[Advaita-l] ***UNCHECKED*** Re: [advaitin] rope has some problem in rope snake analogy :-)

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,
Thanks for the references.

From your quotes, it appears that the vivaraNakAra is providing two
possible options for the superimposition of ahamkAra onto the self. In the
first alternative,  ahamkAra is superimposed onto the self, and in the
second, there is a second, mithyA ahamkAra created in the self.

The opponent alleges two defects in the first alternative - there is no
consonance between the example and exemplified and that this is tantamount
to anyathAkhyAti.

The siddhAntin responds by saying that the mind along with the ego is
superimposed onto the self and therefore it is anyathAkhyAti.

However, more importantly to our discussion, he goes on to say
अन्यसन्निधानादन्यस्मिन्मिथ्याधर्मावभास इत्येतावति दृष्ठान्तः - where an
attribute present in one locus falsely appears in another due to the
proximity of the former object, and that is the limit to which the example
and exemplified are linked.

In the tattva deepana commentary to the vivaraNa, there is the first
reference to the creation of a mithyA redness in the crystal in describing
the opponent's objection.

However interestingly, this sentence occurs in the commentary - यद्यपि
मन्मते धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः; तथाऽपि त्वन्मते सर्वत्राऽऽरोपमात्रोपगमाद्
दृष्टान्तासिद्धिमाशङ्कय दूषणान्तरमाह - अन्यथेति - seems to say that the
creation of a new mithyA attribute is the opponent's view (manmatam, as the
opponent is speaking) whereas only the false association is admitted in
both the example and exemplified (sarvatra AropamAtra upagamAt) by the
siddhAntin's.

It is difficult to be 100% certain of who represents "manmatam" and
"tvanmatam" from some quotes without the context of where they occur in the
overall text, but because the word anyathA occurs in the opponent's
statement in the original, it appears that the commentary is explaining the
thinking of the opponent - and it is the opponent who holds the creation of
a new dharma, not the siddhAntin.

With that as a general understanding, this is how I understand the text.

1) On the face of it, it appears the opponent holds the creation of a new
mithyA redness in the crystal. The siddhAntin holds to the false appearance
redness in the crystal due to the proximity of the flower (ie a transposing
of the flower's redness).

2)  This leads him to allege a non-consonance between the example and the
exemplified, because the siddhAntin holds that a new mithyA ego is not
created in the self. Hence, नायं दृष्टान्तः - the crystal where a new
redness is created ( according to the opponent)  cannot be an example for
the self and the ego because a new ego is not created (in the first
example).

3) Then , he argues from the siddhAntin's position of where no new redness
is created in the crystal, but a redness from the flower is merely
transferred erroneously onto the crystal. Here he alleges anyathAkhyAti.
Hence, दृष्टान्तासिद्धिमाशङ्कय दूषणान्तरमाह - अन्यथेति.

The response from the siddhAntin to these two charges is अहङ्कारस्य स्वधर्म
सहितस्यैवात्मन्यध्यस्ततया मिथ्यात्वान्नान्यथाख्याति प्रसङ्गः - this is not
anyathAkhyAti where superimposition is not admitted. There is a
superimposition of the mind along with its attribute, hence it is mithyA
and not anyathAkhyAti, which alleges that an attribute elsewhere appears
somewhere else because of alaukika sannikarSha.

As Chandramouli ji says in the other email, even where there is no new
redness created in the crystal, there is anirvachanIya khyAti to the
sambandha of the redness and the crystal - the sambandha is not asat,
because the crystal appears red. It is not sat, because the sambandha is
sublated when the flower is removed. The appearance is sadasat vilakshaNam.

The consonance between the example and exemplified is limited to
अन्यसन्निधानादन्यस्मिन्मिथ्याधर्मावभास इत्येतावति दृष्ठान्तः (sic) - the
false appearance of an attribute in an object due to the proximity of
another object is the extent to which there is consonance between the
example and exemplified.

In the case of the ego, mind and the self, there is a svarUpa adhyAsa
between the mind and the self which leads to the appearance of the ego that
belongs to the mind to appear in the self. In the case of the crystal,
there is a samsargAdhyAsa leading to the false appearance of the redness of
the flower onto the crystal, without there being a tAdAtmyAdhyAsa between
the crystal and the flower.

So in general, the example and the exemplified are different because there
are two different adhyAsa-s taking place. However, the vivaraNakAra says
that the utility of the example is limited to saying that an attribute of
one object falsely appears elsewhere, and to that extent the example
applies.

In my view, that is not in contradiction with the VP.

Now, this response is entirely based on the passages quoted by you. I may
have misunderstood the intent of the authors, but without knowing the
context of where exactly in the book this appears, it is difficult to do
much more than that at this stage.

If you want me to review further, please provide page numbers / editions of
the books where these passages occur. I would be happy to review them in
detail and get back to you.

