, and it is easy to see why such a one is
impossible.

> These are conjurable phantasms of the alleged Mind that somehow
> spins its own astoundingly fantastic maya.  When its epic adventure
> into infinite delusion is shattered, the whole polemic argument [of
> dvaita/advaita] collapses as clean as a fog in a dream upon
> awakening to the fresh blast of sunrise.

All of that is an extraneous prevarication unrelated to, and not
following from, anything said previously.

Regards,

Shrisha Rao

> Frank Maiello

>From  Fri Dec  6 16:10:10 1996
Message-Id: <FRI.6.DEC.1996.161010.0700.>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 16:10:10 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.16.19961206152934.2cf77e0a at mail.jetlink.net> from "Charles
        A. Hillig" at Dec 6, 96 07:29:34 am
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Charles A. Hillig wrote:

> At 07:37 PM 12/5/96 -0700, you wrote:
> >Charles A. Hillig wrote
> >
> >> >>      Any attempt to seek a time-based, linear "causality" ignores the
 fact
> >> >> that cause and effect are, quintessentially, the same thing because they
> >> > >"both" arise simultaneously.
> >> >
> >> >Or, in other words, we dream at the same time as we are wakeful?
> >>
> >>        We are neither "dreaming" nor are we ever "wakeful."
> >
> >In which case, the "arise simultaneously" is false?
> >
>
>           No.  I'm suggesting that "everything" is "happening" at the same
> "time."

You're saying different things alternately.

  1> You say neither happens.
  2> You say both happen at the same time.

There is an obvious conflict between the two, and unless you pick one
of the two as your firm thesis, your view would have to be rejected
as an inconsistent muddle.

> >>        "We" are not really here at all.
> >
> >Who is "we"?
>
> We can't really answer if "we're" not really "here."

That statement invokes "we," and is thus self-contradictory.

> >>       Only the Self is present
> >
> >What is the Self?
>
> The Self is "what is."  It is one without a second.

If that is the definition of the Self, then "Only the Self is present"
has no meaning, since one cannot invoke a property of definition as
one of qualification as well, with reference to nothing else.  That's
a epistemic feedback loop hanging free, with no basis or grounding.

If you say the Self is unique and cannot be given a basis, etc., then
that is a condition indistinguishable from one where a person
describes something false or illogical, and is unable to provide
support when asked.  Your thesis of the Self is indistinguishable from
a thesis of a rabbit's horn, and even the latter could be justified on
similar or identical grounds.

> >>       As Maharshi has said,  the so-called dream world and the waking world
> >> are  exactly the same.
> >
> >But since "we" are not here, neither is the Maharshi, nor his
> >statement.
>
> That's true.  Only the Self is present.

Which is an admission of self-contradiction on your part.  As you are
doubtless aware, in Vedantic discussion as well as in worldly matters
like sentential logic, legal debate, etc., a self-contradiction is
sufficient to reject the thesis on the side of which it occurs.

> >Also, since "we" never either wake nor dream, what weight
> >to the alleged equivalence of the "dream world" and the "waking
> >world."
>
>    Neither the "dream world" nor the "walking world" is real.
>    Reality is "that which persists."      The Self.

If the "dream world" and the "waking world" are not real, then how can
there even be any persistence?  Persistence across what?  Two
illusions?  If that is the case, then the Self, "that which persists,"
is illusory as well, for merely being a persistent common found in two
illusions.

> >>            One just SEEMS to last longer.
> >
> >I seem to think that the "SEEMS" is itself a part of the sense of
> >waking.  So how can that be true when the latter isn't?
>
> Things are not what they seem.

That can only be so if things *are*, period.  If they have no reality,
then "things are not what they seem" has no meaning.

> >> >>      However, just because I see an intense movie during the waking
 state
> >> >> and then dream about that movie at night, it still doesn't mean that the
> >> >> movie is "real" or that the characters and action really, in fact,
> > occurred.
> >> >
> >> >Of course it occurred.  Movies are made at tremendous cost, etc.; they
> >> >don't happen by themselves.
> >>
> >>          But the "characters" on the screen that triggered an emotional
> >> response were only flickering lights.
> >
> >>         The reality supporting the illusion was still only the unbroken
> >> screen.
> >
> >-- and the flickering lights, which are different from the screen, and
> >from oneself.
>
> The point is that, in a good movie, we don't experience the screen.  We only
> experience the movie.  We are mesmerized by an illusion.

And what about a bad movie?  Also, the experience of the movie is
hardly an illusion.  The screening is real, the lights are real, the
projector is real, the reels are real, the sound is real, etc.

> >> >>      The variety of dream-objects manifesting as part of the dream was,
> >> >> seemingly, only triggered by the illusory variety of objects that
 appeared
> >> >> as the movie on the screen.
> >> >
> >> >... which in turn was "triggered" by what?
> >>
> >>             Obviously, the analogy has its limitations.
> >
> >Not the analogy, but the theory it attempts to support.  The analogy
> >is fine.
>
> No, it's basically limited.  Words can never describe the pure consciousness
> that is the Self.

Which can be said about a rabbit's horn as well.  How is this any
different?  Also, "words can never describe..." is itself a
description of the Self, and in fact, you have also given other
descriptions like "pure consciousness," "one without a second," etc.
Self-contradiction (pun intended).

> As they say, the "map is not the territory."  Well, in this case, there are
> a lot of so-called "maps" but the real irony is that there's no "territory"
> that's "out there" that can be ventured into.  The Self is fully present.

If there is no territory, there can be no map.  That is against the
concept of maps.  And in fact, if someone paints, say, a Picasso
imitation, that has to have a real Picasso as its basis.  One cannot
posit a universe with only Picasso imitations around, because then
they would not qualify as imitations at all, and their qualification
as "Picasso imitations" would be meaningless.  In the same way, one
cannot have the concept of maps when there is no territory, because
said concept cannot be conceived or defined then.

> >> >>      But didn't the screen, itself, still remain seamless, undivided,
 and
> >> >> whole?
> >> >
> >> >... and different from oneself as well?
> >>
> >
> >>      No, not different.  The perceiver and the perceived are one and the
> >> same.
> >
> >Ah.  In that case, you're saying that I myself am the screen upon
> >which the movie is projected?  But since the perception of the screen
> >is part of the experience of waking, wouldn't the latter then become
> >true as well?
>
> To continue with this limited analogy, you are the infinte screen that's
> only pretending to be one of the characters that's being projected upon it.

That's fine, but even then, the projector is something else, not the
screen itself; the act of projection is also different from the screen
itself.

> The essence of the Self is to be what it is by pretending to become
> what it isn't.

If the self is "one without a second," etc., it cannot pretend to
become something other than itself, because pretense is only possible
when there is something else to pretend to be.

Regards,

Shrisha Rao

>                                            Chuck Hillig