Kind regards,
Venkatraghavan




On Fri, 29 Dec 2023, 19:45 Sudhanshu Shekhar, <sudhanshu.iitk at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Namaste Venkat ji.
>
> //In my view, the panchapAdika quote is saying that the mithyAtva of the
> redness of the crystal is because that redness of the crystal (स्फटिकमणेः
> लोहितिमा) is a result of the association with the crystal (उपधाननिमित्तः),
> ie it is not a property that the crystal possesses intrinsically, a
> property belonging to the upAdhi appears in the crystal - atasmin
> tadbuddhih//
>
> PanchapAdikA uses the drishTAnta of crystal and red flower for AtmA and
> ahamkAra for the appearance of Dharma of ahamkAra, kartritva, in AtmA. Just
> as redness, a property of red flower, appears in crystal. PanchapAdikA goes
> in detail just immediately afterwards and rejects both akhyati and anyath.
>
> Here VivaraNa says -- 
> ननु अहङ्कारधर्मस्यात्मन्यारोपमात्रं क्रियते ? किं वा मिथ्यैव
> धर्मान्तरमुत्पद्यत इति ?
> (1) Whether only superimposition of Dharma of ahamkAra is done in Atman OR
> (2) dharmAntara is produced (mithyA kartritva) in Atman.
>
> पूर्वस्मिन् नायं दृष्टान्तः, अन्यथाख्यातिश्च स्यात् ।
>
> If we hold the first option, then the drishTAnta (of red flower) will
> become inapplicable and it will be anyathA-khyAti.
>
> उत्तरस्मिन् सत्य-मिथ्याकर्तृत्वद्वयावभासः स्यात् ?
>
> In case of later, (the drishTAnta will be applicable) and there will be
> perception of two kartritva, one Satya (belonging to ahamkAra) and other
> mithyA (appearing in Atman) (just as it happens in red crystal)
>
> उच्यते-अहङ्कारस्य स्वधर्म सहितस्यैवात्मन्यध्यस्ततया
> मिथ्यात्वान्नान्यथाख्याति प्रसङ्गः, अन्यसन्निधानादन्यस्मिन्मिथ्याधर्मावभास
> इत्येतावति दृष्ठान्तः ।
>
> Here it is said - since ahamkAra is superimposed in AtmA along with its
> Dharma (kartritva) and is hence mithyA, there is no occasion of
> anyathA-khyAti. And the drishTAnta is meant for perception of mithyA-dharmA
> somewhere else due to sannidhAna of other.
>
>
> अथवा - कर्तृत्वद्वयेऽपि धर्मिणोरेकत्वापत्त्या धर्माभेदावभास इत्यविरोधः ।
>
> Or else, there are two kartritva -- but since the dharmI are one, there is
> perception of non-difference of both. (Here the drishTAnta applies in full
> force. MithyA kartritva is produced in AtmA wherein Satya kartritva is
> superimposed on account of swarUpa adhyAsa of ahamkAra).
>
> ================
>
> Pl see Tattva Deepana
>
> उक्तमर्थमाक्षिपति - नन्विति ॥
>
> दृष्टान्ते मिथ्यालौहित्यस्योत्पन्नत्वाद् दृष्टान्त
> दाष्टन्तिकयोर्वैषम्यमाह  पूर्वस्मिन्निति ॥ (Pl note, the drishTAnta holds
> the production of mithyA lauhitya). In the first option, where only
> superimposition of kartritva is done and no production of mithyA kartritva
> is considered, there is drishTAnta dArshTAntika vaishamya on this count.
>
> यद्यपि मन्मते धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः; तथाऽपि त्वन्मते
> सर्वत्राऽऽरोपमात्रोपगमाद् दृष्टान्तासिद्धिमाशङ्कय दूषणान्तरमाह - अन्यथेति ।
>
> द्वितीयं दूषयति- उत्तरस्मिन्निति ॥ अहंकार-
> गतसत्यकर्तृत्वमात्मगतमिथ्याकर्तृत्वं चेति कर्तृत्वद्वयप्रतिभासप्रसङ्ग
> इत्यर्थः । (As per drishTAnta)
>
> पक्षद्वयोक्तदोषस्यापि नानुषङ्ग इत्याह-उच्यत इति ॥
> अन्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गमुक्तं निरस्यति - अहंकारस्येति । अन्यथाख्यातिमतेऽन्यत्र
> सत्यरूप्यादेः संसर्गमात्रस्यारोप्यत्वम्, अत्र तु
> धर्मविशिष्टस्याहंकारस्यारोपोपगमान्नान्यथाख्यातिरित्यर्थः । (Had there been
> no swarUpa adhyAsa of ahamkAra, it would have been a case of
> anyathA-khyAti. But here since superimposition of Dharma along with dharmI,
> hence no anyathA-khyAti)
>
> So would there be drishTAnta asiddhi as no mithyA kartritva is accepted to
> be produced?
>
>  तर्हि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः,
>
> तत्र धर्म - धर्मिणोरध्यस्तताऽनङ्गीकरणा- दित्याशङ्कयाह- अन्यसन्निधानादिति ॥
>  As above--
>
> पक्षान्तराङ्गीकारेऽपि न दोषानुषङ्ग इत्याह- अथवेति ॥
> धर्मिणोरहंकारात्मनोरिति यावत् ।
> As above
> ==================================
>
> It is clear from these discussions that
>
> (1) the drishTAnta accepts production of mithyA redness of crystal.
>
> (2) There is no mention of eye-contact with red flower.
>
> (3) There is non-productiom of mithyA kartritva in Atman only because
> ahamkAra is swarUpa adhyasta in AtmA . Had this not been so, by the very
> force of drishTAnta, one has to accept production of mithyA kartritva in
> Atman.
>
> (4) Even production of mithyA kartritva is accepted by the very force of
> drishTAnta. Note that no eye contact etc is even imaginable in case of
> ahamkAra.
>
> This whole discussion of eye-contact with red flower is a non-issue in the
> given discussion and everywhere else. It is accepted everywhere that
> redness-of-crystal is mithyA. By the force thereof, VivaraNa accepts two
> kartritva also. Only because there is swarUpa adhyAsa of ahamkAra, that it
> is not needed.
>
> Just a little before, it has been clarified by PanchapAdikA as to how
> redness-of-crystal cannot be redness-of-flower.
>
> ===========
>
> Regards.
>
>
>